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ABSTRACT 
The thesis is comprised of four parts. The first, consisting of two . 
chap, ters, challenges some generally accepted views about the 1930's as 
a whole and emphasises the change in political consciousness that 
occurred in the minds of ordinary people. The ideology of the B. U. F. 
is analysed in the context of the decade. 
The second part, consisting of five chapters, provides a detailed history 
of the B. U. F. in the North of England from the days of its precursor, the 
New Party, to the detention of the leading B. U. F. members in 1940- 
Much of the history of the movement is concerned with Manchester though 
attention is also paid to other areas in the North of England. The 1938 
Manchester municipal elections also receive attention, because of the 
campaigns waged by the B. U. F. candidates. This is the first major 
regional study of the B. U. F. 
The third part deals with the ordinary membership of the B. U. F. in the 
North of England. The two chapters in this section assess previous 
judgements regarding B. U. P. membership and make use of interviews and 
unpublished manuscripts to provide the most detailed analysis of the 
membership of a British Pascist party. 
The final part of the thesis consistsq firstlyq of a detailed account of 
the reaction of the Jewish community, both nationally and in-thrighesterg to 
the anti-Semitism of the B. U. P., and, secondly, the attitude of the police, 
j#diciary, local authorities and the government to the rise of the 
British Union of Fascists. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In spi-teof the many words written on British Fascism we have still been 
left with gaping holes in our knowledge of the British Union of Fascists 
in the 1930's. In particular, we have no detailed regional study of 
Fascism available in publication. Similarly we have lacked a detailed 
analysis of the ordinary membership of Mosley's movement. 
The reasons for this situation are clear. The history of the movement 
has been written Trom the top down'. So, for example, the available 
analysis of the membership of the B. U. P. has dealt with the top 100 
members of the movement, and the analysis of the ideology of the B. U. P. 
has concentrated on the output of literature from the National Headquarters 
of the movement and the ideas emanating from Mosley himself. No attempt 
has been made by previous historians of the B. U. P. to discover what 
ordinary B. U. P. members were thinking and doing. 
This thesis challenges some generally accepted views about the B. U. F. by 
reversing the order of analysis. National leaders of the movementj 
including Mosley himself, only appear in the following pages when they 
are either crucial to an understanding of the ordinary membershipp 
illuminate the general picture of the B. U. P. 9 or when they appear 
in the 
North of England, the area studied in this thesis. 
Not only are previous histories of the B-U-F- challenged. The general 
approaoh of this thesis allows us to provide an alternative view of the 
1930's from that currently fashionable. The 'revisionist' view of the 
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decade is analysed and new evidence, relating to-changes in political 
consciousness, is provided, vhich challenges the revisionists view of 
a politically stable decade. 
The argumnts in this thesis rest on two approaches which have been 
lacking in previous accounts of the history of the B. U. F. Firstly, the 
rise of Fascism in Britain in the 1930's is seen in relation to the 
long term development of capitalist society. In particular, to the 
development of a more conservative authoritarian state. This approach 
differs radically from that of other published histories of the B. U. P., 
which have rested on an unstated ? celebration of Western democracy'. 
Secondly, this study makes use of research techniques drawn from new 
ways of writing history, epitomised by the 'History Workshop' movement, 
This means, for example, in the case of this study, that political 
labels which have traditionally been attached to peoplek have to be 
questioned. The analysis of the membership of the M. P. in this thesis 
suggests that many people, while 'Fascist' in the sense that they were 
members of a Fascist movement, did not display the characteristics normally 
associated with the term 'Fascist' as it is popularly known. Similarlyp 
it is wrong to assume that all anti-Fascist activistsAn the 1930's 
were 'Communist'. Simple labelling of this sort, often in a way in which 
'Fascist' and 'Communist' degenerate into terms of general abuseq 
disguises the rich political mixture of the community at large and adds 
to the general de-politicisine of a generaticn of people characteristic 
of the approach of the 'revisionist' historians* 
Another approach to the history of the B. U. P. which is lacking in 
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previous accounts of the movement is a recognition of the strength and 
significance of oral testimony. In the course of this thesis members of 
the B. U. F. and others speak in their own words, not just to impart 
knowledge about the movement as a whole but to reveal also something 
of themselves and their motivations. This is not the place to discuss 
the merits or otherwise of oral history. Part of the answer to that can 
be found in the following pages. However one observation must be made here. 
In the case of the members of the B. U. F., no quantitative analysis can 
be made. The results are essentially impressionistic. The reason for 
this is that it is not in the nature of oral history to attempt to 
interview, say, a 20% sample of membership. In any case, it would be 
impossible with the membership of the B. U. F. Tracing the members who 
have been interviewed has, to say the least, been frought with difficulties, 
and not a little danger, though some were very pleased to be interviewed. 
The results of those interviews shed new light on the B. U. P. in the 
1930's- 
Since the B. U. P. was involved in many confrontations with anti-Pascistsp 
I have devoted part of this thesis to an analysis of the response of the 
community to the spectacle of uniformed Fascists on the streets of Britain* 
The response of the Jewish community is particularly interestingg but 
it was not only the Jewish community which had to detennine its response 
to Fascism. The State, too, had to respond. The final part of this t4esis 
deals in particular with the response of the police, the judiciaryp local 
authorities and the government, to the B. U. F. Those responses provide 
a new insight into the part that Fascism plays in a parliamentary democracy, 
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This thesis would not have been possible without the help and 
encouragement of many people. I would like to express my thanks to the 
following members of the B. U. F. who agreed to be interviewed: Mr J. 
Charnley, Mrs A. Barlow, Mr. A. Collinge, Mr J. Hamm, Mr G. P. Sutherst, 
Mr W. Eaton, Mr A. Fawcett, Mr. B. Row, Mr T. Pickles, Mr R. R. Bellamy, 
Miss N. Driver. Mr Bellamy and Miss Driver very generouKy allowed me 
to inspect their unpublished manuscripts and Mr. Fawcett gave me 
permission to reproduce a letter to him from the Deutsoher Fichte=Bund e. V. 
Mr Bellamy also wrote to me and in doing so provided further detailed 
information about the B. U. F. under his control in the Not-th of England, 
Miss Driver's unpublished autobiography From the Shadows of Exile is a 
remarkable document and has been indispensable in the writing of this 
thesis. The transcripts of the taped interviews and a copy of Miss 
Driver's MS will be made available in the Library of the University of 
Bradford. 
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Public Records Office; Manchester University Library; Bradford University 
Library; Bradford Central Libraxy; University of Birmingham Library. 
The staff of all these institutiozis have been most helpful. Mr J. Hamm and 
Mr B. Row, both members of the Directorate of the Union Movement were 
ve7 helpful to me and I would like to thank them for their patience. 
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PART ONE; 
BRITISH FASCISM IN TIM CONTEXT OP TBE 1030's 
I 
CHILPTER ONE 
THE LANDSCAPE OF THE 1930's 
The period of history bounded by the advent of the second Labour 
government and the beginning of the Second World War has perhaps 
attracted more attention from journalistsq film-and television 
producers andq indeed, the public at largeq than any other decade 
in British history. 
This response is understandable. The period is within living 
memory, and many people can talk and write about the 1930's with 
the authority of experience. It was a decade in which the recording 
of sound and vision came into its own. Newsreels and films of 
contemporary life captured the imagination of millions of oinema 
goers. The events and occasions which people still remember 
achieved a significance which reached new heights and which has 
not lessened with the passing of time. 
9 
The 1930's were the years of the Islumpt. The decade has becomeg in 
popular parlanceg the definitive Depression* It has been described 
as the 'Devils' Decade' and the 'Low dishonest decade'. Unemploymentj 
the Means Test, hunger marchesq Fasoism and appeasement were the 
symbolic features of such descriptions. 
Even at the time however, many people were able to observe that it 
was a case of poverty in the midst of plenty. The first major history 
of the period, published in 1955t considered that: 
2 
Recovery, despaired of in 1931, was in the air 
by 19339 obvious by 1935. The National government 
got little thanks for it, partly because it did 
not deserve it... partly because recovery, like 
the depression, was uneven, so that the misery of 
the depressed areas drew attention away from the 
return of prosperity elsewhere. This was the basis 
for the myth, sedulously propogated laterv of the 
'hungry thirties'. The reality was rather different* 
As more data and information became available, economic historians 
began to substantiate Mowat's view of the period and continued 
the revision of the traditionally gloomy view of the -1930's. - 
A-new---orthodoxy has grown up which, until recently, rested on an 
analysis of Britains economic performance during the 19301s. The 
debate has centred on the long term growth of the economy. The first 
assault on the traditional view of economic stagnation and under- 
utilisation of resources appeared in 1961 and emphasised the growth 
of new industries. 
2 The arguement was later extended to deal with 
the economic recovery of the decade compared with economic 
performance in the 1920, B. 
3 With the increasing availability 
of economic data for the 1930's and the compilation of indices of 
growth, this 'revisionist' arguments has become a somewhat orthodox 
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school of thought. 
More recently the revisionism has extended to an analysis of social 
and political questions. It is to this controversial field of study 
that particular attention is paid herep since it is of crucial 
importance in understanding the history of the British Union of 
3 
Fascists in the period. 
The arguments3 of recent revisionists rest on data concerning four 
specific areas* Firstly there is a concentration on the various 
social investigations carried out during the 1930's, which dealt 
with the problems of poverty and health. 
In the nineteenth century the works of Disraeli, Dickens, 'Mayhew, 
Boothp Gissing and Rowntree, set the seal on the merit of social 
investigations in the understanding of contemporary life. The 
twentieth century has seen a continuation of such works, with the 
emphasis moving away from the Metropolis to the more distant 
industrial conurbations. The post war period produced a flood of 
new surveys which reflected the growing concern with post-war 
unemployment and poverty. 
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The social investigations continued right throughout the 1930'sy 
with the various regions of Britain receiving particular attention. 
The North East was studied by MIGonigle and Kirby in 19379 
Manchester and Liverpool by Allen Hutt in 1933.7 Rowntree 
surveyed the standard of living in York and compared it with the 
results of hid first survey conducted in 1899.8 Liverpool and 
Manchester also received the attention of social investigators to 
add to the work carried out by Hutt. 
9 John Boyd Orr90G. D. H. Cole 
and M. Cole 
11 
and Fenner Brockway 
12 
added their voicesp as did 
many other commentators, to the growing evidence of social and 
economic deprivation, 
4 
The fact that social investigations, census returns, official 
inquiries and commissions had been in existence in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries enabled comparisons to be made, in 
the light of which the conclusions drawn by some historians about 
the quality of life in the 1930's seem convincing. In spite of the 
poverty, ill health and bad housing, ' all exacerbated by unemployment, 
social conditions had not deteriorated during the decade and there 
were signs of improvement. Many people were indeed "condemned to 
live in poverty, ill health and poor housing, whatever the passing 
movements of the trade cycle or the short term policies of the 
government.,, 
13 What was of greater importance was the rate of 
improvement. Many commentators felt that not enough was being 
done to help the poor, the unemployed and the ill, or to improve 
housing conditions. They were critical of what they considered 
to be government complacency in dealing with the numerous social 
problems* 
A second area of interest to revisionist historians draws on the 
work of economic historians in the 1960's and 1970's and their 
emphasis on the emergence of boom towns with low unemployment. Thus 
a very different picture from that traditionally presented is 
arrived at. In the past more attention has been paid to towns such 
as Jarrow or Merthyr, with 67.8% and 61.9% unemployment raspectively 
in 1934, than to Coventry (5.1% unemployed) or St, Albans (3.9% 
unemployed) in the same period. Similarly the decline of the staple 
industries has received the attention of historians and economists 
at the expense of the new growth areas of the economy. The recent 
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change in emphasis has focused attention on the growth of the 
economy as a whole in the 1930's rather than on the stagnation 
and decline of certain key sectors, 
14 
The new industries, such as those producing vehicles or electrical 
goods, fostered the growth of prosperous suburbs which were the 
antithesis of Jarrow and Merthyr. For those in employment everywhere, ' 
however, 'a new found prosperity was experienced as the standard of 
living increased throughout the decade. The increase in real wages 
depended of course on the cost of living index, which fell by a 
third between 1920 and 1939. Most of this fall occurred in the early 
19301s. For those in employment, 'average real wages rose by 15% in 
the 1920's alone*15 The increase in disposable income was reflected 
in the queues outside the new cinemas, car production for the home 
market and the ribbon development of new houses along the sides of 
the new arterial roads* The new homes contained the products of 
the booming electrical goods industries vacuum cleanersy cookersp 
radios and electric ironsl'powered by the equally booming electricity 
supply industry. 
A third area of concern to recent historians has been the response 
of the electorate to the governments handling of unemployment and 
I 
the depression in the economy. Historians are now turningg with a 
psephologis? s eyep to the elections of the 1930's. The overiding 
impression one gains from such analysis is the stability of British 
politics during the decade. The second Labour government suffered 
a landslide defeat inthe general election of 1931. For many the 
6 
defeat wassseen as a result of the betrayal of MacDonaldland-1-the -i 
subsequent desertion of the party by its working class supporters. 
The question now being asked is "if there had been no split in the 
party, no rushed election in 1931, what would Labour's electoral 
? 
tt16 chances have been. The answer is provided by an analysis of by- 
election results between 1929 and 1931 and of the general election 
returns. 
Whether or not MacDonald had deserted the Labour Party, the general 
election of 1931 would have been lost, The 1929 election had been 
won by Labour by gaining control of a large number of marginal seats. 
Only a slight reversal would be needed for the party to lose them, 
In addition over 40% of the Labour seats were won on a'minority 
vote in three-cornered contests. Labour had won more seats than the 
Conservative Party, on fewer votes. 
The state of the other main party also affected Labour's electoral 
fortunes. The vast majority of Liberal seats in the 1929 election 
had been-won on a minority vote mostly where the Conservatives 
were the next major party. Any movement of votes away from the 
Liberals would benefit the Conservatives rather than Labour. 
17 The 
1929 general election, then, had not been such aýsuccess for the 
Labour Party as many people had thought. The by-elections between 
1929 and 1931 emphasised the point, 'with large swings against the 
government throughout the period, This weak electoral positioný 
together with the defection of MacDonald and a united opposition to 
Labour, made a defeat for the government certain in 1931. 
7 
In spite of the defeat of 1931 the fact remains that, with the 
exception of 1929, Labour gained more votes in the general election 
of that year than ever before. 
18 This was a reflection of the large 
number of marginal seats the Labour Party held and the swing of the 
Liberal vote to the National government. The Labour Party regained 
much of the lost ground in the various by-elections between the 
general election of 1931 and 1935. Not only by-eleotions but 
municipal elections also, with the result that "Only a year after 
the debacle of 1931, Labour was again to be reckoned with in 
municipal p6litics. Any chance of a vacuum for extremist,, parties to 
exploit had gone. " 
19 
Labourb revival, however, had to be measyred against two very 
important concomitants. Firstly, the revival was far from nation 
wide. Secondly, the Liberal Party continued its rapid decline, with 
the Liberal voters either supporting the Conservatives or abstaining. 
Thus the 'middle ground' of British politics, the crucial factor in 
the outcome of the 1935 general election, was lost by Labour. 
20 Far 
from 'extremist' groups reaping the benefit of the political vacuum, 
the Communist Party, like the British Union of Fascists, failed to 
take advantage of the situation and remained on the fringe of 
British politics. The. 1middle ground' of British politics was 
captured by the National government and the prosperous employed had 
nothing to gain by joining either a Communist or Fascist movements 
"The primary reaction of the British electorate in the face of the 
depression was to vote for traditional parties and a majority voted 
in a decidedly conservative direction. " 
21 
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The Communist Party, in terms of electoral challange and also 
membership, is considered a failure. The growth and consolidation 
of a home grown Labour Party was more important than the 'alien 
philosophy' of communism. Neither the unemployed nor those in work 
supported left wing politics and the Communist Party remained a 
"revolutionary party in a non-revolutionary setting,, " 
22 
As for the impact of the left on the Labour Party: 
Might not the Labour Party in the 1930's have 
been used as an instrument for aiding the 
unemployed at home, restraining fascism abroad, 
or making a significant step towards the 
achievement of Socialism? The answer ... is that 
opportunities existed but were wasted - partly 
because of left wing pressure whicht far from 
encouraging brave initiatives, inhibited the 
Party leadership and restricted its room for 
'23 
manoeuvree 
The same writer also derides the impact of the Unity Campaign: 
That the United Front was entirely a fantasy was 
rapidly demonstrated by the Unity Campaign* The 
Popular Front might have had more substance: yet; 
based as it was on the extreme left, and aimed at 
masses, not at leaders, it was rightly perceived 
as having far more to do with a struggle for support 
within the Labour movement than with the realities 
of Whitehall and Westminster. 
24 
9 
The National Unemployed Workers Movement is similarly considered 
a failure in its overall political impact, which in turn was a 
result of its lack of success in challenging the existing leadership 
of the Labour Party and the T. U. C. in the areas of highest unemployment. 
25 
Similarly the hunger marches are considered "relatively obscure 
events, involving a restricted group of political activists. The 
view that hunger marches were a typical response to unemployment 
was very far from the truth. " 
26 
The progress of fascism in Britain is similarly charted. Here the 
argument. t rests mainly on the assumptions of other writers more 
closely concerned with the history of the British Union of Fascists. 
27 
However, it is suggested that the B. U. P. did not draw any significant 
support from the unemployed. The problem of unemployment is in 
fact singled out in an attempt to disprove the contention that the 
failure of the B. U. P. to attract support was due to the relatively 
less severe economic depression in this country compared1to other 
parts of the world. It is noted, for examplev that unemployment 
in the depressed areas was at least as severe as in Europe or 
America but that this did not lead to support of the B. U. F. by the 
unemployed or the middle classes in South Wales or Jarrow etc. The 
reason for this was that "the National Government provided a 
bulwark for these people against the Communists and in doing so 
condemned the B. U. F. to a relatively minor role. " 
28 
It is said that the B. U. F. had to contend with the 'civility' of 
British politics, whether myth or reality, and the dominance of 
10 
middle opinion in Britain. "The majority of British people chose 
to regard themselves as living in a relatively well-ordered, gentle 
society. " 
29- Hence the B. U. P. was doomed to failure rig1it from the 
start. 
While both*communists and fascists presented problems for the 
preservation of public order, the cohesiveness of British societyq 
it is argued, enabled such problems to be overcome without undue 
repression* 
30 
Finally, one of the main areas which the revisionists focus their 
attention on is that of unemployment. They emphasise the 'striking 
degree of normality' of the unemployed and their characteristic 
fatalism. Only a minority failed to 'adjust' to unemployment and 
turned to radical politics rather than settling down to life on the 
dole. While previous writers had noted that the depression affected 
Britain less severely than other countries, Stephenson and Cook, 
the chief revisionistsp'claim that comparing absolute figures of 
the number of unemployed is misleading and that "Britain, Germany 
and the United States had roughly comparable rates of unemployment 
when judged as a percentage of the labour force. Each country had 
three years when more than a fifth of the working population was 
out of a job.,, 
31 
Emphasis is placed on the different experiences of unemployment in 
this country compared with others, The onset of unemployment was 
less sudden than in the U. S. A. or Germany and thus, it is argued, 
II 
it was less the absolute level of unemployment which created 
political upheaval, than the rapidity of its onset. The depression 
and unemployment had become so familiarv it seems, that the 
unemployed thought that the remedy was beyond human control and 
there was nothing they could do about it. 
****** 
Perhaps there is a great deal to be said for the work of recent 
historians of the inter-war years, Maybe there is little room for 
disagreement when dealing with statistics of infant mortality rates 
or contagious diseases, or with cost of living indices and the 
measurement of unemployment in different areas of the country. The 
health of the country seemed to be improving. Unemployment was 
patchy and the growth industries produced boom towns. Unemployment 
did not, in fact, have a major impact on the political life of the 
nation as seen from the standpoint of the National government* 
Psephological data is similarly convincing. Election returns and 
the relative strength of political parties, both 'major' and 
'extreme' now seem to have been put beyond reasonable doubt. 
Howeirer it must be said that there is little originality in the 
work of recent revisionists. A selective use,, pnd over reliance on 
secondary sources has fed the prejudices of those commentators and 
politicians whop from a right wing standpoint, use the argaments3 
of the revisionists of the 1930's to reflect on the economic 
problems of the last third of the twentieth century. The significance 
12 
of this point was not lost on the publishers of Stevenson and 
Cook's book, since the blurb on the dustjacket tells us that "Not 
only are the conclusions drawn by the authors of historical - ýp r, 
importance, but they are increasingly relevant today in view of 
the revival of mass unemployment as a political and social issue 
of the 1970's. " 
A brief reply to the revisionists, which touches on the unreliability 
of their use of documentation has already been voiced, 
32 
and 
indicates, for eýmmple, that more care should be taken with the 
interpretation of unemployment data. The greater fluctuation 
within cyclical changes in the demand for labour in the inter war 
years has been ignored by Stevenson and Cook. 
33 This in turn affects 
the computation of real living standards. The difference between 
real wages and real standards of living is similarly commented 
upont which leads on th3the problem of quality of life. The authors 
of the reply quote E. P. Thompson on the matter, in a passage worth 
repeating at this point. 
... the term 'standard' leads us from data amenable 
to statistical measurement (wages or articles of 
consumption) to those satisfactions which are 
sometimes described by statistidians as 'imponderables'. 
From food we are led to homes, from homes to healthq 
from health to family life, and thence to leisuret 
work discipline, education and play, intensity of 
labour, and so on. From standards-of-life we pass to 
way-of-life. But the two are not the same. The first 
is a measurement of quantities: the second a 
description (and sometimes an evaluation) of qualities 
13 
It is quite possible for statistical averages 
and human experiences to run in opposite directions. 
A per capita, increase in quantitative factors may 
take place at the same time as a great qualitative 
disturbance in people's way of life, traditions, 
relationships, and sanctions. People may consume 
more goods and become less happy or less free at the 
same time. *034 
In ignoring the qualitative side of the argumenti, the revisionists 
have isolated improvements in living standards from the political 
context of the 1930's. One is here reminded of the nineteenth 
century standard of living debate amongst economic historians and 
which E. P. Thompson was alluding to. Protoganists from both sides 
of the debate have accumulated massive evidence concerning the price 
of wheat or potatoesq standards of housing and sanitationg life 
expectancy and child labour, to show that the standard of living had 
improved, or alter-natively, had declined, during the early decades 
of the nineteenth century, When the basic problem, the experience of 
living, is abstracted from wider considerations relating to the 
political context, the argupentl - becomes devalued. The masses of 
people around whom the debate revolves, i. e. the victims of the early 
years of the Industrial Revolutiong become dehumanised and depoliticised 
out of all recognition. 
Fortunately the history of the working class in the first half of 
the nineteenth century has begun to be rescued and the standard of 
living debate placed in its proper perspective. E. P. Thompson also 
has this to say of the living. -standards of early nineteenth century 
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working class people: 
All in all, it is an unremarkable record. In fifty 
years of the Industrial Revolution the working class 
share of the national product has almost certainly 
fallen relative to the share of the property-owning 
and professional classes. The 'average' working man 
remained very close to the subsistence level at a 
time when he was surrounded by the evidence of the 
increase in national wealth, much of its transparoncy 
the product of his own labour, and passing, by 
equally transparent means, into the hands of his 
employers. In psychological terms, this felt very 
much like a decline in standards. His own share in 
the lbenefits of economic progress' consisted of 
more potatoes, a few articles of cotton clothing for 
his family, soap and candlesp some tea and sugar, and 
a great many articles in the Economic History Revi ew. 
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The same view may be taken of the attempt to revise the history of 
the people of Britain in the 1930's. While we are dealing here with 
a debate concerning nineteenth century conditions, we might note in 
passing that many employers in the new booming industriesq such as 
automob iles and electrical goods etc. were quick to sWize on the 
lack of trade union representation in their factories and imposed 
what can only be described as Dickensian conditions on their 
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workers. This was certainly true of car workers in Oxford* 
In dealing with eleotions, Stevenson and Cook gloss over the 
atmosphere prevailing at the time of the 1931 Labour defeat. In 
attempting to dispel the notion of a panic election their selective 
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use of evidence provides no indication that "the most powerful 
weapon against the Labour Party was fear. , 
37 Nowhere can we find 
any evidence to suggest that in faojý the Bolshevik scare was almost 
as strong as in the previous Labour defeat in a general election in 
1924. 
Similarly the impact of the Communist Party in the 1930's is 
underestimated. The typical recruit, as evidenced by an examination 
below of radicalism in Manchester in the period, was not young and 
middle class, though the Party undoubtedly attracted such people. 
The influence of the Communist Party went far beyon4 what the low 
membership figures would suggest, and has to be. seen as an important 
concomitant in the change in political consciousness in the 1930's. 
In replying to the revisionists and providing the background to the 
history of the British Union of Fascists in the 1930's, one has to 
utilise a premise notable for its absence in the work of Stevenson 
and Cook. This is, as briefly noted above, that the political 
consciousness of a generation of people in the 1930's underwent 
considerable change. It wes due to this change in consciousness 
that people paid more attention to, and became more aware ofq the 
social and pobh6mielproblems of the age. Much of that change was 
due to the way people saw themselves in relation to others* There 
was a greater awareness of the presence of poverty, ill healthp bad 
housing and unemploymentq which wasp in part, brought about by the 
role of social investigatorsq the impact of the media and by the 
obvious fact that those problems did undoubtedly existq and, in the 
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'depressed areas', were all present in an acute form at the same 
time. 
In dealing with the failure of the Left in the 1930's one has, 
firstly, to consider the numerous defeats suffered by working class 
people and the Labour movement since the First World War. In this 
context the General Strike of 1926 is usually cited as the main 
defeat of working people. Yet the General Strike may be considered 
as the closing drama of post war unrest. 
That unrest was, in part, a continuation of evenjýs and trends 
during the First World War. The rising trade union membership and 
Labour Party support was accompqnied by more militant action in 
different parts of the country, with the formationýof the Shop 
Stewards movement and the Clyde workers committee. The Russian 
Revolution of 1917 inspired vast numbers of people in the Labour 
movement and was even applauded by McDonald and Snowden* 
38 In 1919 
discontent simmered in the armed forces over the method of 
demobilisation. In Glasgow and Dublin general strikes were called 
over a demand for a forty hour week. In Lancashire 300yO00 cotton 
operatives went on strike for a. forty eight hour week and a 30% 
wage increase. The miners went to the brink of strike action before 
being placated by an interim report of the Sankey Commission (whose 
judgement the government subsequently rejected). There was unrest 
in the police force; railwaymen secured a notable victory over the 
standardisation of wage rates and found sympathy and help throughout 
the rest of the Labour movement. 
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The trade union movement strengthened its position through the 
amalgamation of small unionsP39 and, with the formation of the 
General Council of the T. U*C* in 1920 was able to take on a more 
overtly political role, which was further strengthened by the 
formation of the National Joint Council, representing the T. U. C. and 
the Labour Party, and later to be called the National Council of Labour, 
in 1921. The Labour Party itself was transformed into a legitimate 
political party with a Socialist programme and individual membership. 
A new Party Constitution was adopted in 1918. 
With the onset of economic depression in 1920, the labour movement 
in Britain went on to the defensive, and entered into a period of 
defeats and humiliations, of which the General Strike was but the 
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major feature. Miners wages and the strike ability of the miners 
were both reduced by the breakdown of the Týiple Alliancep due, in 
partg to weak trade union leadership on the part of people such 
as J. H. Thomas (the railway union leader) and Frank Hodges (the 
miners I union secretary). The minersdefeat was the first of many 
for trade unionists. Engineers, ship yard workersq railway workersy 
cotton operatives, building workers and workers in the printing 
trades all suffered wage reductions in 1922. According to the 
Economist by 1922 three quarters of the working man's war time 
wage increase had been lost. 
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One feature of the worsening economic climate was the increase in 
unemploymentv which gave rise to the founding of the National 
Unemployed Workers Movement in 1921, Rising unemployment, coupled 
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with the decline of the staple industries, led to a reduction of 
trade union membership in mining, cotton and shipbuilding. The 
trade -unions suffered even more after the defeat of the General 
Strike and the introduction of the Trade Union and Trade Disputes 
Acts of 1927. The problem of the fall in union membership was 
compounded by the problems of company uniolijima in the South Wales 
and Nottingham coal fields. The weakness of the Labour movement in 
the 1930's, to which we now turn, stemmed from the problems 
encountered in the 1920's. 
The series of defeats in the 1920's affected the quality of the 
leadership of the Labour movementp so that the people who accepted 
with equanimity the weakened position of organised labour rose to 
the top ranks of their unions and dictated union policy for the 
next decade. This was true not only of the trade uniorLs, but also 
the Labour Party. It could be said, in fact, that the lack of 
support for the Labour Party, from the lost by-elections of the 
1929 government right through the 1930'sv'was a reflectiong not of 
overwhelming support for the National governmentv even though it 
won the general election of 1935, but of the cautious and timid 
leadership of the political wing of the Labour movementy andy in 
particular, the incompetence of the leaders of the Labour Party. 
They were very busy people of course, but their energy was spentg 
for the most part, in attacking the activities of those to the left 
in the Labour movement. 
The weakness of the leadership of the Labour Party, about which 
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more will be said shortly, allowed the dominant trade union 
personalities, particularly Walter Citrine and Ernest Bevin, to 
dominate the Labour movement. These trade unionists exerted their 
influence through the-National Council of Labour, 'originally 
known as the National Joint Council when it was formed in 1921* 
The Council was reorganised in 1932 and had seven representatives 
from the T. U. C. to three from the parliamentary Labour Party and 
three from the Labour Party outside parliament. Thus the trade union 
movement could dictate to the Labour Partyq which is precisely 
what happened* Both Citrine and Bevin were temperamentally hostile 
to Lansbury, the Labour Party leader, and desired to keep him in 
check as much as possible. For example, when Lansbury agreed to 
speak at a meeting of the Socialist League in the Albert Hall in 
19339 Bevin wrote to him condemning him for agreeing to speak 
without the permission of the Council. 
42 John Saville has pointed 
out that according to Citrine the National Council of Labour always 
met on the day before the National Executive Committee of the 
Labour Party met and so it was almost impossible for the Executive 
Committee and the Shadow Cabinet to reach a decision which differed 
from that of the K. C. L. 
43 A small group of right wing trade unionists 
dominated the official Labour movement throughout the 19331s. They 
dominated the block vote of the T. U. C., they dominated the block 
vote at the Labour Party conference and they dominated the National 
Council of Labour. 
There were three guiding principles and practices to which the right 
wing of the Labour Party and the T. U. C. adhered, The first was a 
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rigid adherence to constitutionalism and parliamentarianism. If 
any section of the Labour movement took any initiative outside the 
strict guidelines of the Labour Party or the T. U. C. it was 
regarded with great suspicion, carefully scrutinised, and often 
stamped out. The' hunger marchers were never officially supported 
by the trdde union movement of the Labour Party, and even the 
Jarrow march of 1936, which was not organised by the National 
Unemployed Workers Movement, was not approved by the 1936 Edinburgh 
Labour Party Conference or the T. U. C. The nationwide Aid for Spain 
movement, which sent foodp clothing and medical supplies to belea- 
e6red. ---el Spainj was condemned by the General Council of the T. U. C. 
as "subversive and unworthy o; recognition. 1144 The Labour Spain 
Committee, a ginger group operating within the Labour Party, and 
whose political objectives increasingly took second place to 
humanitarian relief work, was always considered to be 'unofficial' 
by the Labour leadership and came into conflict with the Labour 
hierarchy. A meeting of the Labour Spain Committee at Conway Hall 
in March 19.16, which called on the Labour Party to fulfil' its 
pledges made at the Edinburgh Conference, resolved to send a 
delegation to see Atlie. The leader of the Labour Party refused to 
see the delegation on the grounds that the resolution had been 
directed against the N. E. C. The X. E. C. in turn declared that the 
L. S. C. was an unrecognised body. 
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Secondly there was an acceptance of industrial collaboration by the 
Labour movement, as though the interests of the employer and the 
employee could coincide to produce industrial harmony. The London 
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omnibus strike of 1937 was betrayed by Beving the Transport and 
General Workers Union leaderv and any other sign of rank and file 
activity was kept under close survai3. landd. ". Thisý-sortcOfýao-tion"iwas 
linked to the third guiding principle of the right wingers, which 
occupied a great deal of their time and called on their greatest 
energy, and that was the attack on anyone to the left of them. The 
history of the Socialist League and the Popular Front movement, 
and the restrictions placed on men like Stafford Cripps and o9nýevrj; j 
Bevan bears witness to the most important of the three guiding 
principles. 
Many issues arose in this country in the 1930's in which the Labour 
Party either took little or no part or fumbled the issue and dis- 
playýe4x I amazine incompe-tonee. It is perhaps as well to remind 
ourselves of one or two of these issues since they form part of the 
intricate jigsaw of the political mood of the period. Firstlyq the 
Labour Party was left on the sidelines in the fight against Mosley 
and his Blackshirts. There were some local constituency Laboar Party 
groups which acted tn thiirdown initiative and spoke out against 
Mosley and acted to defend local Jewish communitiesp but it was 
without any encouragement from the leadership of the Party. In 1934 
a 934. a questi: maire was sent to all the constituency Labour Parties 
and trade councils, requesting information on local Blackshirt 
activity. 
46 The answers to the quest ionhait6-- were" sometime sI astonishlEg 
since the B. U. F. was on the crest of a wave and 1934 was the year of 
peak membership. The results of the exercise were filed away and 
nothing was done. No recommendations for action to be taken were 
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made to the constituencies experiencing the worst excesses of the 
local fascists. 
The Left Book Club was ignored by the Labour Party and trade union 
leadershipv who considered it to be Communist inspired. Yet it was 
a largely independent development and it contributed to the 
awakening political consciousness of a generation of people. It was 
on the policy of appeasement however that the Labour Party appeared 
to be most muddled. While the Labour Party and the T. U. C. did take 
an anti-appeasement liney they confused the issue with that of 
re-armament. The fight against re-armament itself was restricted to 
debate inside parliament* Only Nye Bevan was able to sort out the 
muddlep but he remained a voice in the wilderness. 
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We have seen that the adherence to strict constitutionalism on the 
part of the Labour Party led to a fear of the organised unemployedp 
but the Labour Party did not start its own inquiry into the 
depressed areas until 1936 and the report was not issued until a 
year later. In any history of the 1930's and particularly the plight 
of the unemployed at that time the Labour Party plays a minor role. 
It was the N. U. W. M. that took the initiative in organising the 
unemployed and it was they who brought their plight to the attention 
of the authorities. Not that the N. U. W. M. was able to exert any 
lasting influence on the government without the support of the 
Lalpour Partyp which of course was not forthcomihg. 
Perhaps the key issue which the Labour Party fwnbled was its 
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attitude to the Spanish Civil War. The Labour Party always remained 
on the sidelines in the debate, except when it entered the fray to 
condemn people in its own ranks who became closely involved in the 
organisation of even just humanitarian aid for the victims of the 
war. It is on the issue of Spain that the Labour Party's 
misjudgement of the political mood of the country can be most 
clearly discerned. It is to that political mood of thousands of 
pepple both within and without the ranks of the organised Labour 
inovement that we must now turn. 
It is a paradox that in the years of greatest economic crisis from 
1929 to 1933, the left of the Labour movement, the I. L. P. and the 
C. P. were at their 1ýwest point in terms of numbers and influence 
and failed to take advantage of the situation created by the right -i 
wing of the Labour movement. The I. L. P. had lost most of itoi. 
M. P. 's in 1931 and the decision to dis-affiliate from the Labour 
Party in 1932 merely pushed them further onto the sidelines. One 
point to be made about the I. L. P. in this period is its poor quality 
of leadership. Maxton was not the figure he later became. 
48 McGovern 
was unreliable, 
49 Fenner Brockway was perhaps the best but he 
could not call on any mass base outside the Labour Party and the 
I. L. P. could not organise the industrial workerst50 
As far as the Communist Party is concernedý we know of course that 
there were two phases in its development in these years. The first 
coincided with the worst years of the slump and saw the dominance 
of the Communist International line on Social Fascism, with its 
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assertion that social democratic parties merely encouraged fascism. 
This led to an attack on social democratic groups and trade unions. 
By the end of 1930 the membership of the Communist Party was down to 
3,000 of whom most were unemployed and hence had no influence, 
especially in the trade union movement. However perhaps the most 
significant work of the C. P. in this period was its organisation of 
the unemployedq Wal Hannington being perhaps the outstanding 
figure of this first phase. The second phase began in late 1932 with 
a curb on sectarianism, which was strengthened when Hitler came to 
power and Russia joined the League of Nations. The Seventh World 
Congress of the Communist International adopted the policy of a 
united front against fascism and the British Communist Party 
responded swiftly, Membership of the Communist Party began to 
increase from 1934 onwards and the 1934 hunger march proved to be 
more successful than earlier ones. 
If one takes the level of support, in terms of membershipq achieved 
by the Communist Partyq and also, in this context, the support of 
the British Union of Fascists, there is little to suggest more than 
token support for 'extremist' groups. There was thust the revisionists 
would argue, no radical shift in political consciousness during the 
decade. The mass of the British voting public gave their support to 
the National government. 
The evidence presented by the impact of the war in Spain on the 
people in Britain, and the different responses to the presence of 
the British Union of Fascists, provides a different picture and 
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relates to the failure of the left in the earlier years of the 
decade. That failure, as we have seen, was due to a combination of 
sectarian splits, poor leadership and the dominating position of 
right wing trade unionists over virtually the whole of the Labour 
movement, through the agency of the National Council of Labour. It 
is hardly surpriding that people did not respond more readilyyto: ) 
the National Unemployed Workers Movement, for example, when it was 
organised by the Communist Party still coloured by its sectarian 
attacks on the rest of the Labour Movement. At the same time the 
Labour Party provided little scope for positive action and refused 
to organise marches and petitions. This is not to argue however 
that people were incapable of responding to the problems of 
unemployment or fascism or that they gave their total support to 
the National government. The response to the various pacifist 
organisations was some indication of the potential support for a 
radical programme. 
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By focusing briefly on one particular aspect of the 1930's - the 
Spanish Civil War - it is possible to advance our understanding of 
popular responses to foreign policy issues and the strength of 
anti-fascist sentiment at a time when the established political 
parties offered little direction or purpose to a supposedly apathetic 
public. While it id true that the majority of the electorate remained 
within the mainstream of British politics and the two extremes of 
communism and fascism (as defined by the ideas and actions of their 
respective organisations, the C. P. G. B. and the B. U. F. ) lacked mass 
support, little attention has been paid by historians to the 
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participatory role of many thousands of people outside the 
parliamentary framework. Undue emphasis on the conservatism of the 
British population has tended to obscure the degree of commitmellt'WtO 
specific issues in the inter-war period. One such issue, which 
transcended class and party boundaries, was the Spanish War* Far 
from being a mere vehicle for Communist propaganda and having only 
symbolic value, commitment tbathe Spanish cause went beyond a small 
coterie of militants - many of whom joined the International Brigades 
and breached the barriers of class and political party. On the 
continent the anti-fascist Popular Front movement was institutionalised 
in a formal political coalition; in Britain, the absence of a formal 
political alliance is explained not by the lack of mass appeal, but by -i 
the suspicions and fears of leading left wing politicians. 
The combination of a disastrous experience bf Labour in office, 
major electoral defeats and a crippled Trade Union movement prevented 
the emergence of a Popular Front policy. The failure to provide 
effective leadership created a vacuum which enabled the Communist 
Party to make political capital out Of its anti-fascism and take 
credit for the Organisation of the Spanish Aid movement. 
When war broke out in Spain in July 1936 the response was immediate 
though unorchestrated* Individuals travelled to Spain from all parts 
of Europe to aid the defence of the Republic, By the autumn of 1936 
the trickle of men and arms had become a stream and those who 
volunteered from this country were aided by an efficient support 
system. A total of two thousand British volunteers fought in Spain. 
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They came from a variety of backgrounds from different parts of 
the country and it was'the Communist Party that provided the means 
by which most of the volunteers arrived in Spain. The usual route 
was down to King Street in London (the headquarters of the C. P. ) 
where a group of volunteers would gather before taking the ferry 
over to France on a weekend tourist ticket. They would be met in 
Paris and escorted through to the Pyrenees and over into Spain. 
The British section of the International Brigade consisted largely 
of working class people from such places as the Gorbals in Glasgow, 
the mining valleys of South Walesý and the back streets of Manchester 
and Liverpool. They were people who were willing to die for their 
beliefs, for their response was not, in the main, foolhardy or a 
desperate search for glory, but sprang from a long political 
apprenticeship. Many of the people who joined the Brigade were 
acutely aware of the importance of their response. They had learned 
it in the long dole queuep the humiliation of the means test and in 
the spectacle of uniformed fascists marching the streets of this 
country, They learned of the importance of their response not merely 
by such external events, but also by a developing inner knowledge 
and understanding of what was happening around them. 
Cheap Penguin 'paperbacks started life in 1935, followed by the Left 
Book Club in 1936o Reading circles were formed and the book of the 
month eagerly discussed. Not just reading but listening as well, 
since the tradition of street corner oratory still flourished. Often 
crowds would gather on a patch of waste ground or in the streets 
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(Stevenson Square in Manchester was a traditional meeting place) to 
hear the speaker on the soapbox explain the meaning of unemployment, 
denounce the betrayal of the leaders of the Labour Party or tell of 
the dangers of fascism. Debating societies in Manchester took up 
these themes and the audiences argued and learned. Miners in the 
South Wales vallays learned in a similar way too but had the added 
advantage of their own miners' 16dge libraries. 
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This political apprenticeship of many thousands of people was not 
a dull, lifeless experience. Comradeship flourished and social and 
sporting activities were eagerly jArsued. Even here the political 
content was explored. The Clarion Cycling Club was very popular and 
the British Workers Sports Federation was active in the organisation 
of sporting events, outings and hikes. If the grouse shooting 
landowners decided to prevent hikers walking over Kinder Scouto then 
the young hikers would agitate, organise and trespass. If the 
organisers of speedway events were exploitative then the British 
Workers Sports Federation would organise its own events. 
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was everything and even leisure activities had their political 
dimensions. By the time war in Spain broke out, the political 
consciousness of a whole generation of people in this country had 
been altered in some way. An indication of this is the response to 
the Aid for Spain movement. This was the collection of aid groups 
that sprang up in 1936 on the outbreak of the war. It must be seen 
as a most significant feature of the social and political landscape 
of the 1930's and yet it has largely been ignored by historians. 
Aid groups were formed in almost every town and city in the country. 
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People knocked on doors with collecting tins in thiir hands, jumble 
sales were held, doctors donated bandages and drugs. Tins of milk piled 
high on the dockside and foodships sailed from ports up and down 
the country laden with tins of soup, bags of flour, vitaninsl 
chocolate, dried fruit, bandages, dressings and drugs* Money was 
collected for ambulances to be built - which were then'adoptedt by 
the towns which had sent the money. More than E2m (almost L70m in 
1978) was collected in Britain throughout the three years of the 
war. Aid for Spain was a national movement which broke class boundaries. 
Thendffort. w; is a measure of the political advance of a nation, and 
one which had no small bearing on the victory of the Labour-Party 
in the 1945 general election. 
The Manchester area Aid for Spain campaign was one of the largest in 
the country. In Stalybridge, for examplep a 'Nurse UrmstonFund' 
collected E700 (X23,000 in 1978) in two weeks to aid the work done 
by a local nurse working in Spain*54 In Manchester itself two 
foodships sailed from the docks laden with supplies donated by 
individualsq co-operative groupsq schools etc. which everyone knew 
would find their way to the Republicans in Spain. 
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Shop floor 
engineers in Manchester organised a branch of 
Voluntary Industrial 
Aid, founded by Geoffrey Pykeýaadfýaided by an advisory bOmmittee 
consisting of Lord Farringd6n, Alfred Barnes 
M-P-9 officials of the 
Co-op Party and trade unionists. The engineers, at 
Gardners Diesel 
Engine Works in Patricroftq who were all motorbike enthusiasts, 
constructed in their spare time motorbikes with 
low sidecars designed 
to carry a stretcher or medical suppliesq which 
were sent to Spain" 56 
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In Horwich, near Bolton, the Spanish Medical Aid organiser was 
Mr Kirkwood, who co-ordinated several different appeals and the 
efforts of many local organisations. In some of the local schools 
dozens of children knitted blanket squares while many others 
collected donations from teachers and fellow pupils for the Milk for 
Spain fund. At one time it seemed that the whole of Horwich was 
involved in fund raising. All the co-op shops had collecting tins 
or tubs at the door for people to place gifts of tinned food in. 
An Aid for Spain food shop was opened, staffed by volunteers from the 
Townswomens Guild the League of Nations Union and the Labour Party 
and Conservative Party Women's sections. 
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A local doctor organised a branch of Medical Aid for Spain in 
Manchester in his own surgery. A committee of about thirty people 
was formed which included Communists and Conservatives as well as 
Labour Party people and church leaders. 
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Arthur Koestler and J. B. S. 
Haldane spoke at the first meeting organised by the oommitteeý which 
was held in the Albert Hall in the city centre. The manager of the 
Theatre Royal in the city agreed to let the committee use his premises 
for late night film shows after the regular evening performances 
ended. Films such as 'Defence of Madrid' were shown until the early 
hours of the morning and the cinema staff gave their services free* 
On another occasion a theatre was used to provide a variety show at 
which all the stars, appearing at other theatres in the cityp gave 
their performances free of charge. Several ambulances, each costing 
POW were sent to Spain from Manchesterp all paid for out of the 
proceeds of the Aid for Spain campaign* 
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Manchester was one of the major areas of recruitment to the 
International Brigade itself, with many people, mostly working class, 
joining the steady stream of people who were ready to give their 
lives in the struggle against fascism. Most of them had jobs and had 
served a long political apprenticeship in the Labour movement in 
the area. 
59 On their return the survivors received a hero's welcome. 
When George Brown, the secretary of the Communist Party in 
Manchester, was killed in Spain, it was not only Communists who 
mourned his death. His passing added a new sense of urgency to the 
support of the Republic and yet more money poured into the Aid fund. 
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The support for Spain was inextricably linked to the local campaign 
against the B. U. F. The North Manchester Co-ordinating Committee 
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Against Fascism and Anti--, S6mitism,. for example, which was formed 
to co-ordinate opposition to Mosley, also held a series of meetings 
on the war in Spain and it called on all residents of North 
Manchester, a predominantly Jewish area, to learn the lesson of 
Spain and prevent any growth of fascism in their own area. 
62 
At a 
meeting in Cheetham Park, Manchester, in September 1936v again 
organised by the North Manchester Co-ordinating Committeep the 
platform was shared by the National League of Young Liberals and the 
Communist Party. 
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The secretary, of the Committee read out a report 
of his recent visit to Paris where he had represented the Committee 
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at the International Conference Against Racialism and anti-Semitism. 
The people who supported the campaign against fascism in the city 
came from a variety of backgrounds. The trade union movement was 
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particularly well represented, as was the Labour Party, both of 
which: came-"into conflict with their national organisations because 
of their involvement in meetings and campaigns at which the 
Communist Party was also present. 
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Trade unionists from the 
engineering industry were particularly prominenty and it was they 
who were also the backbone of the Unemployed Workers Movement in the 
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area. 
11any people in the Labour movement in the city were active in 
outdoor pursuits; and it has already been observed that often politics 
and the outdoor life were mixed. Hiking and rambling clubs flourished 
and, as early as 1932, the British Workers Sports Federation in 
Manchester was involved in the Mass Trespass of Kinder Scout. 
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It 
was also the Sports Federation, a Communist Party organisationg 
which campaigned against the ruthless exploitation of motorbike 
enthusiasts by speedway managers in the North. 
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In Cheetham Hill in the Jewish area of the city, the Young Communist 
League formed a Challenge Club, at which not only political 
meetings but also s6cial events were held, Within weeks of the 
opening of the club, hundreds of people attended the Saturday night 
dances organised by the Y. C. L. 
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The Challange Club, named after the 
Y. C. L. newspaper, was one of, the many debating arenas to be found 
in the city. Another one, free from any political seotarianismg was 
the County Forum, which held regular debates inýthe city centre on 
Saturday and Sunday evenings. City councillors and other public 
figures would take part in the debates and the Bishop of Manchester 
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spoke at one meeting. Between 100-150 people regularly attended, 
of whom about one third were Jews who worked in the local clothing 
trade. They all took part in debates which often covered topics 
such as fascism or trade unionism, which were of interest to the 
left. 70 The Y. M. C. A. in Manchester was a similar forum for debates, 
with members often discussing left wing problems. The membership 
here was not particularly Jewish. 
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debating society in the city was the Queen's Park Parliamentq at 
which M. PIs and local councillors would often take part in debates 
with an audience of people of differing political persuasions. 
It was through such debating societies and through the political, 
social and cultural involvement of thousands of people in South 
East Lancashire, and Manchester in particular, not only within the 
ranks of the Communist Party, nor even solely within the wider 
organised labour movement in the area, that ideas and action came 
together. Collecting for Aid for Spain or demonstrating against 
Mosley was usually a result of an understanding of the causes of the 
ills of capitalist society and a knowledge of t1n dangers of fascism* 
It is this understanding and knowledge which underwent a considerable 
improvement, and it is in the context of this radical change in 
political consciousness in the middle years of the 1930's that the 
fortunes of the British Union of Fascists and the opposition that 
Mosley's movement aroused must be seen. 
The B. U. F. was founded in October 1932 at a time wheng as we have 
seen, the labour movement in this country was demoralised and still 
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suffering from a litany of defeats and humiliations. Thoughout 1933 
and 1934 the B. U. F. experienced a rapid expansion, certainly in 
terms of a new political movement, in the North of England, at a 
time when anti-fascists within the ranks of the Communist Party 
were still coming to terms with the change in the Party line on 
fascism. Others in the labour moVement whog a few months previous, 
had been attacked as 'social fascists' by the Communists, were now 
courted and appealed to for support for a common anti-fascist 
platform. Anti-fascists in the Labour Party were-ileaderless on the 
issue, while the Independent Labour Party had a more important issue 
to contend with - its own credibility as a part of the organised 
labour movement. 
Within the Jewish community, which as early as spring 1933 was 
experiencing a systematic anti-semitic campaign from the B. U. F., 
the leaders of Jewry provided no lead whatsoever save the advice 
that Jews should remain aloof from the taunts and physical attacks 
of the fascists. 
It is within this wider context of the weakened opposition to 
fascism that the growth of the B. U. F. in the North of England up 
to 1935 must be seen. There were, as we shall see, attempts to oppose 
the B. U. P. in th-eae years, but it was not until the beginning of 
1936 that a new awareness and cohesion became appareht in the labour 
movement, Although the membership of the B. U. P. began to decline 
before the anti-fascists became properly organised, this was more 
the result of problems within the fascist movement itself than directlyi 
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than directly the result of effective opposition* 
As public awareness of the presence of fascists on the streets of 
Britain grewv an awareness encouraged by the developing cohesiveness 
of the anti-fascist campaign against Mosley, so people were being 
prepared for the massive response to the outbreak of war in Spain 
in the summer of 1936. It is no coincidence that the autumn of 1936 
and the early months of 1937 saw the development of a natioZiwide 
Aid for Spain movement, a general response to anti-fascists groups 
campaigning against Mosley, and at the same time a heightening of 
the struggle within the Jewish community over its response to Mosley, 
It is also the period which sees the campaign fQr the passing of the 
Public Order Act reaching its zenith. All these issues will be dealt 
with in subsequent chapters, with special reference to the city of 
Manchester and its surrounding towns. 
However we must deal briefly here with the fact that by the end of 
1938 it was clear that the developing political consciousness in 
the country, which had achieved such significance in the previous 
two years, was being dissipated. Why had all the hopes and aspirations 
of so many people diminished in such a short time? 
There was, clearly, a drastic change in the international situations 
The thousands of people involved in the Aid for Spain movement 
were becoming demoralisedt not only by their struggle with the 
leadership of the labour movement at home, but more importantlyp by 
the evidence of the impending defeat of Republican Spain. That Franco 
36 
did not march triumphantly into Madrid until the Spring of 1939 
merely prolonged the agony and despairýof anti-fascists in Britain. 
The onward march of the Nazis into Vienna and Austria and, later, 
the Munich agreementq were also very bitter blows to the lefte 
One significant feature of the labour movrimerkt' in the 1930's was the 
lack of any basic structural change in its organisation in the 
light of the changed conditions and in response to the heightened 
political awareness. For example, the failure of the trade union 
movement to extend its membership either in the new industries in 
the boom towns or, indeed, in the staple industries recovering from 
the worst years of the depression, was remarked on at the time, 
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and 
has subsequently come to be seen as a major reason for the 
dissipation of political consciousness. 
73 The number of workers 
affiliated to the T. U. C. rose to 6im in 1919 and 1920. After the 
General Strike the affiliated membership remained under 4m from 
1929 to 1935 and did not reach 5m until 1940. Bevin and Citrine still 
retained their hold on T. U. C. policy and the majority of the T. U. C. 
continued to hold a more strident anti-Communist view than anti- 
employer. 
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Similarly the political leadership of the labour movement remained 
uninspired and ineffectual. The Labour Party while, on occasion 
rising to the level of an effective opposition in Parliamentp 
nevertheless remained generally aloof from the battles in the 
constituencies. Atlee remained staunchly supportive of British 
parliamentary institutions and believed in their ability to respond 
k 
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to changes in the class structure. 
75 It bas been noted by others that 
Atlee's position was consistent with that of most members of the 
Labour Party. 76 The Socialist League was defeated by the Labour Party 
leadership in 1937 q. nd demands for a Popular Front led by the Labour 
Party were ignored. The reiteration of this demand in 1939 led to 
the expulsion of Stafford Cripps, Nye Bevang George Strauss and Sir 
Charles Trevelyan. Bevan's comment was apposite: "If every organised 
effort to change Party policy is to be described as an organised 
attack on the Party itself then the rigidity imposed by Party 
discipline will soon change into rigor mortis, 
J7 Compared with the 
heady days of 1936 and 1937 the labour movement was certaihly 
ailing on the outbreak of the Second World War, and to many it must 
have seemed that the rigor mortis had long since been replaced by the 
dry bones of the deceased labour movement. 
As well as the internal weaknesses of the Left, the labour movement 
had to contend with the increasingly oppresiiveppowercofttheý-6tateq 
directed mainly at those which the state defined as subversive. The 
'state' is here defined as the several institutionsp i. e. the 
government, the administrationg the military and the policep the 
judicial bench, sub-central government and parliamentary assembliesp 
which together constitute its reality. 
78 A brief reference has been 
made to the 'Bolshevik soarel surrounding the 1931 election, but 
such manifestations were merely the most obvious ways in which the 
media and the opposing politicians waged their campaign against the 
Left. More seriously the labour movement had to contend with the 
infiltration of the police and the widespread use of the law, and, 
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new interpretations of the law, against individuals and organisations 
on the Left. 
By the 1930's the role of the police force in the defence of the 
interests of the state had been consolidated by the governments 
action following the police strike of 1919. The strike was broken, its 
leaders dismissed and the organisationzof a police trade union 
prohibited. The Police Act of 1919 allowed swift and heflý_ retributio4 
q. -, The against any who sought to raise disaff@q#Pn,, intt4ý, *r. TFpnk 
Police Federation, recommended by the Desborough Committee in 1920, 
was expressly forbidden to affiliate to the T. U. C. 
79 These changes 
guaranteed the loyalty of the police force in the many instances of 
confrontation with 'subversive' groups in the 1920's and 1930's. 
During the 1926 General Strike the police maintained their loyalty 
to the government and in the actions taken against sections of the 
labour movement in the 1930's the police never questioned the role they 
had by now come to assume. That rolev in the context of action taken 
against the Hunger Marchers, organised by the N. U. W. M., has by now 
been well documented, though only with the help of a 'mole' workinsp 
presumably, inside the Public Record Office, 
8o 
Infiltration and 
spying, kaids on offices and attempts to manipulate the medial 
especially the newsreel companies, were common features of the political 
role of the police at this time. There was even a Special Branch in 
informer on the National Council of the N. U. W. M. 
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It is interesting 
to note that at the time the police force was involved in such 
actions against the labour movementq including the breaking up of 
marches of the unemployed, the police pay was 501o higher than the 
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average industrial wage. 
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The arguement as to whether the police in this country were 'pro I 
or 'anti' the B. U. F., an argumentt, which has occupied the minds of 
most writers on British fascism, and which was of continuing 
contemporaryiinterest, is really of little significance when 
compared to the role of the police force in the developing power of 
the state, as a servant of the state, The actual attitude of the 
police regarding the B. U. F. is referred to in the final chapter, but 
there too the argumentt revolves round the power of the state. This 
is not to argue that there existed in the 1930's a fpolice state', 
in the sense that the police were unrestrained by all other sections 
of the stateg especially the judiciary, However it is to argue that 
the actual powers of the state, of which the police were part, 
underwent a considerable change after the First World War. We have 
seen that the police themselves became much more : integrated into 
the state apparatus in this period, but there other developmentst of 
a more nebulous character, which nevertheless can be discerned as 
adding to the hegemony of the capitalist state. One of these 
developments was the emergence of large new industriesp whicht as 
corporate bodiest wielded a power whibh served the interests of the 
state. Not that businessmen would necessarily see themselves as 
serving the interests of the government or the state, but their 
interests did in fact coincide. Another development, referred to at 
the beginning of this chapter, was the development of the media; not 
only newspapers, with their circulation battles, but also the B. B. C. 
and newsreels developed as potent forces in presenting an. 
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unquestioning loyalty to the interests of the state. The role of 
the B. B. C. in the General Strike is well knowng and it will be 
shown later how the B. B. C. (and also The Times newspaper) complied 
with the Board of Deputies of British Jews (reflecting 'establishment, 
views) when the latter brought pressure to bear on the B. B. C. to 
restrict the reporting of left wing pressure withimnthe Jewish 
community, 
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The bias in newsreels, particularly concerning the 
filming of Hunger Marchers, '-Jis also now well known. 
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When it came to the presentation of news items concerning the 
labour movement on the one hand and the M. P. on the otherý it is 
not difficult to discovdr why a bias should emerge. Communism was 
feared more than fascism. Communism, for example, was already linked 
with violence 'anarchy' and revolution. There was a greater fear 
in the 1930's because of the experience of the Social Fascist stage 
of the C. P. G. B. and throughout the 1930's any anti-fascist 
organisation was considered to be a Communist Front. The National 
Council of Civil Liberties was in fact considered to be such a 
'front I too. As far as fascism was concernad, although it was 
sometimes seen as 'alien', there were other considerations which 
often outweighed this factor. Sir Oswald Mosley was British and a 
well known and respected politician in Parliament before he founded 
the B. U. F. The B. U. F. did not hold allegiance to an outside power 
as it was considered the Communist Party did. It supported the 
monarchy and it claimed to unite the country by rejecting the concept 
of class. It was supportive of the police and the armed forces and 
the Union Jack was often to be seen prominantly displayed at its 
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meetings. The B. U. F. also considered the Communists to be 'traitors'. 
The support of the B. U. F. by the Daily Mail, tras only the most overt 
example of the bias of the media. 
Yet another development in the inter-war period, and particularly 
in the 1930's, was the development of the two party parliamentary 
system. On the one hand there was the decline of the Liberal Party 
as a political force in the country, superseded by the Labour 
Party. On the other hand there was the sep! tration of the I. L. P. from 
the Labour Party and also the formation of the National government. 
The two parties occupied a common ground at the dentre of the 
political spectrump with only issues at the margin of politics 
involving any real divergence of opinion. Even the election of the 
Labour government in 1945 with its radical programme of state . ', 
intervention does not negate the argumentt that the two party system 
strengthened the power of the state in the inter-war yearsq a process 
which has continued unabated since then. 
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Within thid'development 
of the two*party system of government there was a strengthening of 
the exeoutive, power of the state. The power of the House of Commons 
was increasingly giving way to the powers of the Cabinet ani the 
prime minister. The growth of the civil service only added to this 
development. 
We must end this all too brief survey of the development of state 
institutions in the 1930's by turning to the problems of fascism 
in the period. Continuing the broad sweep of historyq we are not 
concerning ourselves here with the detailed history of the M. P., 
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whioh is the ooncern of muoh of the rest of this work, but rather 
with the implications of British fascism in the 1930's and the 
reasons for the failure of the B. U. P. 
Explanations for the failure of the B. U. P. centre inadequately 
round the advent of the Second World War, 
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or the nature of 
political culture and the ability of a democratic pluralist society 
to contain various forms pf political extremism. 
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These themes 
could be said to be the product of the continuing 'celebration of 
Western democracy' 
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which has informed various 'objective' accounts 
of the rise of fascism in a generic form and, in particular, the 
rise of the B. U. F. 
The reason why the B. U. P. waig formed and the reason for its ultimate 
failure are related to the nature of capitalism itself. The whole 
history of the B. U. F. can be seen as a product of a set of dynamic 
forces within British capitalist society. The B. U. P. arose because 
of the frustrations and despair over the old style political 
leadership (the 'old gang' according to Mosley) and a set of state 
institutions and institutionalised ideas that were reluctant to 
acknowledge the developments outlined above* Mosley was impatient. 
He had the ability to see the general direction in which society was 
moving and he wanted to be there to lead the nation into the new world. 
Unfortunately his desire did not correspond to the sluggish nature 
of the development of the state and the economic base of society. 
The inter-war years were years of tension between the remnants of 
Nineteenth Century Liberalism on the one handp and the growth of 
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the executive and powerful new pressure groups which characterised 
the period on the other. The politicians in the Labour Party, Thomas, 
Snowdon etc, were still living, essentiallyg in a pre 1914 world. 
The old politicians in the Tory Party were still living in a world 
dominated by the image of Disraeli. This is the reason why Mosley 
moved from Tory to Independqnt to Labour and the I. L. P. and finally 
to fascism. The existing political parties really could not offer 
what was required to cope with the many problems of a capitalist 
society experiencing the many disadvantages of being the first 
industrial nation while essentially remaining a small island with 
few natural resources. 
The B. U. F. failed because the Movement was too impatient and that 
impatience brought with it many follies, not least of which was its 
anti-Semitism. Political movements have to grow out of economic 
conditions which foster such growth, The rise of Liberalism (and its 
decline) and the rise of the Labour movement are just two such 
examples of this phenomenon. The B. U. F. arose because of the 
political will of one man and the imitating of fascist movements 
overseas. While it was able, initially, to capitalise on the 
political and economic frustrations of many people in the 1930'sp it 
did not arise from the grass roots, moulded and shaped by the 
requirements of capitalist society. 
The B. U. F. also failed because the heightened political consciousness 
of the nation did not allow the B. U. F. to flourish for long in the in 
industrial heartlands of the country. The opposition to the B. U. F. 
was perhaps slow in developing, but when it did it led to local 
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authorities refusing fascists entry to public halls and eventually 
led to the passing of the Public Order Act. The B. U. F. did not fail 
because, somehow, democracy is able to cope with political 
extremism on the Left and the Right. 
Western democracy was attuned to many of the demands that fascism 
made. Since the end of the Second World War we have witnessed in 
this country the steady drift towards conservative authoritarianism. 
_fhe development of a repressive and racist state, built on the 
foundations of a corporate economy, has largely gone unnoticed - 
simply because it is not 'fascist' in the sense that people 
normally understand that word. We are 'democratic' because we are 
not 'fascist' in the old sense. 
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Fascism in the old sense was what 
the M. P. aspired to, but in that aspiration could be found all 
the contradictions of bourgeois democracy; the contradictions 
between classes in society and between different layers of bourge6is 
ideology. Similarly the policies of the M. P. predated some of the 
developments of the British economy. Skidelsky is surely right, 
though for the wrong reasondq when he observes that "If there was 
going to be fascism in England, it would be introduced under the 
auspices of the National Government, not by a grass roots fascist 
movement. 1190 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE IDEOLOGY OF BRITISH FASCISM AND THE POLICY OF THE B. U. P. FOR 
THE NORTH OF ENGLAND 
Theories of Fascism are to be found in abundance. It is not the 
place, here, to provide a survey of even the most recent 
interpretations of Fascism. Such a task has already been accomplished 
by others. 
I All one can do here is point to the danger of employing 
a rigid theoretical framework in a study which has to rely on a great 
deal of empirical evidence. Of more recent writers, Poulantzas in 
particular has been taken to task for making the evidence fit the 
theory. 2 The proliferation of theories of Fascism may be seen as 
a product of the fact that Fascism itself embodies a series of 
contradictions. This is supported by the evidence of heterogeneity 
in the ideology and membership of the British Union of Fascists- 
John Cammett, after concluding that there four major models employed 
by Communists to analyse Fascism, vizt A reactionary movement of 
the industrial bourgeoisie and the great landowners; The expression of 
twentieth century imperialism; A petty-bourgeois movement in its 
origins; An "irrational" movement expressing a crisis in Western 
civilisation, commented thatt 
The point is that Fascism is surely all these things. 
The apparent contradiction between these interpretations 
is a contradiction inherent in Fascism itself* It is 
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an attempt to resolve two of the most fundemental 
developments in this stage of capitalist society: 
(1) 
an ever growing concentration of politicaly military 
and economic power in the hancls of the few; (2) the 
unavoidable necessity of securing at least the passive 
consent of the masses to this rule. 
3 
A suggestion was made in the last chapter that the B. U*Fo was the 
product of a set of dynamic forces within British capitalist society 
in the inter-war years. The task now is to develop this theme by 
scrutinising the ideology of the B. U. F. both in theory and in 
practice. 
It has been suggested by Nugent4 that the ideas of the B. U. P. can be 
divided into two categories. Firstly, the 'authoritative' ideas of 
the movement, emanating from Mosley himself and the inner core of 
Fascists who were considered to be the leadership. This group 
included, at various timesq Alexander Raven Thompsong Niel Francir- 
Hawkins, William Joyce, A. K. Chestertong John Becket and W. E. D. Allen. 
Secondly, the 'non-authoritative' ideasp consisting of the 
publications of the B. U. P. - Blackshirtj Action; and Fascist 
quarterly later to be known as British Union Quarterly and the 
pronouncements of those Fascists on the fringe of powerg especially 
B. U. P. parliamentary candidatesl together with 'all other 
pronouncements'. 
Nowhere does Nugent use the term 'ideology, to describe the ideas of 
the B. U. F. and the reason is clear. For if he were to employ such an 
analytical tool he would necessarily have to refer to the way in 
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which the ideas of the B. U. F. were interpreted by the mass of its 
membership andý indeed, discuss the type of member attracted by those 
ideas. 5 It is true that ideas may be seen in isolation and removed 
from their social and political context, but the ideas thus remain 
and and drained of all vitality. If we look at the way in which 
the policy of the B. U. F. was interpreted in the North of England, 
for examplef especially those policies which were devised for the 
region, we may provide the skeletal structure of ideas with flesh 
and blood. However, if we do this, it quickly becomes apparent that 
Nugent's suggested classification is inadequate. In Nugent's scheme 
'all other pronopnoemente are relegated to a most insignificant role 
in the classification of ideas emanating from the B. U. F. If such 
ideas are located in the wider ideological framework however, then 
fall other pronouncements' achieve a greater significance. Such 
pronouncements made up the greater part of the propaganda of the 
B. U. F. which most people in the areas most affected by the presence 
of the B. U. P. were subjected to. It is certainly true that Inon- 
agthoritativel Fascist ideas drew upon and repeated the 'authoritative' 
category, but it is also true that those ideas emanating from the 
leadership of the movment were often, to put it lightly, linterpretedlp 
often out of all recognition. There is some'evidence that many Irish 
people, for example, became interested in the M. P. because they 
considered that the movement supported the claims of the Catholics 
in the North of Ireland. That was certainly what they heard at 
street corner meetings in Manchester, but does not appear in the 
'authoritative' pronouncements of the movement. 
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We need, instead, to employ the concept of an ideology which has 
different layers. This will enable us to see that, while it was 
indeed true that some ideas were more 'authoritative' than others, 
there was some interchange between the two categories. Anti-Semitism, 
for example, was a development in the movement's ideology which 
gained sustenance not only from the pronouncements of 'authoritative' 
figures, but also the actions of fascists in the streets. The behaviour. 
of ordinary fascists in turn fed the stance taken by Mosley on the 
issue. Dividing the ideology of the movement into different layers 
also allows us to deal with the populism of the B. U. F. and to show 
that people could be seduced by the populist rhetoric of the fascists 
on street corners and be gradually sucked down into the deeper layers 
of M. P. ideology, so that they emerge as fully fledged fascists 
espousing the anti-Semitism, militarism and corporatism that were 
the hallmarks of the Fascist movement. Similarly many peoplet 
having joined the movement for, -populist reasons, turned away from 
the movement when they beg-an to discern the other, more ominousp 
characteristics of Fascism. 
In utilising such a concept of ideology, it is possible to analyse 
the chronological development of Fascist ideas more fully and to show 
how all 'other pronouncements' in the non-authoritative category 
assume as great an importance as the speeches and writings of Mosley 
himself. Different layers of ideology assumed greater importance at 
different times. To be specific, throughout the 1930's the depth 
ideology of the B. U. F. came to dominate the surface or populist 
level, though the latter was very much in evidence throughout the 
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period. That the different layers of Fascist ideology contradict 
each other is quite compatible with Cammett's view of the 
essentially contradictory nature of Fascism as a wh6le. 
4) 
Not only do we have to deal with the ideology of the B. U. F. however, 
but that ideology is in turn. placed within the ideology of society 
at large. It is not the place here to develop a discussion about 
ideology in general terms. The hegemony of ruling elites and C 
the state of capitalist society in the 1930's have been discussed in 
the previous chapter. What is important is the place of people in 
that general ideolog*cal setting whom the B. U. F. was attempting to 
win over. George Rud6 has identified two types of ideology in 
popular protest groups. 
6 
The first consists of an 11-, linherant' 
element -a sort of 1mother6 milk' ideology, based on direct 
experience, oral tradition or folk memory and not learned by 
listening to sermona or speeches or reading books.,, 
7 
This could be 
said to correspond to the ideology of politically non-committed 
people in Manchester in the 1930's, whom the B. U. F. was attempting to 
influence. The second element is the 
I 
stock of ideas and beliefs that are 'derived' or 
borrowed from othersq often taking the form of a 
more structured system of ideas, political or 
religious, such as the Rights of Man, Popular 
Sovereignty, Laissez-faire and the Sacred Right of 
Property2 Nationalism, Socialism, or the various 
versions of justification by Faithe 
8 
It follows that, as Rude notes, there was no tabula rasa. That isp 
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in the case of the history of the D. U. F. , Mosley could not implant 
his ideas into the minds of people who did not have any ideas before. 
They did have ideas - an ideology-- 'inherited' from their own 
traditions and experiences. The degree of failure or success of the 
Fascist movment was a measure, in part, of the receptivity of 
people to the 'derived' ideology of the B. U. P. We must now turn to 
the content of that 'derived' ideology, particularly, in the first 
instance, the ideas projected by the leader of the B. U. F. Sir Oswald 
Mosley, before dealing with just a few of the main points in the 
Fascist programme. 
That Sir Oswald Mosley was an original thinker is open to serious 
doubt. The develppment of his economic ideas is overshadowed 
throughout by those of other, more able, men. Mosley's great 
attribute was his ability to adapt quiukly to new ideas and to argue 
his policy in public. It is important to deal with Mosley's earlier 
public pronouncements on economic policy in order to refute the 
claims made by his supporters regarding his originality. 
Mosley's first significant statement on economic affairs was 
addressed to the I. L. P. conference at Gloucester in April 1925. The 
ideas spilled over into the correspondence columns of The Times in 
the same month, when he took issue with a banker who was critical 
of Mosley's address. 
9 Mosley's ideas crystallised in the form of the 
'Birmingham Proposals' which were announced to a packed meeting at 
Birmingham Town Hall on 3 May. Three months later they were 
presented to an I. L. P. Summer School at East6n Lodge and they later 
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emerged in a publication under the title Revolution By Reason. John 
Stracheyq who collaborated closely with Mosleyq published a more 
detailed study of the proposals under the same title in December 1925- 
Mosley's Revolution By Reason was a fourfold plan for immediate 
action to relieve economic stagnation and unemployment. Firstly, 
instead of merely redistributing resources slightly, a basic 
expansion of demand would be created, which would employ unused 
capacity. Secondly, the expansion of demand would be centrally -a 
planned, An Economic Planning Council would direct new money to the 
poor, creating an expansion of the-ast. aple industries and increasing 
employment. The state would purchase food and raw materials direct 
from foreign producers, thus eliminating the 'middlemen' and 
reducing the capitalist 'sabotage' of speculators. Inflation would 
be avoided by an expansion of credit to dreate demand, which would 
be met by a new and greater supply of goods. Thirdly, the Gold 
Standard came under fire. If the implementation of Revolution By 
Reason led to a drain on gold, the pound would be allowed to float. 
Fourthly, the export trade would be controlled and as much production 
as possible switched to the home market. 
Mosley has claimed that "these proposals went beyond the concept 
of Keynes". 
' 0 This is far from the truth. They were an exercise in 
populism, The ideas behind most of the proposals originated elsewhere 
and were discussed in various circles before Mosley spelt them out 
in Birmingham. The idea of a planned economy was familiar to the 
I. L. P. and both Wheatley and Brailsford had shown some understanding 
of the works of Keynes, Snowden's book The Living Wageq advocating 
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an Arbitration Board to fix minimum wagesq predated Mosley'ý, s ideas 
bv thirteen years. The I. L. P. policy included the nationalisation 
of banks and also the central control of credit as a means of 
keeping up the price level, which, in Mosley's scheme, would be 
undertaken by an Economic Planning Council. 
Mosley's plan to avoid the 'middlemen' who speculated on the price 
and supply of goods and which was the first indication of his later 
attacks on 'Jewish financiers' had already been voiced by H. M. H. 
Lloyd, Lloyd George's controller of food during the wax who, like 
Mosley, had advocated the direct purchase of raw materials and 
food by the state from the foreign producers. 
The inflationary period of the early years of the Wiemar Republic 
probably alerted Mosley to the dangers of such a phenomenon oocuring 
in Britain. It is Mosley's proposal for dealing with inflationy by 
expanding credit to create demand which would be fed by increased 
production, which, as his biographer has pointed outý 
11 is most 
damning. The proposal amounted to an acceptance of the Qaantity 
Theory of Money (the larger the supply of moneyq the higher the 
price level) which Mosley never abandonedq even in the 19601sq and 
reinforced "The strong supposition that Mosley never readq or never 
properly understood, Keynest later General Theory ... 11 
12 This apart, 
although the General Theory was not published until 1936, Mosley 
himself acknowledged his early debt to its central ideas. 
I had many conversations with Keynes during 
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this period and he was publishing many articles 
and reviews; the later excuses of politicians that 
they could not have been aware of his thinking in 
1929 because General Theory only appeared later 
was in no way valid. 
13 
Where Mosley did follow Keynes was in his plan to float the pound if 
the recovery programme led to a drain on gold. Keynes had argued in 
his Tract for Monetary Reform published in 1923, for the stab, . ilisation 
of prices, since this would encourage investment and reduce 
unemployment. It followed from this that the attempt to restbre the 
pound to its pre-war value was wrong. 
14 
1-11osley's final point in Revolution by Reason concerned the control 
of the export trade. This proposal must be seen in the context of 
the wide ranging discussions over the problems of Free Trade. The 
1923 general election had been fought on the issue, with the 
Conservative favouring protection. In the following year the McKenna 
dutiesq the last remnants of war-time protection, were abolished by 
the Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden. Mosleylp 
plan for okport control was very much a part of the ferment of ideas 
circulating at the time and which were undoubtedly discussed between 
himself, John Strachey and Keynes. It has been sa*dg for exampleg 
that Mosley's social imperialism was an amalgam of the views of 
Chamberlain, Hobson, Blatchford, Karl Pearson and other social 
imperialists; "Whereas the earlier social-imperialists had spoken 
sotto voco Mosley shouted, but the elements of his doctrine were the 
same as theirs. 
05 
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Reference has already been made to the correspondence in The Times. 
in 1925 between Mosley and a bankerg named Brand. However it was 
John Strachey and not Mosley who gave the answer to Brand-Is question 
of how an increase in internal purchasing power would help export;. 
Strachey's view was that an increase in British demand for foreign 
goods would follow from an increase in domestic demand and, in turn, 
expand the foreign market for British goods. The fact that Mosley 
did not provide an adequate answer to Brand's question not only 
points to his "major economic heresy: the belief that domestiu trade 
better than foreign trade. f116 but also raises the question of Mosley's 
ability as an economist, and supports the claim of Hugh Thomas, 
Strachey's biographerg that, of the two, "Strachey was the thinker, 
Mosley the interpreter. 07 
Mosley's 'Memorandum' to the Cabinet in February 1930, his subsequent 
resignation speech in the House of Commons in May of that year and 
his appeal to the Labour Party conference at Llandudno in Octobery 
followed by the 'Mosley Manifesto' of the New Party, have all been 
acclaimed, as Mosley proudly notes in his autobiographyt by many 
people. A. J. P. Taylor has described Mosley's proposals as "more 
creative than those of Lloyd George" and "an astonishing achievenmtt. 11,13 
For R. H. S. Crossman, Mosley was "Revealed as the outstanding politician 
of his generation ... this brilliant manifesto was a whole generation 
ahead of Labour thinkinget'19 
Would the acclaim for Mosley's pre-Fascist policy have been so 
pronounced had he staved within the confines of conventional party 
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politics? To put the question another way, would not the radical 
economic policies put forward by Lloyd George in 1929 or the 
schemes put forward by MacMillan in 1932 be similarly acclaimed if 
they had later turned towards Fascism? One cannot help feeling that the 
response to gosley's pre-Fascist proposals has been the result of 
his later political development. It is true that Mosley was 
acclaimed at the time, but was this not more a result of his ability 
to publicise his plans and to choose the., -rXr, %t moment for doing do, 
than-itrue acknowledgement of their originality? The Timns was 
continually critical of Mosley's proposals. In a letter to The Times 
Harold MacMillan queried the papers criticismaz Skidelsky quotes 
somewhat selectively from the letter to show that MacMillan was 
praising Mosley for daring to stick to his party's programme.. 
20 This 
was true, but the emphasis should not have been on the fact that 
Mosley was receiving support but on the fact that his proposals 
were indeedhot new. MacMillan contibued in his letter: 
"0" Your Parliamentary Correspondent rdmarks this 
morning that Sir Oswald's speech (at the Socialist 
Party meeting) 'contained little in the way of 
new proposalsq most of his suggections having already 
been made public in Labour and the Nation% That is 
exactly my point. Had these proposals been novelp 
a Socialist Cabinet might properly have resisted 
them. In point of fact they are part of their own 
official prospectus ... 
21 
It has been argurd elswhere that Mosley dwelt in the 'underworld 
of rejected knowledge 1,22which was not based on the British 
empirical tradition. His freedom from the constraints of the "all- 
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parvading, Treasury dominated, neo-classical, liberal economic 
traditions of the university-trained political establishment" 
23 led 
him to a consist, ent doctrine of 'synthesis, eternal synthesis' 
which, as we have seen, led him to utilise the thoughts of other men 
and the policies of other parties in a novel way and which led to 
him being seen as an original thinker. 
This synthesis of thought continued right through the 1930's and 
informed his view of the future of Britain as a Fascist state. 
The first major statement of Mosley's Fascist ideas in The Greater 
Britain published in 1932t set out to prove "by analysis of the 
present situation and by constructive policy, that the necessity 
for fundwental change exists. " 
24 The problem now was 
to reconcile the revolutionary changes of science 
with our system of government, and to harmonise 
individual initiative with the wider interests 
of the nation ... Hence the need for a New Movement, 
not only in politics, but in the whole of our 
national life, 
25 
The New Movement was d! efined as Fascist because it was "basel on a 
high conception of citizenship" and "because it recognises the 
necessity for an authoritarian state, above party and sectional 
interest. , 26 At the heart of the 'analysis of the present situation' 
provided by Mosley was the 'crisis' of society. The immediate 
crisis was the 'farce of 1931' of which one of the main ingredients 
was a government without any constructive policy and without any 
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authority. The nature of the crisis, howeverg went deeper than the 
problems associated with current events and became one of wider 
social and political dimensions. The country was 'hag riddent. "In 
the public affairs of national life we have disorder and anarchy: in 
the private affairs of individual life we have interference and 
repression. " 
27 The state would have no use for the "drone and the 
decadent". "An ordered athleticism of mind and body is the furthest 
aim of justly enforcable morality. " 
28 The 'justly enforcable 
morality' was bound up with Fascist ideas of the Corporate Statep 
though the publication of The Greater Britnin was by no means the 
final word on the organisation of the Corporate State. Not only 
did 1,11osley's own ideas change, but the analysis and explanation of 
the detailed workings of the Corporate State was left to Raven 
Thompson, Director of Policy of the B. U. F. 
For Mosley, The establishment of the Corporate State was Vthe main 
object of a modern and Fascist movement" 
29 
which he considered more 
suitable for adaption to the 'British temperament' than to that of 
any other nation. In essence it was the rationalised state with 
the power to limit the free operation of individuals and interests 
within the confines of the 'welfare of the nation'. This was not 
to imply a direct control of the everyday affairs of industry - 
individual enterprise and profit making would in fact be encouraged. 
If anyone went beyond the limits of the nation's welfare 'the 
mechanism of the Corporate system descends upon him. 1130 
Rather than chronicle the development of the model of the Corporate 
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State by the Fascist leadershipt a task already achieved elsewhere, 
31 
a more useful exercise would be to outline the concept of the 
Corporate State at its most sophisticated level as proposed by 
Raven Thompson, its 'chief propogandist' according to Mosley, 
32 
in his booklet The Coming Corporate State (1933), before going on to 
see what this would mean for the people and industries of Lancashire. 
It is useful to divide the outline of the Corporate State into two 
parts, Government and Parliament, as in Diagram 1. Under the system 
of goverrununt each industry would be organised on a local basis, 
with representatives of the local Employers Federation (compulsory 
membership), Trade Unions (also compulsory membership)t and the 
District Councils (representing Employers and worl; ers), sitting 
together to deal with local affairs. The local industry would then 
be represented as a corporation dealing with that particular 
industry (e. g. textiles, iron and steel, agriculture, etc. ). 
Twenty such corporations would provide the framework for the economic 
system. Each corporation would be made up of representatives of 
employers, workers and consumersý the latter to be appointed by the 
government. The corporations would produce development plans for the 
industry and deal with social welfare (pensions, insurancet recreationg 
etc. ), and control the more important day to day decision making. 
Since wage rates and conditions of work would be controlled by the 
corporation, strikes and lockouts would be forbidden. Each corporation 
would set up a labour court to settle disputes by compulsory 
arbitration, and an industrial court to deal with unfair competition. 
Representatives of the corporations would sit on a National Corporation 
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(which would control a National Investment Board to advise 
individual corporations, and a Foreign Trade Board). The National 
Corporation would have an administrative ministerf whoy along with 
other such appointees representing other facets of government, would 
be consulted by an inner cabinet. The important decisions of state 
would be made by the inner cabinet and the administrative ministers, 
though the leader would maintain the power of veto. 
Parliament would not be abolished under the Corporate State. Instead 
it would assume an advisory role. Mosley's original plan to abolish 
the House of Lords33 was scrapped in favour of making it into a 
chamber of specialists which might produce advice and ideas for the 
government. The radical change in the nature of the House of Lords 
was not meant to cast any doubt on loyalty to the Crown. "Here at 
least is an institution, worn smooth with the frictions of long ago; 
which in difficult experience has been proven effective and has 
averted from this Empire manyea calamity. 1134 
The House of Commons would provide technical and constructive 
criticism and assist the passing of government bills, a task made 
easier by the banning of opposition parties after two years* MePe'sy 
elected on an occupational franchise, would divide their time between 
the House of Commons and constituency work. Local government would 
be in the control of locally elected counoilsq whose departmental 
heads would be responsible to the M. P. 1s. 
The organisation of the Fascist Corporate State has been commented 
on by other writurs, but there are certain specific features which 
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have escaped attention. Two such features are briefly noted here in 
order to focus attention on the repressive nature of the proposed 
Corporate State. The first is the role of women, the second that of. 
the role of workers in Ceneral. 
The role of women in the fascist state was touched upon, though 
never clearly definedq 1Dy Mosley and otherd. The emphasis throughout 
waýs, on 'normal' women and the tone &f the argumee, &; became distinctly 
anti-feminist. "The part of women in our future organisation will be 
important, but different from that of men; we want men who are men and 
women who are women.,, 
35 The implication was that there was something 
odd about women who became politicians. Thus though women in industry 
would not be excluded from their 'natural representation' in their 
industry's corporation, doubt was cast on their effectiveness. 
The great majority of women do not seek, and have 
no time for, a career in politics. Their interests 
are consequently neglected and their nominal 
representation is accorded to women whose one idea 
is to escape from the normal sphere of women and 
to translate themselves into men. 
36 
111ýomens questions are usually handled by ageing spinsters.,, 
37 
Married women would recieve an occupational franchise as housewives 
and mothers. How women would be allowed to translate the use of 
their franchise into direct political action remained unclearg since 
a woments true interests were in the home rather than in public 
life. We have some indication of how the B. U. F. looked upon its 
women members. The practice seemed to fit the theory. In a survey 
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of 103 of the B. U. F. leaders, all were meno 
38 In Nelson, Lancashire, 
Nellie Driver formed a branch of the BoU. F. in the town. Mainly 
due to her enthusiasm the membership reached over 100, yet she was not 
allowed to become District Leadero She was instead placed in charge 
of the womeno The position of District Leader was a male preserve and 
a rather ineffectual man was appointed to that position, who was 
"clay in the hands of the Women's District Leader (Nellie Driver)., 139 
When plans for the organising of an effective electoral machine were 
announced in January 1935 women members were allocated the task of 
leafleting the constituencies and servicing the Blackshirt 'Political 
Organisationlo This, presumably, meant brewing cups of tea and so on, 
since the main work was under the control of the men. 
40 
Thus women were deemed equal but different, an anti-feminist argumentt 
that had a wider audience outside the fascist circles. 
41 It was part 
of a general reaction against the rise in feminist consciousness 
before the First World War, though it was in the Fascist movements of 
Britain and Europe that anti-feminism achieved its most sinister 
form. 42 
We have already seen that under the Corporate Stateý strikes and 
lookouts would be banned. This seemingly fair system, by which both 
sides of industry would be treated equally, gave some credence to 
Mosley's claim that the Corporate State would treat employers and 
workers impartially. 
Wage questions will not be left to the dog-house 
of class war, but will be settled by the impirtial 
62 
arbitration of State machinery... Instead of being 
the general staff of opposing armies they will be 
joint directors of national enterprise under the 
43 
general guidance of corporative government, 
It is important to note however, that B. U. F. policy was far from 
impartial in this matter. The restrictions placed on employers of 
labour were ill-defined while those on workers were more explicit. 
The whole of the argument was weighted very much against the 
employee. Mosley, in fact, rarely referred to employers of labour 
as such. When he did, it was to defend them against financiers. It 
was not individual employers who kept the workers in misery but the 
"giant rogues of international finance who rob (the millions of 
factory workers) of their wages with soaring prices and of their 
employment with crashing prices ... 1144 The problem was not one of 
employer versus employee but rather international finance versus 
employer, and in that equation it was the employer who would 
receive protection. 
The forces which thwart and destroy productive 
enterprise will be met with the force of national 
authority ... The incalculable powers of finance 
will be harnessed in the service of national 
producýion ... There will be no room for the 
unorganised operations which have led to such 
enormous complexities and have rocked the structure 
of Dritish industry to its foundations. 
45 
One of the few specific examples of the equation is provided by 
Mosley's plans for the retail trade. 
* 
' 
a. 
01 
ýýIj 
Ilk 
B. U. F. view of the T. U. C. published 1937. 
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There is room for both co-op and small trader in 
the new stateg but not for the great chain and 
multiple stores largely created by international 
finance which today injures them both. These 
stores will be eliminated, and the retail business 
will be divided between co-operatives ... and 
individual traders ... 
46 
The individual did not enter into the equation except in that his 
rights as a worker would be controlled by the corporate system to 
benefit the national interest. Hence strikes would be banned, And 
if strikes were banned, there would be no need for lock outs. Hence 
the ban on lockouts was nothing more than empty rhetoric to provide 
a balanced and impartial stand between employer and employee. 
Under the Corporate State trade unions would be crushed, and employers 
would be free to exploit their workforcef which in turn would be 
completely helpless once its industrial and political strength was 
removed. The indication of such action is provided by the attitude 
of the B. U. F. towards existing trade unionsp which provides some 
insight into the relationship between theory and practice in the 
movements ideology. The B. U. F. had a clear idea of the role of the 
trade unions in the proposed Corporate State and at the same time 
was able, in its involvement in particular industrial disputes and 
its general reaction to existing organised groups of workersp to 
illustrate just how it would apply its policy to practical situations. 
The B-U. F. had some problems in applying its authoritarian principles 
64 
in situations in which the populism of the movement was more relevant 
and was more likely to win support. This ideological conflict was 
illustrated by the Fascist Union of British Workers and its attempts 
to gain the support of the working classes by representing claimants 
before public assistant boards and by intervening in industrial 
disputes. 
The F. U. B. W. was started early in 1933 with the aim of "(protecting) 
the interests of workers, whether in employment or unemployed. To 
fight against wage cuts and all reductions in the standard of life, 
to fight the Means Test and all measures to bully the unemployed... 1147 
Its leaders in the first few months were J. P. D. Paton, a 'former 
leader of the National Union of Unemployed Workers' and Micivel 
Goulding, of the Manchester B. U. P. From the very beginning the 
B. U. F. was claiming success in its defence of workers before the 
Public Assistant officials. By July 1933 it was offering employees 
the chance to use its Ilabour exchanges'. 
48 A year later the B. U. F. 
claimed that the F. U. B. W. 's representation of workers was recognised 
by Public Assistant Committees and Courts of Refereesq and that 
5 
"workers grievancesq often given up by the Socialist Trade Unions 
as hopeless, have frequently been remedied by officials of the 
Fascist Union.,, 49 No evidence was offered to support the claim and 
the frequency of remedial action may be doubtedq given the spasmodic 
but inflated accounts of assistance appearing in the M. P. press. 
50 
The B. U. F. could not be said to be reticent in exploitingg for 
publicity purposes, the help and ecouragement it gave to the 
underprivileged in society, and one might have expected much more 
65 
coverage for the F. U. B. W. Rather more publicity was given to the 
general problems of confusion over relief payments to the Manchester 
51 
unemployed, with banner headlines such as "Life on the dole - untold 
sacrifices of the unemployed.,, 
52 More often than not the actions of 
the F. U. B. W. created more confusion, with local P. A. officials becoming 
as irate with them as with representatives of the N. U. W. K. Unlike 
the N. U. W. M. however, the F. U. B. W. did not advocate organised 
opposition against the Means Test or the level of unemployment. The 
unemployed were encouraged instead to develop hobbies as a way of 
making money. 
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Central to F. U. B. W. strategy were the attacks on the existing trade 
union structure. The criticism was twofold. The overall strategy of 
the trade union movement, which defined the workforce in class terms, 
was attacked, as might be expected given the anti-Marxist stance of 
the Fascist movement. A second criticism, muuh more populist in 
nature, was levelled at individual trade unionistsv and degenerated 
at times into terms of personal abuse. Within months of the founding 
of the F. U. B. W. Blackshirt published an article ? by a T. U. Chairman' 
in which it was claimed that: 
Fascism is not hostile to the trade unions, and 
there are large numbers of trade unionists who are 
fascists ... The trade unions are so mixed up with 
the Labour Party, and so many. of their leaders 
are just loud mouthed bullies, living off fat 
salaries sweated from their rank and file.. *Their 
present officials are not, in the great majority 
of cases, fit to be entrusted with the 
responsibilities that will then (when the Corporate 
0 
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State is established) have to be borne by the 
leaders of the unions. For that reason it is 
urgently necessary that Fascists who are eligible 
for trade union membership should be in the unions 
now, and taking an active part in their affairs, 
preparing for the day when they may be called 
upon to take over their leadership. 
54 
The same theme was pursued by Wegg-Prosser in an article The Worker 
d the State55 which attacked the Marxist concept of class - "based 
though it is on the absurd Labour theory of value of the Jewish 
banker Richardo (sic)" - and oritioised trade union leaders about 
big salaries. An attack on the tradd union political levy soon 
followed, 56 and in April 1938 Mosley himself addressed a 'meeting 
of London and provincial trade unionists' in which the trade unions 
again came under attack - "We want to see young and virile men 
taking the place of the leadership of their trade unions in place 
of old men who are living in the past. t, 
57 
The members of the A. E. U., 
N. U. R. and T&G. W. U. who were on the platform with Mosley were 
presumably good examples of the 'young and virile men'. Needless to 
say the meeting did not have the support of the T. U. C. 
58 
By the summer of 1934 the Labour movement had become deeply concerned 
about the attacks on trade unions and also the Labour Party. In 
June the National Executive of the Labour Party issued an instruction 
to all of its affiliated organisations ordering them to ban any of 
their members who were in the B. U. p. 
59 A month later the General 
Secretary of the National Union of Railwaymen, Marchbank, warned of 
the daneers of secret fascist activity within the trade union 
67 
movement. 
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The Left were alerted to the dangers of fascist 
interference when the B. U. F. extended its attack on trade unions by 
intervening in certain industrial disputes. If the aim was to gain 
the support of more trade unionists by such action, -the fascists 
ged successful. 
In June 1934 the could notq by any accountq be judg 
B. U. F. attempted to support lorry drivers at the Ham River Grit Co. 
in London who were on strike over a pay dispute. The fascists, 
according to the press, were trying to effect a settlement. 
61 
This 
consisted of encouraging the drivers (some of whom were members of 
the B. U. P., which presumably is why the F. U. B. W. became involved in 
the first place) to leave their lorries in different parts of London 
with the ignition keys removed. Dirt was also put in the petrol 
tanks. The general manager of the company said he understood that the 
drivers felt they would get better results if they placed their case 
in the hands of the F. U. B. W. rather than the Transport and General 
Workers Union. 
62 
The 4ýi were sacked and the T&G. W. U. redoubled 
its efforts to remove fascists from their ranks, of whom there must 
not have been more than a handful at the most. In another intervention, 
this time in Birmingham, where the local bus drivers were working 
more than the legal number of hours, the F. U. B. W., in its belief 
that it was working in the interests of the drivers, took out a 
summons against the local authority* 
63 The employers were fined and 
the F. U. B. W. suffered t1m wrath of the local drivers when they 
64 
discovered that their hours and earnings were somewhat reduced. 
Rliee lnrýs"Aan6e 
where the F. U. B. W. caused great consternation occurred 
in Manchester, where workers at the factory of Richard and Johnson 
were on strike. It was known that the firm was using blackleg labour 
a 
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and the local branch of the Communist Party attempted to find out 
who they were. Eventually a group of blacklegs were followed from 
the factory to the B. U. P. headquarters in I-ligher Broughton and 
some of them were recognised as D. U. F. members. 
65 
In I-larch 1936 the Blackshirt, adopted 'The Patriotic Workers Paper, 
as its sub-heading, and from then on the paper was said to be 
1 66 
devoted to "matters appealing to workers". The principles of the 
Corporate State were still repoated but the adoption of the sub- 
heading symbolised the triumph of populism in this paticular aspect 
of the ideology of the M. P. 
One feature of the policy of the- B. U. Ps which is particularly relevant 
in this study of Fascism is the movement Is proposals for dealing 
with the ailing cotton industry. The proposals were clearly set out 
and expounded in various 'cotton campaigns' in South East 
Lancashire, during which the B. U. F. gained some support from 
members of the Lancashire Cotton Exchange and from some owners of 
cotton mills to the South of Ibnchester. 
The two major strands of B. U. F. economic policy came together in 
its policy on cotton when it emerged in 1934. The first was the 
idea of the Empire as an economic unit. The second was the concept 
of the Corporate State and its inherent authoritarianism. In 
clarifying the poliuy on cotton, Mosley was to reitise drastically 
his attitude towards India and the Congrass Party, and in so doing 
exposed the weakness of his claim to consistency. This point has 
69 
been made by Scildesky, who quotes Mosley in 1925 as saying, of 
Gandhi , 
(He) was one of the great world forcesq not by 
the power,, of his considerable intellect and 
personality, but because alone amongst statesmen 
he appears to have conquered in himself the ordinary 
* 67 weaknesses of humanity, 
Yet by 1934 Mosl ey was saying that there was no one who could speak 
for India. The members of the Congress Party "were people who were 
inspired by a bitter animosity against Britain, and they would use 
their power to erect prohibitive tariffs against Lancashire goods. " 
68 
Mosley's analysis of the problems of the cotton industry in The 
Greater Britain was basically the same as that for all industries. 
Scientific advance produced lower:, prices and high employment until 
new markets were exhaustedp leading to an overproduction of goods. 
This process of Irationalisationt was at the heart of the problem 
of all the staple industries. Only the Corporate State could resolve 
the situation. "Nothing but the rationalised state can hope to 
overcome the problem created by the rationalised industry. " 
69 
In 
dealing with particular industrial markets, Mosley dealt with the 
export of textile machinery to the underdeveloped areas of the world. 
The manufacturing output of those countries was subsequently 
improvediat the expence of the Lancashire markets. There was alloss 
of the yarn expodt trade to Japan which, in competing with India and 
China was beginning to focus her attention on the production of 
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piece goods, Scientific advance had rendered the use of skilled 
labour unnecessar7 in many sectors of industry. 
No limits are now set to the exploitation of the 
backward labour of the Orient in competition with 
the skilled labour of the West ... that tendency is 
bound to increase and to become a deadly menace 
to the whole white standard of life, and indeed to 
the whole structure of Western civilisation. 
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So far, however, the analysis of the problems of the rationalisation 
of industry and foreign competition had not produced a policy to 
deal with the specific problems of the cotton industry. 
When a fascist policy for the cotton industry was arrived at, in 
1934, great play was made of the fact that it was Manchester that had 
produced the concept of Liberal Free Trade. This theme was first 
expounded by Raven Thompson7lwho, over the following three years, 
expanded on the theme* The B. U. P. Is 'analysis' of the, problems of 
the cotton industry developed this theme and Manchester came to be 
seen as the victim of 'financial power' which had reigned supreme 
until'the Manchester Pree Traders had temporarily "usurped the 
leading place in economic affairs" in the nineteenth century. 
By 1900 the City (of London) had fully regained 
its old power, and had involved the country in 
the Boer War in parsuit of its gold interests, 
despite the disgust of the Manchester Liberals. 
Already the great finance houses were engaged 
upon a campaign of financial expansion abroad 
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far exceeding in magnitude and scope the earlier 
expansion of Lancashire. Manchester was reverting 
to a mere provincial centre, and the powers of 
international finance were planning a revenge, 
even more drastic than the punishment she herself 
had inflicted upon Tox7 landlords by the repeal 
of the Corn Laws. 
72 
Since the power of Free Trade had been usurped by 'International 
Finance' the time had come for Free Trade itself to be overturned. 
By the time the first B. U. P. cotton campaign in Lancashire was 
orgariisedp in July 1934, the B. U. F. pamphlet Cotton, India, and You. ' 
had been published, The pamphlet was addressed to the 'Lancashire 
Workers' and coupled the rejection of Free Trade with attacks on 
the government's attitude to India, which was described as 'surrender'* 
The future of Lancashire is ultimately concerned 
with the 'White Paper' policy of surrender to 
India! Our politicians are determined to hand over 
India to those few native agitators who are 
hoodwinking the ignorant Indian masses. Behind them 
loom the rich mill-owners of Bomtay, who have 
subscribed huge sums to Congress. What does it all 
mean? It means that international finance has 
determindl to exploit cheap native labour in India 
and drive out Lancashire altogether, Are you 
prepared to lose your last great Imperial market, 
to see unfortunate Indian natives herded into the 
hideoud tenements of Bombay to sweat dividends for 
international finance, while you walk the streets 
of Bolton and Manchester? 
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The B. U. P. feared that government policy would hand over control 
of India to 11 ... Indian financiersl who have notoriously supported 
Gandhi and the Congress. Swaraj movement. These rich mill-owners 
rigorously exclude Lancashire goods from India and bring about 
the final ruin of the British cotton trade. "74 
Cotton. India, and You: went on to outline a four point programme 
for'saving the cotton industry and which became the focal point of 
the B. U. P. cotton campaigns in Lancashire, Firstly, 1: 5r excluding 
foreign textiles from the Crown Colonies, immediate employment could 
be given to 11,000 workers in the industry in Lancashire. Secondly, 
the Indian tariff barriers against Lancashire would be removedq 
providing work for another 25,000 workers. The corollary to this 
point would be strong government in India and fall fiscal control 
placed in the hands of Britain. Thirdly, the exclusion of Japanese 
textiles from India would create employment for 299000 workers in 
Lancashire. Thus a total of 65,000 jobs could be saved. The fourth 
point was that Indian mill owners would be compelled to raise wages 
and thus provide a decent standard of living for their workers. The 
employers would also be forced 'to gut and rebuild the foul 
industrial slums of the East! * 
The use of force required to implement this policyg or the type of 
government needed to use such force, was never spelt out in detail 
at meetings, nor were the means by khiýhMosley arrived, at . his figures. 
The policy would in all respects have been impossible to implement 
successfully, though the point iEk that it brought cheers from the 
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audience and a belief that Mosley would be able to do something. On 
the street corners the policy was translated into clichea and 
slogans and embellished with any other propag-anda, the speakers 
could think of. 
It was not to be long before 'international Finance' was translated 
into 'Jewish International Finance', exploiting 'oriental labour,. 
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This move was partly a result of Mosley's own hardening anti-Semitism 
but was also a result of the fact that this was how Mosley's original 
words were translated from the beginning by the ordinary fascist 
members in the B. U. F. branches. 
It is here that the 'authoritative' and non-authoritative' sources 
of B. U. F. ideas became entangled. One fed the other, until the 
result, as perceived by the general public, was confused. The over 
simplified and p9pulist panacea for the ills of the cotton industry 
was seen as part of the B. U. F. 's general anti-Semitic campaign,, oni 
the one hande On the other hand the authoritarianism and use of 
military force implied in the B. U. F. 's policy for the cotton 
industry was never far below the surface. The different layers of 
Fascist ideology could be seen most clearly. The authoritarianism 
implicit in much of the policy of the B. U. F. was made explicit in 
theeactual organisation of the movement. The command structure and 
the emphasis on Mosley's leadership was continually stressed and 
affected the relationships between different ranks at branch level. 
While 'survival-of the fittestt wast as we shall see, the way of 
solving local leadership problems, Mosley himself imposed his own 
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brand of leadership on the movement. Both in his personal 
over the movement and in the logical conclusion of many o 
movement's policies, the classical fascist concept of 'dictatorship' 
can be discerned. Part of the authoritarianism of the B. U. P. was 
linked to the movements policy on anti-Semitism, and it is to this 
aspect of British fascism that we must now turn. 
There are three possible explanations for the campaign of anti- 
Semitism pursued by the B*U*F. The first is that Mosley was 
opportunistic and used anti-Semitism to increase the support of his 
movement, without personally being a convinced anti-Semite. The 
second is that the Movements anti-Semitism was genuine. The third 
I 
explanation is that the movement responded to irresistable internal 
pressures. 
76 The second explanation, that the anti-Semitism of the 
B. U. F. was genuinev is the one adopted here* Not only was it genuineq 
but it was present from the early days of the formation of the New 
Party, which preceded the M. P., and thereafter provided a 
continuing theme throughout the life of the B. U. F. 
There is of course a history of antiýSemitism in this countx7g and 
that history has been adequatiaýy researched*77 All one can point to 
here is the fact that that history of anti-Semitism provides the 
social setting for the anti-Semitism of the New Party and the B. U. F. 
The B. U. F. didinot suddenly produce a new policy out of a hat which 
shocked the sensibilities of the British public. The Jewish 
community for one, was certainly aware of the continuing danger of 
anti-Semitism rearing its headq thoughp as we shall see, the leaders 
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of the Jewish community were quite unprepared for the anti-Semitism 
of the Fascist movement* 
By the summer of 1932, the Jewish community was beginning to be 
aware of anti-Semitioopinions being expressed by seotions of Oswald 
Mosley's New Party. An attempt has been made to lay the blame for 
incidents of an anti-Semitic nature in the New Party fairly and 
78 
squarely on the shoulders of the individuals involved, since the 
declared policy of the New Party did not include any reference to 
antiý. Semitism. When similar 'individual' acts of anti-Semitism were 
carried over into the British Union of Fascists, similar claims were 
made*79 Mosley himself, it seems, has been cleared* 
The point to be made here is that a political movement does not 
solely become anti-Semitio when the leader of that movement describes 
it as such, or when the public at large see the leader attaching 
himself to that doottine, A political movement, such as the M. P., 
can be said to have adopted anti-Semitism when the general body of 
its membership does so and when that membership or sections of that 
membership takes part in anti-Semitic acts. It id not enough for the 
leader of the movement to disown anti-Semites within the movement if 
such people are allowed to continue their activities, especially 
when the leader himself states later that he is of a similar frame 
of mind. 
In August 1932 an unemployed youth aged nineteen, who was a member 
of the New Party and gave his address as I Great George Street, 
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Westminster (the headquarters of the New Party), was convicted of 
sticking labels on windows in Oxford Street, London. The labels 
contained the slogan 'Nationalise the wealth of the Jew Banks and 
expel all Jews from the country. ' 
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Earlier, in July, a speaker at 
a New Party meeting held in Westminsterg spoke out against the Jews* 
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The New Party did in fact issue a statement following the court case 
referred to above, which the Jewish Chronicle printed in full. 
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In 
it, the New Party acknowledged that the defendant in the case was 
a member of their organisation and that he lived on the premises of 
the New Party headquarters. However. ' since the youth was acting in 
a private capacity the New Party did not provide any defence for 
him. Anti-Jewish propagandag'the statement added, 'was neither 
authorised nor approved by Sir Oswald Mosley. The youth remained 
in the New Party. 
While the Jewish press welcomed the New Party statement, 'it was 
not entirely satisfied. In October 1932, by which time the New 
Party had been transformed into the B. U. F., Mosley himself was 
saying: 
We attack Jews if they are engaged in subversive 
activities such as the direction of the Communist 
Party or equally when they are engaged in 
international financial transactions such am those 
which have recently shaken this country. We never 
attack Jews because they are Jews. Jews who are 
loyal citizens of Britain and who serve their 
country rather than its enemies will always have 
a square deal from us*83 
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As the Jewish Chronicle pointed outp in the minds of many poople, 
. 
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a Jew must necessarily be either a Communist or a banker. 
The link between the Jewish comnunity and 'international financial 
transactions' or the Communist Party had odrtainly already 
formulated in Mosley's mind. At a B. U. P. meeting in the Memorial 
Hall, Lond6n, at the end of September 1932, Mosley, in reply to 
three questionersp shouted out "Three warriors of class war, all 
from Jerusalem". 
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The New Statesman, for one, was already 
wondering why Mosley had taken up anti-Semitism as part of his 
creed. 
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Nor was it just a question of the leader, or sections of 
the movement in London adopting such a creed. As early as December 
1932, the Yorkshire B. U. F. table tennis club resigned from the 
Leeds TablezTennis League when it found that its list of matches 
included one against a Jewish team. 
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Even so, Mosley could write 
to Lord Melchett in January 1933 as follows: 
It is quite in accord with my definition of the 
British Union of Fascists attitude upon this 
question to say that anti-Semitism forms no part 
of the policy of this organisation and that 
anti-Semitic propaganda is forbidden in this 
organisatione 
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The B. U. P. did izi fact disown some members who were obviously 
giving the movement a bad namev though the members were not actually 
expelled. They were merely said to be acting in a 'private capacity'* 
This was the case in March 1933 when a Manchester membert Daniel 
MoNichol, 'was arrested and charged in Rochdale with conduct likely 
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to cause a breach of the peace, assaultq and being armed with a 
rubber coil filled with lead. 
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KoNichol and many others were connected with what the Jewish 
Chronicle referred to as 'anti-Jewish manifestations' in ganchester 
in February 1933, Jews were- 
***threatened with personal violence. Jewish 
shopkeepers have found their premises plastered 
with inflammatory incitements such as 'Down with 
the Jews' and 'Perish the Jews'. Offensive notices 
are reported to have been posted on the walls and 
railings of a local synagogue and chalked on the 
pavements, with the swastika decoration* Moreoverv 
a brick has been thrown through the window of a 
house where a woman was lying seriously ill, while 
a piece of paving brick, hurled with great force 
thruogh the window of the Talmud Torahq had labels 
attached bearing attacks on the League of Nations 
as "a plot for world control of Jews", on the 
Peace Conference as a "Jews Conference" and on 
Jews in general as controllers of politics, 
Purveyors of "sensual films", "temperers with 
white girls" and the cause of all the national 
troubles in Ireland, India, Egypt and even Chinao 
go 
It was not just Manchester that had to put up with 'anti-Jewish 
manifestations'. They were repeated in Leeds and London and identical 
labels to the ones found in the Manchester Talmud Torah were pasted 
on to Jewish owned shops in the Strand in London. 
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It was also reported from Ruskin Colleffe, Oxfordq in a letter to 
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the Jewish Chronicle that 11 ... Mosley can deny what he likes, his 
members are frequently notorious anti-Semites, and some of them 
told me last term that they had affixed labels to the doors of 
Jewish students (not Communists). 1192 In fact, the members of the 
B. U. F. in Oxford went further than this* 
Last term in Oxford a branch of the British Union 
of Fascists was started by Sir Oswald Mosley himself, 
and it was not long before labels were posted on the 
doors of Jewish students rooms "Down with the Jews. "'; 
"The Jews are the enemies of the human race! "; "The 
Jews control the Press, the Cinema and the wireless! " 
were among the least offensive. Several Jewish 
students were 'ragged' in a disgraceful and 
unprovaked way by squads of Fascist bullies from 
various colleges. TIm Blackshirts were to be seen 
everywhere in the city streets, and the devices of 
the Swastika and fasces were chalked upon every 
important building. 
Matters came to a head when gangs of Fasoists 
attempted to invade club meetings at which Jewish 
students were present., I took it upon myself to 
organise a defence for these meetings. When Dr Thostp 
Hitlers Chief correspondent in Londonp came to 
Oxford to address the German clubp he found that more 
than fifty per cent of his hearers were violently 
opposed to Hitlerism. Demonstrations were held at 
intervals, and there was a marked diminution in the 
ardour of the Fascists. So uneasy did they becomep 
in spite of their numerical superiority to our 
organisation, that they adopted the custom of 
fixing the dates ard times of their meetings in 
private and of publicly announcing the wrong dates 
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and times. This happened on several occasionsp and 
must have occasioned them no little expense* 
Towards the end of term attempts at molesting 
Jewish students became more frequent and there were 
a few ugly cases. I need hardly say that we administered 
effective reprisals. 
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Perhaps people did have some grounds for thinkingp as the Jewish, 
Chronicle was keen to stress, that the "anti-Jewish manifestations" 
were the work of misguided individuals which did not suggest the 
existence of any widespread or important movement. The Manchester 
Jews were, for example, advised that the wisest course was "Just 
to leave the dogs to their vomit and the police,,, 
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However, the uniformity of the anti-Semitic slogans and IstickY- 
backs' does suggest that the B. U. F., if it did not actually 
commission the campaign of anti-Semitismv didq at the very leastv 
condone the activities of those members who isstted such anti-Semitic 
material. By its sin of ,, ýomissionq failingthat is, to censure such 
members, the movement as a whole must be held resposible. 
In May 1933 a representative of the Jewish Chronicle interviewed 
Mosley. During the interview Mosley stated that: 
The Press of this country as a whole has completely 
misrepresented the position of the British Union Of 
Fascists in relation to the Jews. This 
misrepresentation, of coursev has been quite 
deliberate and on the facts is inexcusable. Within 
a month of the foundation of the B. U. F. in October 
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1932 an order was posted by me in all our premises 
forbidding Jew baiting in any shape or form and stating 
definitely that the M. P. was not anti-Semitic. I 
have repeatedly challenged any newspaper to bring to 
my notice cases which infringe this order and 
consequently would lead to the expulsion of a member. 
No case has been brought to my notice but the 
misrepresentation continues. 
There are one or two small societieso but in no 
way connected with us, called Pascistsp which still 
exist purely for the purpose of Jew baiting. Their 
activities and their attacks upon the Jews are often 
ascribed to us. They are entirely ineffective and for 
practical purposes can be ignoredv as any effective 
memýership which they ever possessed long ago joined 
this organisation and loyalýY accepts our discipline. 
As I stated six months ago, any British citizeng Jew 
or Gentile, who is loyal to Great Britain will 
always have a square deal from us. Our attitude in 
this respect is very similar to that of Italian 
Fascism, whose attacks upon Jews are unknown. 
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When asked about the allegations of an inter-national financial 
conspiracy which was levelled against the Jewsq Mosley said that 
he not only accused the Jews of such conspiracyp but also Gentiles 
and that whether they be Jews or Gentiles he was openly hostile to 
them. Mosley went on to say that the word Jew was strictly forbidden 
in any of the Union literature. 
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This statement wasq however, riddled with falsehoods. The pI ress had 
not misrepresented the B. U. F., except in so far as sections of the 
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press, the Daily Mail and the London Evening Standard for example, 
played down the anti-Semitism and the violence of the movement. 
Other newspapers, the Manchester Guardian 2,,, the-. News Chronicle an& 
the Jewish Chronicle among others, accurately reported the anti- 
Semitic content of Mosley's speeches and provided accurate coverage 
of the Anti-Semitism amongst the membership of the movement. If 
the order refCrred to by Mosley had been posted in all the B. M. 
premises - and there is no evidence whatsoever of such a notice 
being posted in the Manchester headquarters - the ordinary 
membership was not eager to comply with it. No members were expelled 
because of their proven anti-Semitio outbursts; certainly not from 
the Oxford branch or the national headquarters in Great Ge6rge 
Street London, or from the Manchester headquarters* 
Mosley referred to "one or two small societied'19 by which he meant 
the Britons and the Imperial Fascist League which existed '#purely 
for the purpose of Jew baiting. " Mosley did not refer to the fact 
that in April 1932 he chaired a meeting of the Imperial Fascist 
League, at which the foundert Arnold Leese, spoke to the youth 
section of the New Party, NUPA, on "The Blindness of British Politiol 
under the Jew Money-Power.,, 
97 Nor did Mosley see the inconsistency 
in his statement that the B. U. F. was not anti-Semitic but that 
people left the Britons and The Imperial Fascist League, which 
existed "purely for the purposes of Jew baiting'19 in order to 
join the B. U. F. 
Meanwhile some other actions of the leadership of the B*U. P. were 
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causing disquiet in Jewish circles. f 
In August 1933, four of the leaders of the B. U. F. paid a visit to 
Nuremburg at the invitation of the Nazi Party, where they took part 
in a Nazi rally waaring the full uniform o; C the B. U. P. The Jewish 
Chroniole pointed out to Mosley the old saying '%en are judged by 
the company they keep. Will he now set himself right by a 
declaration that his deputies pilgrimage to Nuremburg implied no 
approval of the war declared there on the Jewish people. "98 
In faot Mosley had intended visiting Germany in January 1932 with 
Harold Nicholson. In the even* he missed the German trip and met 
Nicholson in Rome. The trip was described by Nicholson to his friends 
as "an information gathering exercise. "99 Mosley certainlv seemed 
impressed by the information he received from Nicholson, who noýed 
in dismay, that "Tom cannot keep his mind off shook troops a-ad the 
roll of drums around Westminster. He is a romantic. That is his 
great failing. "'C)o 
In April 1932 Nicholson wrote to Dr Robert Forgang revealing his 
dissatisfaction with the New Party: 
I joined for two reasons. (1) Personal affection and 
belief in Tom. (2) A conviction that a serious crisis 
was impending and that our economic and parliamentary 
system must be transformed if a collapse were to be 
avoided. Now I feel that the New Party as such has 
101 become too much identified with Hitlerism. 
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Robert Skidelsky quotes a letter written to Mosley by Nicholson, 
dated June 29 1932, concerning the first draft of, Greater Britain. 
Nicholson referred to Mosley's I'destructve platform manner" and 
continued: 
I dare say that the Jewish baxting houses may have 
been a trifle international in their frame of mind. 
I am quite prepared even to believe that they have 
been the villain of the peace. But there is a Nazi 
note, a yellow press note in these denunciations 
which will cause many people to blink and question 
your seriousness. It is easy to tone down that sort 
of statement by a short qualifying phrase. English 
readers are always impressed by propogandists who 
take off their boots before they start kicking 
below the belt. 102 
As a result of this pressure from Nicholson, Mosley did not include 
the pages referring to Jews in The Greater Britaino 
As far as the anti-Semitism of the ordinary membership of the B. U. P. 
was concerned there are some interesting examples one can turn to* 
We have already noted the case of Daniel MoNicholp which occurred 
as early as March 1933. That may be considered an isolated examplep 
but we have available some general observations of the movements 
anti-Semitism from older members. The leader in Hull for examplep 
has stated that anti-ýSemitic feelings ran high amongst local 
members. 
103 A member of the B. U. F. speaking panel in Leeds spoke 
of similar feelings being expressed from a very early date (1932) 
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in his area and he himself still held extreme anti-Semitic views. 
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A common feature amongst old members who were interviBwedaas'7ýpait 
of this study was their denial of any anti-Semitic feelings of their 
own, before going on to ascribe certain characteristics to Jews. 
We will see later how Sutherst, one of the interviewees, accused 
the Jews of causing the Second World War, Before making that 
statement, Sutherst had this to sayt 
The truuble at any local meeting was caused through 
organised opposition. Communist opposition. Even 
Jewish opposition as well, That doesn't make me 
anti-Semitic by the way, I always followed Mosley's 
lead on this anti-Semitism and this discrimination. 
He always said that he condemned the Jewsq not for 
what they were, but for what they did* What caused 
them I think to be anti-Mosley and anti-Union 
Movement was the fact that our policy would hit themg 
not racially, but financially ... they were more 
predominantly, somehow, in clothing factoriesy which 
were notorious for paying low wages. It was really 
sweated labour ... 
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In Manchester2 another old member, while refusing to believe 
that she was anti-Semitic, went on to say that t1they (the Jews) 
brought it upon themselves. I mean, the way they controlled 
everything, tt 
106 When Thomas Pickles was asked whether there were 
any. feelings against the Jews in his branch in Manchesterp he 
replieds 
It never seemed to register to us that there wasp 
but I don't think the British Fascist 14ovement was 
really as anti-Semitic as the Germans were. I think 
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it was the reaction of the Germans to Semites 
that caused the feelings here. They thought well 
one Pascist organisation was like another one. 
don't knowq the geneml run of British people 
are not aggravated minded are they reallyp against 
other races. To me a Jew is only another part of 
the count: r7. He's one of us as far as I know- 
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At the same time, however, he praised the work of Ilitler in GermanY- 
Of course you have got to realise that Hitler was 
making quite a success of things in Germany at that 
t1me and naturally you think that if you have Cot 
somebody in that area he could probably do the same. 
I mean as you realise that Hitler at that time was 
doing good for his country. He hadn't startedrthe 
aggravation that subsequently came along. 
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Pickles explained his lack of activity in the B. U. P. by saying he 
didn't like aegravation. #'I could see that was what it was you see. 
Where the present N. F. (National Front) have got the coloured people 
against them, at that time we had the Jews. 11109 
The most common form of Fascist behaviour in Manchester, in which 
a feeling againsttJews was a motivating factor, was marching through 
a Jewish area. However innocent this may 
have appeared, it was a 
deliberately provocative act- It seemed 
to work; that is it 
provoked the Jewsv as this example provided 
by Arthur Fawcett would 
indicate. 
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We had a meeting at the Free Trade Hall and Mosley 
had been there. We were walking backg a gang of us, 
a number of us, back to Northumberland House which 
was in Higher Broughton ... and of course in those 
days it was a Jewish quarter and there was a Jewish 
cafe, there was a Jewish fish and dhiý shop and all 
this sort of thing. And the Jewish people used to 
go there, the young ones you know, talking about 
what have you, you know, and congregating on the 
street corners and this sort of thing and we were 
fully conversant with this and this was the reason 
we walked down there to tell you the truth. And if 
its trouble they want, its trouble they can have. 
If its trouble they don't want its trouble they 
won't get and so we walked down there and there was 
booing and the crowds was following us ... 
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The fact that the Jews had been provoked by Pasoists marching in 
uniform was entirely missed by Fawcett. 
Well, you seeg it wasn't a movement against the Jews 
at the start, It evolves. They did eventually gov 
because the Jews were against usp more than You can 
understand the Jews being against us because we 
represented to them Hitler, didn't we? That was the 
link and you can well understand themp you see, and 
not taking our word that we weren't anti-Semitiov 
which we weren't at the beginning of time. But as 
time went by and all the attacks we got were from 
Jews, then we became anti; 4emitic. I became anti- 
Semitic, but I'm not anti-Semiticq not now, not 
really you know. I can be as friendly with a Jew 
as I can be friends with you* It doesn't make any 
difference to me. And I think most of us were like 
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that at the time. But its just the fact that 
they were always attacking us and whenever there 
was trouble there was Jews. And, as you know there 
were a Jewish Communist Party in Russia. In the very 
early dVs the Jews were there in positions of 
power* 
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Fawcett ts activities went beyond marching with his friends through 
the Jewish district of Higher Broughton. 
I remember sticking anti-Jewish labels in teleph6ne 
kiosks. Little labels, andiit had ong well I 
remember one. Somebody had just been made a peer. 
Some Jewish chap had been made a pder and it said 
"Look at the long noses of our aristocracy. #$ They 
would be the B. M. stickers. I don't know where 
they came from, but we had them at the club. That's 
the only one I can remember but various things 
like that happened you know- Insults to the Jewish 
people as it were. 
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Fawcett made the point that Jews were against them 
ff, because we 
representedv to themp Htler. " It is true thaty in calling his 
movement Fascist, Mosley implanted in many people's minds the idea 
that it was a movement similar to that 
in GermanYp where the 
persecution of Jews was already taking place* 
Even if there was no 
connection with the anti-Semitism rife 
in Germany at that time, 
many people could be excused for 
thinking there was. Mosley's visit 
to Germany in August 1933 merely served 
to emphasise the point. 
Peoplep especially Jews in this cOuntryp 
could not be blamed for 
Putting two and two togethero 
The Jewish Chronicley remarking on 
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that visit, said: 
Few people - and certainly few Germans - would 
suppose that you could 'heil Hitler' and denounce 
at the same time one of the chief things for which 
he stands. 
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The paper went on to point out that the diplomatic representatives 
of Britain, France and America had turned down the German invitation 
to attend the same rally. 
We have already noted Harold Nicholson's remark that the New Party 
itself was already "identified with Hitlerism". This identification 
could not but increase when the New Party became the British Union 
of Fascists in October 1932. Not only was Mosley's movemenV, anti- 
Semitic but, as we have seen, at the heart of the different levels 
of ideology was the revolutionax7 concept of the Corporate Stateo 
That, in turn)was deemed to require a use of force and the 
dictatorship of Mosley himself over every aspect of the Felpoiat ý-' 
State. The British Empire would become a fortress, presided over bY 
an armed dictatorship equalling that of Hitler's Germany. That was 
the deepest layer of ideology to which the leadership and many 
other people in the movement adhered. We shall now see that these 
ideas co-existed with other levels of ideology. In focusirigS. our 
attention on the B. U. P. in the North of Englandq and on Manchester in 
particular, we can reveal the populism of the movemaht as well as 
its more sinister side. 
PART 'IWO 
FASCISM IN THE NORTH WEST OF ENGLAND. 
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO VANCHESTER. 
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CHAPTER THM 
SPRING OFFENSIVE 
A picture of the organisation and history of the B-U-F- in Manchester 
is something that can only be built up in a piecemeal fashion- The 
records kept by the Manchester headquarters of the movement are 
inaccessible. Internal rivalries and disputes led to frequent 
re-organisation and a fairly high turnover of leading figures. As a 
result it has sometimes been rather difficult to keep track of eventsy 
particularly as the Fascist press would not be the first to disclose 
and analyse such upheavals. However it is possible to present a 
general idea of the development of the movement in the Manchester 
area by using as many sources as possible. The Fascist press2 of 
course2 carried some news and articles relating to the area and local 
and national newspapers maintained an interest in the movement. 
However2 in October 1938, the Fascist newspaper Blackshirt split 
into a Southern edition and a Northern edition. It seems that copies 
of the Northern edition placed in the British Library newspaper 
section were destroyed by enemy action during the 2nd World War. It 
has not been possible to trace the newspaper either in the 
Union 
Movement archives or in any of the major 
libraries in the North of 
England2 though the paper may be available 
in some private collections. 
Various groups kept the B. U*F- under surveillance and2 when 
those 
observations were recordedp are another source of 
information* Left 
wing political groups, together with groups 
within the Jewish 
community, have proved to be important 
in this respect. Vall1able 
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information has also been provided by ex-members of the B. U. F. who 
responded to requests for help in the building up of a pieture of 
the movement in the North, 
By following the progress of the movement in Manchester, it is possible 
to learn something about its national significance. This is 
particularly the case sincep outside London, Manchester was the most 
important area Xor the B. U. F. Indeedv in some respects, Manchester 
achieves a greater importance than London in terms of the development 
and progress of the movements We need to distinguish between the 
various claims made by the B. U. P. about it strength and devel"opment, 
and to relate them to what actually happened. We need to monitor 
the response of the rmovement to the particular difficulties posed 
by a city such as Manchester, with its varied problems resulting from 
the vulnerability of its staple industries in a harsh economic climate; 
its heterogeneous population, with a large mixture of Jews and Irish, 
and yet its strength as an important major city in the United Kingdom. 
Part Two of this thesis attempts to achieve these tasks* The exercise 
will result in a better understanding of the growth and development of 
the B. U. F. than we have so far had at our disposal. 
** ** *** 
The B. U. F. was not the first Fascist organisation to appear in 
Manchester. Eight years prior to the appearance of Mosley's movement 
in the dity, the Manchester Fascist Brigade was formed* This particular 
organisation was founded by members of the substantial community of 
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Italians in the district of Ancoats, near the city centre. It is 
perhaps worth looking at this organisation in some detail, since it 
has so far evaded the eyes of contemporary historians. It provides 
an interesting insight into one of the many immigrant communities 
in Manchester and is relevant- to the later history of the B. U. F. in 
the area. 
The Manchester Fascist Brigade was formally established in January 
1924 at the home of 'Ingeniere Bertolast in Cecil St.,, Ancoats. The 
*I people who attended the first meeting were known as the Idella primara, 
A 
(of the first hour), and were drawn from the professionalt cultural 
and religious leaders'-df the local Italian community, Apart from 
In, -, eniere Bertolas, those present were "Dr Laetre Azzonip the 
geometrician/land surveyer, Prof. Piero Rebora, Dr Azzoniq Cav. D. 
Antonelli, Mr Megatti of the Midland Hotel, the lawyer Himinip Mr 
G. Pessagno, a pepresentative of the Newcastle Fascist League and a 
good number of Italians from Ancoats. " This account of the first 
meeting is taken from a previously untranslated history of the Italian 
community in Manchester, 
1 
which went on to outline the aims of the 
organisation and, in providing information on other Italians 
involved, showed the level at which the Brigade was organised and its 
links with Mussolini. 
(The) 'Fascists of the first hour' encountered 
great difficulties. Its leaders in partioulart had 
to face grave risks, the more so because at first 
the movement was regarded with deep suspicion 
abr6ad. The first attempts were therefore hazardous. 
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However, with boldness, enthusiasm and unshaken 
faith in the Duce who had started the drive 
towards rebirth, it was possible to continuep at 
least for a time, at liberty and safe from any 
'hitch or hindrance'. The presence in subsequent 
assemblies of the Conoil Cavalieroe Uff. E. Fontana 
Jucher and of Cav. Uff Ten de Cavolis, Vice 
Consul General at Liverpoolq instilled the neophytes, 
if such we may call them, with faithfulness, and 
In turn, around these gathered the ex-combatants. 
The first President was Prof. Piero Cav. Rebarap 
at one time Captain of the Alpini, a resolute mang 
with great initiative. He announced frequent 
reunions, held conferences and ccommamorationst 
organised feasts and banquets, with the aim of 
revitalising the Colony, which for some years... 
had fallen into lethargy, so that it could re-establish 
its existence and regain its conscience. On Dr Rebora's 
retirement in 1928, the Fascist Brigadeq as a. 
testimony to his worthwhile and fruitful workq 
presented him with a gold medal with a portrait of 
the Duce and an appropriate inscription* However he 
did continue to take part in the organisinE; committee 
and to serve the cause readily, 'especially by defending 
to the bitter end the fascist regime in the columns of 
the principle critical English newspapers. 
2 
On-tbe retirement of Dr Rebora, Dr Laele Azzoni became aotine 
secretary until he returned to Italy for business reasons. Cav. 
Rantozzi took over from Azzoni as secretary and also became honorary 
treasurer, Under the guidance of Rantozzi, the Fascist Brigade 
apparently increased its membership and funds. Rantozzi retired in 
1928 because of ill health and was presented with a framed portrait 
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of theýDace for his services to the Brigade. He was succeeded by 
Giovanni Panizzi, Chancellor to the Consulate in Manchester, who 
managed -to increase the membership, and co-ordinated the activities 
of the Brigade by issuing regular ciroulars. 
Panizzi, eventually became Chancellor to the General Consulate in 
Liverj)ool andýtook up the post of'secretary to the Fascist Brigade 
there. The Pýsclst Brigade in Liverpool appeared to be well organised, 
with regular issues of information bulletins. Fascist Brigades were 
formed in other cities where Italians had formed small communities. 
I , . 
Dr Rebora, who was present at the inaugtLral meeting in Manchester, was 
instrumental in forming a Fascist League in Leeds, in which interest 
was shown by the Italian Consul in Bradford. There was a IiAgorous' 
Fascist League in Sheffield, whose trustee was Sig. Giovacchino 
Stefanutti, ' which had some links with the Manchester section. There 
was a flourishing Fascist Brigade amongst the Italian community in 
Xewcastleýand also in Glasgow. In December 1931 the Fascist Brigades 
of Manchester'and Glasgow were noted, oUt of all the Fascist Leagues 
of Great Britain, for 'services rendered' by the General Secretary 
of the Fascist Leagues Abroad. 
When'Panizzi left Manchester he was replaced as Seoretei-y- of the 
Brigade by Cav. Domenico Antonelli. Circulars continued to be 
distributed and Anto-nelli "(developed) the'va - riou ,s activities of the 
Fascist League with zeal and intelligence. Circular-No. 46 stated 
that at ýthe' end of October 1931 there were 140 members in Manchester 
and that net funds were 9259 6s 2d. in credit. ,3 
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The Fascist Brigade in Manchester provided many benefits for those 
members of the Italian community who paid their membership fees. An 
annual 'whist drive' was held in November which produced a profit in 
the region of Z40. Such fund raising events, together with donations 
(In 1931 the President contributed Z50) enabled the Brigade to provide 
annual outings for the children of the local community, The Fascist 
Brigade, in fact, took over the management of schools for Italian 
schoolchildren, at St. Alban's Church, Ancoats. The Parish Priest 
of St. Alban's, Father Gaetano Fracassi, provided the premises for the 
day school. There was an annual Fascist feast day of the Befana 
(la festa della Befw4t-is Epiphany, a traditional Italian holiday) 
at which the schoolchildren were provided with sweets and presents. 
In July 1931 the Consul in Manchester invited the children and the 
staff of the school to his residence in Fielden Park. Children of 
the community attended summer school, ýcamps in Italy every year* 
The benefits resulting from membership of the Fascist Brigade were 
considerable in the Italian community. The community leaders were 
members (their leadership of the community may in fact have depended 
to a large extent on their membership of the Brigade) and others 
in the community gained some respect by their social intercourse with 
members of the Consulate and intellectual and religious leaders of 
the community. 
There was another important function performed by the Fascist Brigade, 
which could be realised by sending children to the summer camps in 
Italy. Valgim'igh provided a descriptiont 
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Thus children of Italians are kept in contact with the 
motherland, and learn to appreciate the natural and 
artistic beauty of the districts of origin of their 
'fathers, niether can it escape them, albeit they of 
, 
tender years, the 'restful lives of the citizens'. 
This innovation also serves to keep alive a spirit of 
Italian-ness amongst emigrants, more so because 
through the severe restrictions, especially in these 
islands, the number of our compatriots is decreasing, 
and in time maybe the. different colonies might 
disappear or would become absorbed. In any case, as it 
was rightly said by a writer in the Marzooco of 
-. 
Florence: the Italians abroad 'are a real and living 
part of the. common homeland. They are no longerg as 
was once the cape, turned away from the life of the 
nation'. No one, thereforev can deny the beneficial 
and salutary affects of the new regime in all their 
4 
manifestations. 
The Fascist Brigade was fully aware that if the Italian community 
in Manchester was to maintain its identityq its language and its 
oulture, it had to be oonstantly reminded of its links with the 
#motherland'. Howevert the links were not only to be with contemporary 
Italy, 
, 
ýO, with Italian history, its greatness and its leaders. 
Mussolini-yas seen as the present incumbant of the honourable 
post of 'great leader' who had rescued Italy from turmoil and defeat. 
Religion and, politics, were close allies in the Manchester Italian 
community, reflecting the relationship which existed in 
' 
Italy itselfo 
St. Albans church, Ancoats,. wqs the centre of religion. for the 
commmnity and did as much to preserve the identity of the community and 
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instil in it a sense of history as the Fascist Brigade attempted to. 
The Church organised its own Whitsuntide procession which was 
distinct from those of other Catholic churches. The older Italian 
generation of the 1930's conversed in Italian and the St. Albans 
school, under its headmistress and her two assistants, instilled in 
the children a sense of national awareness. 
One of the many interesting personalities thrown up by the Italian 
community was Father Gaetano Fraoassi, the Parish Priest of St. Albans, 
who highlighted the close relationship between church and politics. 
Fracassi was one of the leading figures in the Fascist Brigade. He 
orga: Used a youth club at St. Albans which was, in effect, the 
Fascist club for boys. The members of the youth club wore black 
shirtsq black ties and black berets. Old members of the congregation 
of St. Albans remember the club well and also remember the Italian 
5 boys marching and training on a 'croft' near the school. 
The black uniforms worn by the Italian Fascist Brigade members were 
obtained from Italy, as was the black dress worn by the Italian 
schoolchildren. When the Public Order Act became law on January 1st 
1937, there was some doubt as to whether the Italians would be able 
to continue wearing the black 'uniform'. The Italian ambassador to 
Britain, D. Grandi, was warned that the dress constituted a 
political uniform. After attempting to argue-the pointt Grandi 
eventually issued a direction to the schools, by which the black 
shirts and pullovers were to be replaced by ordinary blue jerseys. 
6 
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In -the late 1930's Father Fracassi supervised the collection of 
gold wedding rings and other valuable trinkets from the Italian 
community, which were sent to boost similar collections in Italy for 
the war effort. When the Second World War broke out, Father Fracassi 
became known locally as the 'Rebel Priest' because of his continued 
7 
support for Italy in the war. 
Defence Regulation 18b was introduced in 1940 to restrict the 
movement of aliens, and Fracassi was arreuted on June 11th 1940t 
within 24 hours of Italy's entry into the war. Many of the Italians 
who were interned under Defence Regulation 18b were transported by 
ship to the colonies. Father Fracassi was escorted aboard the 
Andora Star which sailed for Canada* On July 2nd 1940 the ship was 
attacked by a German U Boat in the Atlantic and--eventvLally sank. 
There were some survivors. Father Fracassi was not one of theme 
8 
It is apparent that the Manchester Italian Fascist Brigade must be 
seen. in relation to contemporaneous events in Italy and not as part 
of-the. development of Fascism in this country. The Fascist Brigade 
was as much a cultural movement as a political one and sought to 
strengthen its ties with Italy rather than take it0a message out to 
the people of Manchester. Yet the isolation of the Brigade does 
highlight some problems which faced the B. U. F. in Manchester in the 
19301s. The B. U. P. was seemingly pursuing similar ends to the 
Fascist Brigade. Mosley's movementp as we have seenp certainly drew 
many elements of its ideology from the experiences of Italy under 
Mussolini. At the same time, however, we know that the two 
99 
movements had virtually no contact with each other although each 
must have known of the other's existence. 
The reasons for this mutual isolation are relevant to the history 
of the B. U. F. and can be related to the discrepancy between the two 
levels on which the ideology of the B. U. F. operated. While the B. U. F. 
did indeed draw a great deal, in terms of ideas, from the Italian 
experience, the similarity ends there. The surface ideology of the 
B. U. F., which accounted so much for the type of membership in 
Manohestero mitigated against any official contact with the Fancist 
Brigadeo The Italian community was very close knit and had its own very 
distinct cultural life. Hence they were sepqrated socially and 
culturally from, say, the Irish Catholic community in Manchestero from 
which the M. P. drewýmuch of its support. Community identity, even 
the, group identity of a particular street, was important in the 
cultural and: social life of the city. Street gangs were a symbol of 
the', territoriallidentity of such communities. 
9 Such forces were at 
playq for example, in the developing anti-Semitism in the cityp with 
the Irish Catholics of Levenshume 'ganging hpt against the Jews of 
Cheetham Hillo There could be little contact of a social kindq which 
was a prerequisite to political contact in this contextq between the 
Italian community and the groups from which the M. P. drew its 
support. Out of all the many different types of people who became 
members of the B, U, F, in the city, only two, and those to the 
knowledge of only one of the ex-members of the BX-Fo interviewed, 
came from the Italian community in Ancoats. 
10 
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Another group of people in Manchester belonged to the British Fascists, 
whose President, Brigadier-General R. B. D. Blakeney, visited the city 
in December 1925. The British Fascists, which originated as the 
British Fascisti in May 1923, was the brainchild of Miss R. L. Linton- 
Orman, the daughter and grand-daughter of military men. Robert 
Benewick has identified three phases in the life of the movement, 
11 
the first of which, from 1923 to 1926, covers the period in which it 
is known there was a branch in Manchester. Initially the movement 
was nothing more than a military version of several anti-communist 
groups which existed at that time. The General Strike produced a 
split in its ranks, from which a more positive political programme 
emerged. In the last stage, in the 1930's, a Fascist policy modelled 
on Italian Fascism was developed. 
Blakeney used the occasion of his visit to Manchester to explain to 
the public the policy of his movement. There wqs a strong hint of 
anti-Semitism as well as anti-communism in the movementIS policyt both 
of which were held together by an extreme sense of patriotism. The 
aim was to 'revive the spirit of sane and intelligent patriotism? 
uphold the established constitution and prevent the spread of 
Bolshevism and Communism. 112 Blakeney spoke to a small audience in the 
Memorial Hallp Albert Square on December 16th 1925- It seems that more 
than half of the small group were opposed to Fascism. 'A strong dash 
of Stevenson Square soon manifested itself in the mental outlook and 
vocal capacity of the audience' commented the Manchester Guardianp 
13 
intimating a strong Communist presence much given to heckling. 
BlakenBywas at pains to distance himself from other Fascist movements, 
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'We have nothing to do with blackshirts and that sort of thing'. 
14 
,, 
Apparently the President was unable to explain much more about the 
policy of the British Fascists before the meeting ended in chaos, 
with, ipart of the audience singigg the National Anthem and another 
part the 'Red Flag'. 
There was no indication of the strenglh of the Manchester branch of 
the British Fascists. It could certainly not have been very large 
if the audience at the Memorial Hall meeting was anything to go by. 
ý; 
" Nothing was heard again of the movement in Manchester. Most of the 
national membership joined the B. U. P. on its formation in 1932, 
though nothing is known of what happened to the members in Manchester. 
****** 
The links between such existing fasoist organisations and the precursor, 
of, the B. U. F., the New Party, were, at the most, somewhat tenWus in the 
City of Manchester andy presumably, in the North West of England 
generally. 
TheýManchester branch of The New Party ran into trouble almost as 
soon as it was founded in March 1931. One of the key national figures 
in the New Party was Allen Young, who was in charge of the organisation 
of the Party. 'Young had been a Labour Party agent in Birmingham when 
I 
Mosley fought the Ladywood constituency for the Labour Party against 
Neville Chamberlain in 1924- Young became Mosley's private secretary 
in 1929 and played an important part in the formation of the New Party. 
I 
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He was instrumental in forming a branch of the New Party in Manchester. 
In March 1931 a meeting was held in the Free Trade Hall in Manchesterg 
at which Young was the main speaker. As a result of this meeting, 
several people described by the press as Socialists, who had been 
active in the Labour Party in the area, decided to form a local branch 
of the New Party. They held a meeting of their own which was 
presided over by Young. 
15 A Mr James Mathews became President of the 
local branch, with Harry Maskd as Vioe-President. George Glancy was 
nominated as Secretary and James Norbury as honorary General Secretary. 
This arrangement was short lived and cane to an end as soon as Allen 
Young was nominated as the New Party candidate for the Ashton 
parliamentary by-election the following month. Young's nomination 
was announced without any consultation taking place with the New Party 
branches outside the London Headquarters in Great George St. As far 
as the Manchester branch was concerned, this proved to be the final 
straw. It seems that the contact between the Manchester branch and the 
National Headquarters had been minimal right from the start* 
Arrangements concerning the development of the Northern region were 
made solely from London and, when Young was announced as a candidatep 
matters came to a head and the executive of the Manchester branch 
resigned en bloc in protest. None of the executive members of the 
Manchester branch of the New Party were heard of again in connection 
with Mosley's movement and it can be assumed that they did not 
become involved with the B. U. F. in Manchester. The New Party did not 
collapse altogether however, and some of the remaining members 
went on to serve in the B. U. F in Manchester. After the resignation of 
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the executive members, the New Party quickly degenerated into a 
social club as much as anything else. There was only one branch in 
Manchester, with around forty members. Eighteen or twenty of the 
members met for a drink and a social eveningg known as 'club night', 
in a city centre public house. 
16 
The transition from the New Party to the B. U. F. was conducted in 
precisely the same authoritarian and centralised way as the New Party's 
nomination for the Ashton by-election had been. The New Party's 
political agent in Ashton was Wilfred (Bill) Risdon, and it was he who 
was instrumental in the formation of the Manchester branch of the B. U. F. 
Bill. Risdon was typical of a certain section of the mebbership of the 
B. U. F., in that his political roots lay in Socialism. As a miner in 
South Wales he had become involved in politics with Aneurin Bevang 
and went on to become the Labour Party candidate for South Dorset in 
the 192-4 general election. Risdon found himself on the left wing 
of the Labour Party and was soon appointed Independent Labour 
Party organiser for the Midlands, based in Birminghamp where he 
first met Mosley. 
The B. U. F. was formally founded on 1st October 1932, at a meeting 
in the New Party headquarters in Great George St. London, with 
Mosley-in attendance. Risdon, who was appointed the first Director 
of Propoganda. of the B. U. F. was soon dispatched to Manchester in 
order to organise a branch which was strong enough to appoint all of 
its own officials. The inaugural meeting of the branch was held in a 
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6ity'centre cafe and the chair at that meeting was taken by Walter 
Dent, aTew Party member in Manchester. 
17 At the meeting, Dent, at 
the age of 31 , was appointed Commanding Officer of the B. U. F. in 
18 the City., Meetings were held at Dent's home in Stretford and 
sometimes at the homes of other members of the movement, until 
branch'headquarters were opened in Deansgate in the 6ity centre in 
March, 1933. 
In the'first years of the movement, the County Head4uarters were 
based in Prestont, and were referred to as Northern Command 
Headquarters, ýunder the leadership of G. G. Vincent, who was assisted 
by Captain-Vinoent Keens. The same compliints that were. voiced against 
the-centralist policies of the New Partyy which lud to the resignation of 
the Manchester executive, began to be heard about the administration 
of the B. U. F. in the area. Vincent and Keens ruled the, area in what 
seemed to be a dictatorial mannerg with no room fo dissenters, -, or 
appeals to higher authority. 
19 The propaganda department in Preston 
was run by Captain Wright, a cigarette salesman employed by Imperial 
Tobacco. Wright was, said to have been a 'big noise I in -the Scout 
movement, - and had taken many scouts with him into the B. U*F. He 
20 
was, thought by, markv-to be the 'life and soul' of Preston. -- 
Hisýwife- 
was in charge. bf the women's section of the B, U. F. in the, Northe 
Wright was helped in the propoganda seotion by IvIr Fisher, who was 
closely. involved in- the leadership of the local branch, -the, offices 
of which were in Mosley Hall' in St. Johns Place. The Northern 
Command Headquarters-, in Preston were run from a house'supplied by a 
Lady Tooley. 
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Preston was chosen, presumably, because it was the traditi6nal 
administrative centre for the county. In practice, howevero Preston 
was'far removed from the main areas of Fascidt; support in Lancashire 
and the arrangement did not last long. The immediate consequence of 
this arrangement was that the Deansgate premises in Manchester dealt 
only with'the Manchester area and was subordinate to the Preston 
headquarters. 
The first'few months in the life of the Manchester branch paralleled 
the fortunes of the movement in a national context. Members of the 
B. U. P. did not wear blaekshirts or adopt the later trimmings of the 
militai7 side of the movement until 1933. Mosley himself was 
certainly not ostracised by society. Indeedq his 'social links with 
politicians and members of the aristocracy continued to flourishy 
a nd he was still sought after as a public speaker and a contributor 
to debates* He addressed a meeting of the Manchester Sales Managers 
Association in October 1932 in the presence of the Lord Mayor and 
local This visit must have provided some stimulus to the 
local Fasciets and they seemed to be quietly working away at the 
task of building up local support. The membership of the Manchester 
branch'was beginning to take on the features which were to become the 
hallmarks of the membership nationallyt with a strange mixture Of 
people whom it was perhaps only possible to draw together under the 
um1rella" i of a Fascist movement. Risdon, 'as we have seeng' had been 
politically active as a socialist and had arrived in the B. U. P. through 
the I. L. P. Walter Dent was a painter and decorator andq as it turned 
out, something-of a petty criminal. In 1935 he was charged in the 
lo6 
Westminster Police Court in Londong with breaking and entering a 
restuarant in Great Smith St. and stealing a sum of money. 
21 
Another man who was charged with the same offence was Frederick Knowles, 
who was also a member of the Manchester branch in its early days, 
having joined at the age of 28, and was employed as a solicitors, clerk. 
There is some evidence that Dent was ostraoised by the B. U. F. when 
he ceased to be the leader in Manchester. He was thrown out of a 
Fascist meeting at the Albert Hall, London, in October 1934 by 
Fascist stewards and was arrested by the police for using insulting 
behaviour. 22 More attention will be paid to other members of the 
Manchester branch as we discuss their role in the organisation. 
Within a few months of the formation of the Manchester branohq Sir 
Oswald Mosley announced arrangements for a 'Spring Offensive' in the 
North of England, to take place in March 1933, and. to be launched at 
a mass meeting in the Free Trade Hall on March 12th. 
23 The few 
months since the founding of the B. U. F. had been taken up with the 
organisation of the movement in London, and Manchester was the first 
area outside the capital city to which Mosley turned his attention. 
The 'Spring Offendivelp in factq wasAo achieve a certain notoriety, 
since it was accompanied by the first serivas disturbance at a Fascist 
meeting at which Fascist stewards used weapons to beat down hecklers 
in theaudience. By the time of the 'Spring Offensive', the movement's 
newspaper Blackshirt had begun publication and the B. U. F. had 
adopted the blackshirt as a symbol of full membership of the movement, 
and had organised a 'defence force' to steward large meetings. It was 
r 
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this defence force which was used to full effect at the Free Trade 
Hall meeting on March 12tho 
At the very start of the meeting, in responge to a heckler who was 
thrown out of the hall by the stewardst of whom some 180 were on 
duty, Mosley said: 
We do not want any fighting or violence. On the other 
hand we are going to have free speech. That is why we 
are organised to preserve free speech and have our 
defence force here tonight. No one will be molested 
by us providing he gives us a chance to put our case. 
If anyone has come with the object of preventing free 
speech in Manchester he may go out head first* 
24 
Mosley then went on with his speech, which outlined the aims of the 
Fascist movement and the circumstances which had given rise to such 
modern movements. He described the system of industrial organisation 
which wouldoperate in the country once the fascists achieved power. 
In spite of a few interruptions, Mosley completed his speech and there 
was then an interval, during which Mosley accepted written questions. 
The organ in the hall played passages from 'The Maid of the Mountains' 
to while away the time. When Mosley started to answer the written 
questions, some verbal questions were asked from the floor of the 
hall, One questioner wanted to know whether the Union was anti-Semiticor no 
Mosley denied that was the case. Another questioner apparently wanted 
to pursue the point when, standing near the press tabley he was 
approached by a Fascist steward and told to be silentp A reporter from 
the Manchester Guardian was sitting at the press table and observed the 
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following scene. 
There was some argument and much disorder, in which 
Sir Oswald could be heard at the press table telling 
the steward to leave the interrupter alonel but he 
did not hear and continued the dispute, which ended 
with a blow which could be heard at the press table. 
This plunged the whole of the watching audience in 
tumult. One steward pinioned. the interrupter by the 
arms and carried him along the front aiý. sle;,, sweeping 
the people off the front row chairs immediately 
below the platform. Immediately after an indignant 
Scotsman rushed at the platform loudly calling on 
Sir Oswald to tell him that one of the stewards had 
hit a woman and asking if he allowed that. A large 
part of the audience was booingg and the rest 
appeared to be shouting and screaming. In no part of 
the hall were there people sitting down. 
Sir 0sweld stood helpless, with his arms folded, looking 
at the confusion which increased every minute. The 
centre gangway was filled with people fightingt 
civilians, grey shirts and black shirts. A row of 
three chairs was lifted in the air. Some men could be 
seen using what looked like rubber truncheons* At the 
moment it appeared that the hall would never be 
cleared without serious injury. 
25 
However, the hall was cleared when the police entered and moved the 
Fascist stewards outside. Mosley decided to end the meeting and 
followed his stewards outýof-, the hall. 
26 
a 
This meeting demonstrated several points which have since been of 
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central importance in the debates surrounding the history of Mosley's 
movement. At the risk of labouring the issue it is important that 
they are pursued and clarified. 
I 
It has already been pointed out that this was the first major B*U*Fo 
meeting which ended in violenceg thus setting a pattern for subsequent 
B. U. P. meetings all over the country, As far as violence was. -conceradd. 
the Free Trade Hall meeting was of particular importance because of the' use of 
weapons by the Ihscists. In a libel case brought against the Star 
newspaper in ANOVý 1934, Mosley had this to say when asked if his 
movement had often been in conflict with the 'Redo': 
Yesq when they have attacked us. We have never 
interfered with the meetings of our opponentsp but 
when our meetings are violently attackedy we resist 
attack. If people try to shout down speakers at our 
meetings, fascists are sent to throw them out with 
their bare hands and nothing more, 
'Do you not issue rubber truncheons to your forces? ' 
Rubber truncheons are not issued to our forcesp and 
the carr7ing of any weapon is absolutely forbidden 
in fascism. Only oncel, in a ver7 heavy fight in 
Mnchester, rubber truncheons were used after our men 
had been slashed with razors for weeks. Subsequently 
I forbade these weapons being used. 27 
A year latery in*19369 Mosley again'admitted that weapons had been used 
in Manchester, He was being cross-examined by D. N. Fý. Jttp X. C. for 
the defencep in a case of slander brought by Mosley against John 
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Marchbank, an official of the National Union of Railwaymen. 
Appam,, ntly the: lascist defence force had arrived from London for 
the Free Trade Hall meeting in March 1933. Under the questioning of 
Pritt the following admissions were made by Mosleys 
Mr Pritt: A large number of men at that meeting were 
using truncheons? - 
Not a large number. That was an occasion on which the 
order against the carrying of weapons was disobeyed. I 
believe 24 out of something like 140 used rubber hosing 
at that meeting. 
Who-supplied them? - Kriftercyt. who wes in charge of the 
men* 
Where did he get them? -I understand they were bought 
at Woolworthsp ordinary garden hose. 
And filled with? - Nothing. 
Not even lead shot? - Not even lead shot* 
A store of then was kept in a convenient room under the 
platform and the men, in the military phrasey were 
'issued' with these truncheons? - 
Twenty four weret contrary to orders. 
And while they were knocking people about you stood on the 
platform with your arms folded? 
Nop There was a very short fight and then the police 
entered the hall. 
Sir Oswald added that it was always his practice at a 
meeting to remain on the platform until complete disorder 
occurred, and then go to the body'of the hall. He therefore 
remained on the platform. 
Mr Pritts Would it be fair to say that on that occasion 
you condoned the use of weapond? 
No, because I immediately investigated the matter and forbade 
III 
any repetition of that incident. That is the only 
occasion at a meeting at which I was present that any 
form of weapon was used by our people* 
Did you dismiss Mr Piercy? - 
No. because Mr Piercy had, but a few weeks before, been 
slashed in the face with razors and I couldn't greatly 
blame men who used ordinary rubber hosing against people 
accustomed to slashing faces with razors. 
Knowing you didn't really blame himg did he use them 
again? - 
He did not. 
Were some of your men also using knuckledusters? - 
NO. 
Did you know there is quite a volume of evidence that 
Your men have used knuckledusters? 
So far as I am aware I saw no knuckledusters being used, 
What happened to the (knuckledusters) after that meeting? 
I understand they were destroyed* 28 
Several important points are raised here. Without wishing to place 
too much emphasis on one particular meeting that occurred at the 
beginning of thelvascist movement in Manchesterg it is important to 
clarify certain issues before going on to describe in more general 
terms the subsequent history of the movement in the City and the North 
of England generally. 
Firstlyy no attacks on B, U. F. members previous to the Free Trade Hall 
meeting were reported in any of the Manchester newspapers, If the razor 
attacks on members had occurred as Mosley stated in the Star libel 
casev either the press ignored themp which is unlikely since they 
would have been good news items, or the victims did not report the 
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cases to the police and the B. U. F. chose to ignore the attacks, which 
again would have been unlikekyq sinceq if the attacks had occurred, 
the B. U. F. would have wished to make as much politi6al capital out 
of them as possible. Alternatively, the attacks could have occurred in 
other parts of the country, in which case it would have been 
prematuret to say the least, to assume that similar attacks would 
occur in Manchester and to lay in asbtore of rubber truncheoms for use 
in such an event. It must also be noted that no anti-Fascist was 
arrested after the meeting. Nor was there any evidence in newspaper 
reports, or eye witness accounts, of anti-fascists using weapons. 
Secondly, some three years after the Free Trade Hall meetingt Mosley 
stated that the fighting was limited to theý-back of the hall and that 
was why he remained on the platform. Yet we know from what was 
presumably a responsible eye witness, namely a Manchester Guardian 
reporter, whose obser7ations were never refuted by Mosley or 
anyone else at the time, that the fighting was not confined to the 
back of the hall. A blow by a Fascist steward at an interrupter was 
heard from the press table, which was at the front of the haft. The 
reporter saw the man being ejected by the steward andq in the processq 
people who were sitting in the-front row-of the-_ýalliznvarest the 
platform, were swept off their chairs. Mosley stood on the platfozm 
and watched the violence esoilate. 
Thirdly, Mosley denied that knuckledusters were used at the meetihg. 
That may well have been the case. However it is known that certain 
members of the Fascist movement in Manchester did wear knuckledusters 
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or heavy ringa on their fingers whenever they left the Deansgate, 
headquarters to attend meetings. Stevenson Square was a popular 
venue for small Fascist meetings and such weapons were seen there at 
the same period as the Free Trade Hall meeting. A member of the B. U. F. 
at the time distinctly remembers knuckledusters and rings being worn. 
29 
Mosley later stated, in 1936, that the meeting was tthe only occasion 
at, a meeting at which I was present that any form of weapon was used 
by our people'. Mosley chose his words carefully. He could not refer 
to meetings at which he was not present, because he most have known 
that the very same type of weapon used at the, Free Trade Hall 
meeting on March 12th 1933 was used in another incident at Rochdale, 
twelve miles away,. on March 14th, just two days later. This time the 
rubber hosing was filled with lead shot. A Manchester member of the 
B. U. F. was arrested and charged in Rochdale with conduct likely to 
cause a'breach of the peace, assault, and being armed with a coil of 
rubber filled with lead. 
30 
The mang Daniel McNicholq who was a painter and decoratorg had 
travelled to Rochdale in a lorry with about a dozen other Blackshirts. 
A meeting, was arranged on the Town Hall-square and Wilfred Risdon 
spoke, to, a crowd of about 250 from the back of the lorx7. "Before 
the meeting began, Risdon was asked by a police inspector if anyone 
in the party! had rubber staffs or other weapons with them. Risdon 
deniedýthat any of them carried any weapons. The meeting went on 
for half an hour, in a peaceful manner when a seotion, of the crowd 
sta, rted-to sing, 'Tell me the old, old story',. The BlackshirE's 
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responded by charging the crowd with their fists clenched. McNichol 
lashed out with a piece of rubber filled with lead, hitting several people. 
One person in particular was hit and found himself under attack later, 
during the court case, for being a member of the National Unemployed 
Workers Movement. The inference was that he was hardly beyond blame 
himself for being attacked by McNichol. However, McNichol was 
remanded in custody and was later sentenced to three months hard 
labour., 
Perhaps it is worth noting a couple of secondary points which emerge 
here. Firstly, the barrister who held a watching brief for the B. U. P. 
and represented McNichol in court, was Mr Edgar Lustgarteng a 
Kanchester Reform lew. He later became famousq of course, for his 
radio. and television presentations . 
6f: famous or infamous trials. 
The second, and more important point here id that on the same night that 
McNichol attacked the crowd in Rochdalev he returned home to 
Manchester after being released from police custody. He walked down 
Miller St. in the O*ity and saw a Jew walking in ffont of him, He 
attacked him from behind, shouting 'Here is another Jewish 77-'. 
He was later fined E5 for that offenoeq Having just completed his 
stint'of bard labour. 
31 It was also disclosed at the Rochdale court 
cas e'that McNichol bad been going round Jewish districts in 
Manchester, placing 'sticky backs' containing antisemitic slogansq 
on to premises occupied by Jewish tradespeople. 
The Free Trade Hall meeting and the incident in Rochdale were not the 
only cases where - rubber tubing was used as a weapon by Fascistso It 
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has not been within the scope of this research to undertake a 
systematic study of the provincial press ef Britain in the 1930's 
in order to look for cases where Fascists used weapons. However, 
two other cases have incidentally come to light. One of the very 
first of the meetings orgainised by the B. U. F., in Battersea Town ITall, 
in December 1932, ended in disorder when fights broke out between 
sections of the audience described as 'Communists' and Fascist 
stewards. Weapons were said to have been used on that occasion, with 
the stewards using rubber tnmoheons. 
32 In 1936, the year in which 
Mosley, during the Marchbank case, denied the use of such weapons 
by Fascists, ' a case came before the Manchester magistrates in which 
five men were fined for fighting in Oxford Rd in the city centre. 
Four of the accused were members of the B. U. F. in Manchester. The 
other person, Thomas Garnett, was not a member of the B. U. F. but was 
described as a sympathiser and had been in the Fascist Club with the 
other defendants. Garnett used a piece of rubber tubing in the fight 
against anti-fascists. When the five were taken to be questionedy 
Garnet inadvertantly dropped a piece of rubber tubing down his trouser 
leg and then tried to remove it out of sight with his foot. 
33 It 
could be said that in this case no B. U. P. member was found to have 
carried such weapons, but it cannot be denied that theyp and a friend 
who carried a weapon, got into a fight with others. The Fascists 
must have known of the existence of the rubber tubing. They made 
no attempt to remove it from Garnett. 
The use of rubber truncheons and the like by Fascists could be quite 
easily denied as long as the Fascists using such weapons did 
116 
not appear, in court and the facts substantiated. Many confrontations 
did not have a sequel in a court room andq as a result, did not,, ý- 
necessarily achieve press coverage. Howeverp it is apparint, through 
discussing the fights betweenlascists and anti-fascists with some 
of the people involved, that the cases recounted above were not 
isolated examples and that it was common knowledge that sections 
of the'Pasoist membership in Manchester regularly used weapons, 
including rubber hose. Of course one has to use this sort of evidence 
carefully. -In the highly charged political atmosphere of the 1930's 
it ý would be -easy to assume certain actions on the behalf of political 
opponents and to draw general conclusions concerning the use-of __ 
weapons, from particular examples. There were people who opposed the 
B. U. F*, who. also resorted to acts of-violence and clearly. the use of 
force was; not all one sided. In Manchester, the pattern of violence 
was set by the Fascistsvin a way which will be further elaborated 
I 
as, we. unfold the history of the movement in the City. Those anti- 
fascists who, resorted to physical attacks on members of the B*U. F*p 
or regularly heckled at Fascist meetings, were responding to a 
violent situation which was not of their making* 
It would seem then that the 'Spring Offensive' in the North Westj 
and particularly in Manchester, got off to a rowdy start. The 
Manche ster'F asci'st s quickly gained a reputation as bullies and their 
meetings and speeches were permeated with provocative'references to 
the 'Reds' and the, 'Jewsl., 
The conflicts between the Yascists and their opponents continuedi 
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though only rarely did they end in court appearancesq at which 
point the, usual charge to be answered was that of obstruction. 
A rather more serious note was struck when a disturbance occurred 
after a Blackshirt meeting at Belle Vue ih October 1933. This 
meeting was obviously of some importance to the movement. Mosley 
was billed to speak and 400 Fascists arrived from London in a 
special train hired for the occasion. Many were driven into the City 
by coach from surrounding parts of Lancashire and between 800-900 
came from Manchester itself. The meeting was conducted in what had 
come to be seen as an expected manner. When Mosley entered the hall, 
the Fascists rose en masse and honoured him with the Fascist salute. 
Powerful spotlights directed at Mosley replaced the ordinary lights 
of the hall as the main source of illumination. Towards the end of 
Mosleys speech on Fascist economic policy, a woman caused an 
internuption, which resulted in a fight at the back of the hallo The 
Manchester Guardian reported the following sceneo 
The spotlights were turned on the scuffley and the 
cinema photographers busily photographed the scenee 
After 2 or 3 minutes of struggling the interrupters 
were-thrown out of the hall. 
A man who was seated near the disturbance told a 
Manchester Guardian reporter that the BlackEhirts 
tried to eject the woman interruptere A man sitting 
next to her intervened and then they set upon him. 
"He shouted out 'They are trying to murder me'y his 
screams were pitiful to hear. I am not a Communist, 
but I do not think that people should be treated 
as this wretched man was". 34 
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There was further trouble at the end of the meeting when a small 
group of people in the audience started to sing Me Red Flag' 
while the National Anthem was being played. 
When the London contLngent marched away from Belle Vuep headed by 
a bandv they wrre set upon by a gang of about 60 youths who threw 
stones at them, 
The fascists immediately broke ranks and charged the men. 
There was a brisk fight in which several fascists with 
military decorations took part. Two at least of the 
anti-fascists were seriously hurt. .. the fascists 
chased their assailants for a considerable distance up 
the sýreet, but were recalled by the 'fall-in' played 
on the bugle-35 
There was no court sequol to this clash, but rather a sequel of a 
different kindo when the Secretary General of the Italian Fascist 
Partyp Signor Achille Staracep congratulated Mosley by telegram 
on 'the gallant performance of British Fascists at Manchester'. 
36 
This episode served to reinforce several generally held beliefs 
about the ideology and organidation of the B. U. F. Meetings were 
crowded with groups of Fascists from different parts of the country, 
The military style of the movement was evident throughouty right 
down to the bugle-call for the men to 'fall-in', and the telegram 
sent on behalf of the Italian Fascist party emphasised the links 
between the B. U. F. and a Fascist dictatorship uhose use of violence 
was well known. The received wisdom was that Mosleyts movement was 
a seri,, ous threat to the English way of life and yet one more sign 
lig 
of the impending disintergration of Western society. In a decade of 
economic lunacyg'politioal upheaval and wart it would have been 
difficult to think otherwise. 
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CUPTER FOUR 
FASCIST ADVANCE 
There were many indications that the British Union of Fascists was 
gathering fairly rapid momentum in the city of Manchester throughout 
1933 and'into 1934. The Deansgate headquarters became something of a 
social club and attracted many people who had little idea of, the 
ýconcept of'the Corporate State or, indeed, the meaning of the term 
'Fascist'. By the autumn of 1933 the local headquarters had been 
organised to the extent that it could field a boxing team against a 
team'from the I. C. I. works at Blacklqy* 
I Ju Jitsu classes were also 
held'and there was a lounge and bar in the club. The basement rooms 
were fitted out as a gym where members could take part in training for 
various sports and games. Boxing, 'in facto seemed to be the most 
popular sport. 
2 
In 1933 and1934 the Manchester branch was produoing a high turnover of 
members. Many were attracted by the social facilities provided'bv the 
movement* The lure of the uniform and the sense of comradeship were 
added incentives to people who otherwise, might not have been 
involved in any political organisation. Many of the short term 
members,, those who remained in the movement for a couple of months or 
sop probably-never attended the mass meetings at which Mosley spoke* 
Their'normal experience of Fascist meetings would be those held just 
across the city centre in Stevenson Squarev which was the favourite 
meeting place for the B, U. P. in Manchester. Before the square began 
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to be used as a tenninus for buses serving the North East side of 
the city, it was a well known speaker's corner, where many political 
and religious groups held meetings and arranged for speakers to 
address the crowds who would sometimes gather in the early evenings, 
or more particularly, on Sundays. As soon as it became known that the 
Fascists held regular Sunday meetings in the square, people began 
to arrive to oppose the frequently inflammatoryspeeohes. The 
Fascists spoke of Jews in a derogatory manner and referred to the 
Jewish area of Cheetham Hill as a 'ghetto% The meetings were oftan 
disrupted by fighting, with some of the Fascists wearing, and using, 
their heavy rings and knuckledusters, and some of the anti-fasoists 
retaliating in a like manner. The police were usually in attendance 
whenever the B. U. F. were-, U)Ahe square. In February 1934 a local 
member of the B. U. F. was fined for creating a breach of the peace when 
fighting broke out following a speech he had delivered. The press 
reportedýthat 'the crowd seemed to be unfriendly towards what he was 
; saying, 43 In faot the Fasoistp Alexander Milesp who lived in 
Chorlton-on: Aedlockv was known to make speeches which were often 
anti-Semitic and which inflamed the passions of the crowd gathered in 
the square* Of course it was not just the speeches that inflamed the 
crowd* The meetings in Stevenson Square must be seen in the context of 
a'wide ranging campaign of anti-Semitism in the cityp which included 
attacks on synagogues and Jewish cemetries. Jewish shopkeepers found 
their shops covered with, grafitti of an anti-Semitio nature and there 
had 6vez been physical attacks on Jews in the Cheetham Hill area t5r 
members of the B. U. P. 
CE 
03 
Ea 
Cd P, 
pi 
122 
f 
Anti-Semitism, rowdiness to the point of physical assault, a high 
turnover of membership, with many members seeing the, movement's 
social facilities as being at least as important as its political 
creedvere, then, the dominant characteristics of the first couple 
of years in the life of the B. U. F. in the city. These factors did 
, not deter Mosley from continuing to look upon Lancashire as a very 
important centre of growth for his movement. In 1934 special 
recruitment campaigns were organised and popular--political issues 
of relevance, to the area were taken up. The movement expanded at a 
fairly rapid rate in the North in this period and new branches 
began to be opened up in towns-around Manchester* In the spring 
of 1934, Mosley arrived in Manchester to open new headquarters in 
Northumberland St, Higher Broughtong in the heart of the north 
Manchester Jewish community (the premises were later converted, into 
a Jewish synagogue). The Union Jack was raised on the building and 
100 Fascists paraded in the street* After the opening ceremony the 
Fascists boarded coaches and followed Mosley by road to Stoke for 
another meeting. 
4 Three months later, at the end of June 19349 a 
shop known as 'The Blaokshirt' was opened in Picoadillyp Manchester, 
where there was a uniformed officer in charge of selling Fascist 
5 literature and where new members could be enrolled* Ambitious 
plans were announced for the formation of new branches to the south 
of Manchester, The offices for the area were to be opened in ý 
Ashton-Under-Lyne, Mosley and Stalybridge, and 1ý7de* Included in 
the area were the boroughd of AsIton, Stalybridgeq 1ý7deq Mossley 
and Dukenfield and also the urban districts of Audensbawq Dentong 
Failsworth and Droylsden. 
6 
By the summer of 1934 the movement claimed 
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to have gained about 40 members in Bury, and Mosley opened new 
premises for the headquarters in the town in July. 
7 In the same 
weekend new premises were also officially opened. by Mosley in 
Blackpoolp Heywoodp Accrington, and Moss Side in Manchester. 
In Manchester itself during this periodp we are presented with a 
rather confusing picture. In the first two years of its life the 
Manchester branch had had its fair share of upheavals and internal 
disputes. Personal rivalries had led to dome resignations and the 
progress of the movement in the area must have suffered as a 
result. In August 1934 rumours of differences of opinion in the 
Manchester leadership appeared in the local press. The Manchester 
Evening News, got hold of a report of a Imutiny' among the local 
blackshirts"and that as a result the B. U. F. had suspended about 
100 of the local members. -9, The National Headquarters denied the 
story and added that it amounted to an attempt to discredit the 
organisation in Manchester* However there does seem to have been 
some truth in the report, since Mosley claimed in July that there 
had been wholesale expulsions from the B. U. P. branches in an attempt 
to weed out the less desirable elements who ran the branches"'more 
as; social clubs than political organisations. 
10 It was also at this 
time that Walter Dent ceased to be the leader in Manchestero Dent 
was replaced by Charles Dickinson without any official explanation 
from the B. U. P. 
The new leader was the son of a squadron sergeant major and was well 
known locally as a boxer. He led the Manchester branch boxing team 
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of 12 men against teams from National Headquarters and teams in the 
North. 11 The B. U. F. claimed that Dickinson had led a successful 
recruitment drive in the North in the winter of 1934/35, resulting in 
a trebling of membership in Manchester. 
12 How accurate this report 
was is difficult to judge, given the fact that various branches often 
sent in widely exaggerated membership information to Blaokshirt and 
Action, However it is known that recruitment in the North of England 
was so encouraging in 1934 that Mosley actually considered moving the 
National Headquarters from London to Manchester. This story was denied 
by. Dickinson at the time, 
13 but was confirmed by the contemporary 
leadership of the Union Movement, the present day remnant of the B. U. F. 
Mr Bob Rowv a member of the Directorate of the Union Movement and an 
old member of the B. U. F. in the North, thought that the idea of moving 
the Headquarters to Manchester was possibly dropped because of the lack 
of. suitable premises. 
14 The stox7 is given further credence by the 
fact that the East End of London had not been penetrated by the B. U. F. 
at this time and the organisation in London centred mainly around the 
National Headquarters. The North West of England in general, and 
Manchester in particular, were undoubtedly the areas in which the B. U. P. 
made most headway in this period. It would be reasonable to consider 
setting up the National Headquarters in Manchester to control and 
capitalise on this growth more effectively. At the same time it would 
serve to emphasise the rejection of the tOld Gang' parliamentary 
system centred on London. 
The North West of England was the scene of more special B. U. P. 
campaigns than any 6ther part of the countr7. We know that the 'Spring 
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Offensive' launched the movement proper in the area, but this was 
followed by campaigns of a rather more specific nature. One of the 
themes which dominated the thinking of the movement in the North was 
the problem of the declining cotton industry, and this theme 
provided a vehicle for campaign after campaign in the cotton areas 
of South East Lancashire. The first cotton campaignp lasting three 
months, began in the summer of 1934 and was directed from the 
Lancashire area headquarters at Preston by Captain Wright. 
The cotton campaign was supported by large coverage in the Fascist 
press and possibly more space was given to the problems of the cotton 
industry than any other topic. In fact, before the campaign started, 
the industry received a great deal of attention* In March 1934 comparisons 
were made between the organisation of the cotton industries in both 
Italy and Britain. A problem considered to be common to both countries 
was that of Japanese competition. In the face of this competition it 
was shown that Italy, under the leadership of Mussolinig had 'unified' 
the cotton industry by enabling the Italian Cotton Inztltute to 
'liquidate and merge weaker units, to regulate conditions of labourg 
determine quotas of production and to fix minimum prices in the home 
marketi. 
15 This initiative on the part of the Italians was contrasted 
with the British reliance on conferences, The theme was pursued later 
by Mosley in a speech at Preston in April. He said that he did not 
believe, 'that politicians from London could teach Lancashire how to 
organise the cotton trade. "The Fascists would build a self-contained 
Empire and would exclude foreign cotton and textile goods from tho 
Crown Colonies. By these means unemployment in Lancashire would be 
reduced by a third 'at a stroke' 1% 
16 'International Finance' was 
drawn Anto the argument and was accused of being at the root of the 
decli 
. 
neýof the, Lan cashire Cotton industry*17 Mosley repeated his 
arg=ents about the cotton industry at a meeting in Liverpool at 
the beginning of May, in which he also outlined his plans for the 
British shipping industry. However the cotton campaign itself was 
yet to, begin. , 
Plans were made for a total of 500 meetings in the county and the 
campaign started in Southport with a speech by Mosley in the Floral 
Hall. 'He, elaborated on his plans to save the cotton industry, which 
he claimed would create employment for a total of 65,000 cotton 
, 18 
workers* , Mosley's policy for the cot-ton industry was to provide the 
basis for theýcotton campaigns, in which the cotton workers were 
urged tojoin-the B. U. P. Attempts were made to infiltrate trade 
unions in the industry and overtures were made to the mill owners 
andýstockbrokers, on the Lancashire Cotton Exchange* 
19 
By the end-of August 1934, the Fascist press was claiming that over 
400, 'meetings had-been held as part of the cotton,. campaign* Meetings 
had been held in most of the towns in South East-Lancashire and it 
could be said that the B. U. F. had met with some success in its efforts 
to win support for its cotton policy. The Communist Party certainly 
saw Mosley's success as a threat to its own campaign in the area 
and attempted to counteract Fasoist, policy. by, exposing the fallacy 
of Mosley's argument'i and at the awe time putting forward its own 
solution for the ailing cotton industry. 
20 In, Bolton the B*U. F. 
campaign was headed by the District Leadert Hardman, who organised 
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lunchtime meetings at the cotton mills in Bolton and Bury. Enough 
advance was made in Oldham, in terms of new members, to form a 
branch of the B. U. F. in the town, In Stookport one of the main 
organisers was Battersby, a director of a local firm of hat 
manufacturers of that name. Burnley was a particularly successful 
area and the campaign resulted in a relatively large membership in 
the town, Accrington was another strong area and the B. U. F. also met 
with some success in Chorley, Heywood, Blackburn and Nelson. In the 
latter town, the peak membership rose to over 100 under the 
guidance of the District Woman's Leader, Nellie Driver, who was 
herself a local cotton worker. 
21 
Mosley was not the only representative from National Headquarters 
to, take part in the cotton camptigns. William Joyce spoke at 
several meetings in the North and extended the argument about the 
Lancashire cotton industry by attempting to show the effects of the 
Jewish boycott of German goods on the cotton trade. Commander 
Tillotson, and Captain Wright, the man in charge of the first cotton 
campaign, both of whom were from the Northern Administrative 
Headquarters in Preston, took an active part in the meetings and 
speeches, and were often to be seen with both Mosley and Joyce 
during the campaign. 
The cotton campaign went beyond the organising of mass meetings and 
area recruitment drives. Fascist newspapers were sold outside 
factory gates and meetings were held outside employment exchanges. 
22 
This sort of activity angered many Communist,, %Party members in the 
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North who considered that they had worked hard to build up support 
in certain mills and factories, only to see Blackshirts move in 
and receive a rather better reception immediately. 
It was not just among cotton operatives5that the B. U. F. attempted to 
gain supports Some cotton manufacturers looked favourably upon the 
cotton campaign. According to G. P. Sutherst, who was instrumental in 
forming the Bury branch of the B. U. F. and who later became leader of the 
Middleton branch, contributions were made to the cotton campaign funds 
by the Ash Spinning Co. Lilly Mills and William Pickles, all large 
cotton manufacturing concerns based to the North of Manchester. 
23 The 
campaign extended to a canvassing of the Royal Exchange building in 
Manchester, home of the Lancashire Cotton Exchange. Businessmens 
luncheon's were provided by the B. U. F. and were apparently well attendedv 
jýarticularly in later cotton campaigns in which Mosley himself 
became more directly involved. 
The 1934 cotton campaign was to be brought to aclose by a mass meeting 
of Fascists at Belle Vue in Manchester on September 29thl with Mosley 
billed as the main speaker, The meeting was. -planned to be the largest 
ever held outside Londong' with special train-Ioads of Fascists 
arriving in Manchester from all over the country. The plans for the 
meeting were thrown into confusion when the Manchester Watch Committee 
decided that the cost of policing the meeting should be borne by the 
Belle Vue authorities, since it was they who had requested special 
policing of the meeting. The Watch Committee considered that the extra 
police required would cost as much as Z1,000 and that it wogld be 
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asking too much to place this expenditure on the shoulders of the 
ratepayers., 
24 When Mosley heard of this decision he immediately 
complained to the Home Secretary, since he considered that the 
Home Secretary had given an assurance to the House of Commons that 
this sort of action would not be taken by local authorities as it 
might hinder the right to hold public meetings. 
25 The Watch 
Committee seemed to back down from its decision when it later 
appointed a special sub committee to sort out the cost of policing 
the meeting with the Chief Constable, Mr John Maxwell. 26 
Further problems relating to-Ahe Fascist rally arose when it was 
discovered that the Manchester Anti-Fasoist Campaign Committeev one 
of the main organisations which had been formed to pppose Fascism in 
27 the North, was planning to march to Belle Vue with the intention 
of attending the meeting. , The anti-Fascists were to assemble at 
three points in the citys Mile Street Croftl Bridge Street, Cheetham; 
and the Albert Memorial Croftt Platting. They would then march to a 
c-emtral meeting point at Ardwick Green, where they were to join up 
with groups from Ardwick, Hulme and Chorlton-on-Medlock. The Chief 
Constable responded by issuing a statement in which he said that all 
street processions would be banned on the day of the meeting* There 
was no doubt inLmost peoples minds that the ban was aimed 
specifically at the anti-Fascists, especially since the B. U. F. had 
not made any plans to march to Belle Vue. The anti-Fascists decided 
to ignore the ban and went ahead with their plans. At the same time 
they decided to send a deputation to the Town Hall to interview the 
Chief Constable in an attempt to resolve the problem before taking the 
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step of breaking the law and carrying on regardless. The Belle Vue 
management wasý also contacted to see if an anti-Fasist rally could 
be held inside the grounds of Belle Vue, alongside the Fascist 
meeting. John Strachey, secretary of the National Committee Against 
Fascism, contacted the Council for Civil Liberties as soon as he heard 
of the ban on marches and they responded by telegramming a protest 
to the Chief Constable of Manchester. 
The ban on all marches on the day of the Fascist demonstration had the 
effect of creating far more interest from the general public than might 
otherwise have been the case. Many important politicians and other 
public figures protested against the ban, including Professor Harold 
Laski, Lord Manley asid Professor Lascelles Abercrombie. 
28 The Home 
Office received a deputation of anti-Fascists on the day of the 
meeting, to petition the Home Secretary to reverse the decision of the 
Chief Constable. A deputation arrived in London from Manchester with 
the same objective. Yet another anti-Fasoist group expressed its wish to 
see the Lord Mayor of Manchester in order to protest against the banpt, 
Manchester and Salford Trades Council, although not directly connected 
with the proposed anti-Fasoist march and demonstrationsp added its 
voice to the growing campaign to get the ban lifted@ 
29 
Amidst all the fuss created by the ban, the B. U. P. went ahead with its 
plan to hold the rally. The problem of who was to pay for the 
policing of the meeting had been clarified by the decision of the 
Watch Committee to reluctantly pay for the bill out of the rates* Bill 
Risdon, from the National Headquarters of the B. U. F. had high hopes 
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of attracting a massive audience. Throughout the day of the meeting,, 
on Saturday 29th September, thousands of Fascists and anti-Fascists 
arrived in the City. One of the organisers of the anti-Fascist 
demonstration, Mick Jenkins, remembered the scene from the Anti- 
7ascist point of view in some detail. 
This (march) plan was carried through. Hundreds 
marched from Mill Street Croft in Openshaw; Albert 
Croft, Miles Platting, and New Bridge Street 
Cheetham. At Ardwick Green more hundreds were already 
waiting to march to Belle Vue there , as a united 
demonstration of between two and three thousand 
workers and middle class people proceeded to march 
along Hyde Road towards Belle Vue. The Chief Constable 
had eaten his words. Two or three policemen 
accompanied the march. The march arrived at Belle Vue 
to find hundreds of people assembled on the croft 
opposite. 
Most of the people who marched would not stay for the 
meeting. As the march reached the oroft so large 
numbers broke ranks, crossed the roadq paid their 
entrance fee and entered Belle Vue, They were not 
listening to speeches that night - and one speech in 
particular, and they were prepared to pay for the 
privilege. 
30 
The Manchester Guardian reported . that 'from 40 Lancashire and 
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several Yorkshire centres, B. U. F. contingents arrived in motor coaches . 
Th .e scene was being set for a conflict which could outstrip the 
Olympia meetine in London, held four months earlierv in terms of 
the numbers of people injured and also in terms of the subsequent 
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outcry, permeated with claims and counter claims as to where the 
blame should lie. 
However, nature intervened in the form of a continuous rain storm 
prior to the meeting. In spite of the large numbers of people present, 
the crowd was not as large as many people had predicted. The anti- 
fascists had hoped to organise a demonstration of 25,000, while the 
Fascists anticipated the arrival of thousands of their members in the 
city, 
32 A month previous, an official of the Manchester Fascist 
Headquarters was quoted as saying that 2909000 people were expected 
to attend and that it would be "the biggest political demonstration 
that the North had seen for years,,. 
33 
About 1000 Blackshirts and 3000 members of the public heard Mosley's 
speech. They were surrounded by 500 police and the Fascists were 
fenced off fr. om the rest of the crowd. A fire engine was in 
attendance ready to pump water from the lake onto any riotersp and a 
searchlight was mounted on therroof. 'Its beam frequently raked the 
audience below and could at any moment have been directed on a group 
that was deemed tameed the attention of the police or the firemene #34 
The meeting was interrupted for the first fifteen =inutes by the 
shouting of anti-Pasoist slogans. Police moved into the area of the 
shouting, but it was the use of powerful amplifiers which allowed 
Mosley to be heard. He spoke of the two party system being part of 
an international racke: ý and the speech was not without its anti-Semitic 
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content. Referring to the hecklers he said ". . Socialists and 
Communist organisations are here to make a row and Jewish finance 
are-h-,,; --e to make a row. .. we challenee the alien finance which 
has paid for the mob here tonight. Look at the mobilisation of all 
those Jews'from Cheetham 35 This meeting, in facto seemed to 
mark a new stage in the movements anti-Semitism. -The. inve6tive 
against the Jews was now approaching the order of a systematic 
campaign'and Mosley continued his tirade against the hecklers, 
referring to them as "sweepings of the Continental ghettolsv' hired 
by Jewish financiers" and "an alien gang imported from all quarters 
of Britain by Jewish money to prevent Englishmen putting their 
. "36, case. 
The meeting in fact proved to be something of an anticlimax after 
the massive demonstration at Olympia. Only one person was arrested 
and that was a woman who was charged with being drunk and disorderly. 
The Chief Constable considered that the meeting had been conducted 
satisfactorily and he was later congratulated by the Manchester 
Watch Committee. It turned out that the actual cost of policing the 
meeting was only Z7, which was spent on the transporting of 
policemen. This was far from the C1000 quoted by. the Watch Committee 
before the meeting and it helped to quell the expeoted flow of 
complaints about the meeting. In fact, although the issues surrounding 
the meeting rumbled on in the press, it seems that the passions 
aroused by the whole affair-were soon forgotton by the general publiop 
though nott of course, by the Fascists and anti-Fascists themselvesp 
both of whom claimed the meeting a victory for their particular cause. 
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The Belle Vue meeting may have helped the Fascist recruitment 
drive in the city, both immediatley before and after the even, ý. It is 
probable that the sales of Blackdhirt in Manchester increased in this 
period if the Fascist press is to be believed, 
37 It', is known that 
the new Commanding Officer of the B. U. P. in Manchester, Charles 
Dickinson, brought a certain flair to the position he held, though he 
took over the leadership of the Manchester branch at a particuLarly 
crucial time for the B. U. F. nationally. 
* It is in this period also, 
as has already been noted, that the movement considered moving the 
National Headquarters from London to Manchester because so much 
headway was being made in the area. More and more meetings were 
organised in public halls in Manchester. Churnett Street Hall in 
Collyhurst was a popular venue and the B. U. F. claimed audiences of 
300 at the meetings held there. In September meetings were held in 
Moston each week at which the Fascist press claimed there were 
audiences of 400*' Halme Town Hall was also a favourite meeting placep 
where William Joyce spoke in the first week of November. Dickinson 
claimed in November that the movement was looking for new premises in 
Manchester, preferably near Piccadilly, which would enable the 
organisation to expand. 
38 There were also claims that Mosley was 
The alliance between the movement and the Rothermere Pressp in 
which the Daily Mail, provided supporting news coverage for the 
Blackshirts, was beginning to break down after the violent Fascist 
meeting at Olympia in June. The M. P. was at this time taking a much 
more explicitly anti-Semitic line and anti-Fascists were beginning 
to gather their strength and organise more effectively. 
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planning a new recruitment drive in Lancashire to capitalise on his 
recent successesq and in the middle of November Mosley stated that the 
B. U. F. would contest some parliamentary seats in Manchester and other 
parts of Lancabhire at the next general election. Other seats in the 
country were also to be contested, but Lancashire was singled out for a 
39 
special campaign. 
Mosley returned to Manchester in the last week of November to address 
a meeting at the Free Trade Hall on the 25th. He arrived with Lady 
Mosley, who had been staying with Captain and Mrs Wright in Preston. 
She went on a tour of Preston, Southport and Liverpool branches and 
was met by Bill Risdon in Manchester where, as well as visiting local 
branchesp she attended Mosley's meeting on the 25th. 
Mosley spoke to a packed Free Trade Hall on the issue of the 
Lancashire Cotton Industry. He repeated the themes outlined in the 
recent cotton campaign and denounced the use of international Jewish 
fina n6e. 
40 One woman who repeatedly heckled the meeting from the 
balcony was removed by Blackshirt stewards and a crowd of anti-Fascists 
gathered outside the hall and surrounded Mosley's car as he drove off. 
On leaving, the Fascists marched home through the Jewish district of 
41 Strangeways, Fourteen men and one woman appeared in court on the 
following Monday to answer charges of disorderly behaviourp obstructing 
the police and assault. All but one of those arrested were anti-Fascists. 
Shortly after Mosley's Free Trade Hall meetingg Captain Vincent Collier 
spoke at the first indoor meeting held in Stretfordq where the Town 
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Hall was the venue. A move was made to increase the number of 
outdoor meetings in a campaign launched by Collier in which he was 
assisted by other national speakers. The team, which included A. C. 
Miles, P. Moran and Micheal Goulding, toured many towns to the North 
of Manchester in the first weeks of December 1934.42 It was in this 
period that new branches were started in Rotherham and Wakefield. The 
branch in Barnsley increased in numbers and in Bolton the B. U. F. was 
particularly strong under the leadership of Leslie Hardman. There 
was a degree of contact between the Bolton Rover Crew of the Scout 
movement and the local B. U. F. branch. The B. U. F. liked to stress the 
common emphasis on patriotism, public service and training for 
manhood between Baden Powell's Rover Scouts and the Fascist movement*43 
Regular social events were held in the Bolton area to boost local 
funds and there was talk of a local Fascist weekly newspaper being 
pr . oduced, 
44 Membership in Bolton in July 19,34 totalled 619 with 
twice as many men as women*45 
We have some idea of the type and number of branches in the Manchester 
area at this time. In June 1934 the Labour Party distributed a 
questionnaire about the level of local B. U. F. activity to a total of 
900 secretaries of Divisional Labour Parties, Industrial Trades Councils 
and Party agents. The replies from the North of England were the 
m. ost detailed. 
46 
In Manchester itself the Moss Side branch was said to have 200 
members. In Plattingt where there two branchesý onep at Charlton Street, 
had about 20 members. They were unable to pay a gas bill because of the 
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lack of funds. There were also two branches in the Blackley area, 
one in Moston and one in Crumpsall. All four of these branches would 
sometimes combine for theit activities in order to create the 
impression of strength. There were also branches in Rusholme and 
Withington. 47 In Rusholme there were possibly as many as 80 members. 
48 
Gorton and Ardwick also had branches at this time. 
49 
I 
It would be fair to assume that at this time the Fascist movement 
in the North was in a particularly confident mood. New recruits were 
pouring in. Mosley was paying particular attention to the area and 
the organisation was beginning to settle down after the interruptions 
and dismissals of the summer months. The Fascists could feel reasonably 
satisfied on the conclusion of their cotton campaign, and the 
movement had found new and larger premises from which to control the 
Manchester area. 
From a'--distance this picture of 'success' would seem to be fairly 
accurate. On closer observation however it was apparent that the 
movement in the North was experiencing difficultiesq as was the 
movement generally. One of the problems was that of internal upheavals. 
The leader of the Manchester branch, Dickinson, had arrived at that 
position through a series of internal disputes. Mosley's view of the 
control of local branches was that they should be led by- those most 
able to lead. In other words, it was the strongest who would become 
leaders. Those most adept at intrigue and manouevre would do well. It 
is not surprising that in some areas the leadership changed hands as 
frequently as it did. Dickinson himself was to be the victim of this 
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system, as were his successors. Within a matter of months of assuming 
the leadership in Manchesterg Dickinson hadito rely on the system of 
intrigue to dave his own skin, when he was sacked by Commander 
Tillotson. Tillotson, from County Headquartersq suspected that 
Dickinson was leading a group of unemployed members in a series 6f 
housebreakings and thefts from w. -Warehouses. Dickinson appealed to 
Mosley against this decision and was reinstated. Tillotson resented 
being overuled in this way and went to see Mosley. Reynall Bellamy, 
who was later to assume command of the B. U. F. in the North, was 
present at this meeting, at which Tillotson announced his decision 
to resign from the movement. Tillotson was from a very different 
background to Dickinson, and had a reputation for being a man of 
honour and a strict disciplinarian. Honour was more important to 
him than the movement, though he remined personally loyal to 
Mosley*50 
The instability of the leadership and the system of competition that 
fed it was reflected in the high turnover of ordinary membership and 
the number of uncompleted campaigns and membership drives and fund 
raising activities in local branches, It was true that 1934 was a 
good year for recruitment to the M. P., but the number of new 
Blaokshirts who stayed in the movement for more thang say, one yearp 
was probably a small proportion of the total. 
Another problem facing the B. U. P. in this period was the increasingly 
hostile reaction to its policy of anti-Semitism. The reaction could 
be said to be in direct proportion to the importance attached to that 
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policy by Mosley and his followers. The official anti-Semitism of the 
B. U. F. became much more explicit in the latter half of 1934 and the 
reaction to it by anti-Fascistýgroups followed a similar line. The 
Belle Vue meeting in September 1934 proved to be an important stage 
in the development of the movements anti-Semitism, with interrupters 
referred to as "sweepings of the Continental Ghetto Is hired by 
Jewish financiers" and "an alien gang imported from all quarters of 
'51 Britain by Jewisli money to prevent Englishmen putting their case. 11 
This meeting provoked the anti-Fascist movement in Manchester to 
organise more effectively against attacks on the local Jewish 
community, Most of Mosley's speeches on his January tour of 
Lancashire contained anti-Semitic overtones. Perhaps the most virulent 
speech was the one he made at Accrington, in which he blamed the 
Jews for the Indian competition in the cotton textile maelet. "Men 
sitting in the City of Londont enjoying your hospitalityp using Your 
wealth to draw a higher rate of interest from sweating Indians than 
they get from helping a White man. t, 
52 
This outburst provoked Nathan 
Laskiq Honorary President of the MancInster Zionist Central Councilp 
to challange Mosley to name names instead of resorting to generalities 
as a way round the libel laws. 
53 Mosley never replied* 
The reaction to the campaign of anti-Semitism must be seen in the 
context of escalating violence between Fascists and anti-Fascists. 
The BOU. P. was considered to be eager to use violence as a means of 
putting across its point of view and to silence hostile critics. The 
meeting at Olympia in June 1934 is considered to be something of a 
watershed in the history of the movement, at which violence broke 
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out on a scale never before seen at a mass political meeting in this 
country. The meeting itself has been the subject of major debate 
amongst observers who'were present and amongst commentators anfi 
historians ever since. 
54 It was also the subject of a parliamentary 
55 debate at the time. In the aftermath of the meeting the Fascist 
movement, was seen by the general public, rather than just anti- 
Fascists, in a rather different light. The Fascists in the North of 
England were more than ever considered to be anti-Semites ready to 
resort to violence in a campaign of terror. This may not have been 
an entirely-correct picture of the Fascist movement, but it is 
I certainly how it was interpreted and, as such, had an impact on the 
growth and development of the movement. 
If we look at the reaction to the campaigns waged by the B. U. P. in 
this period, we are presented with another problem which tarnishes 
the veneer of success of the movement in the North. This was the 
reaction of local authorities and other bodies who controlled the 
letting of halls for meetings. This reaction was governed by the fact that 
meeting after meeting ended in disruption. Outbreaks of violence 
between Fascists and anti4Fascists had occurred at several meetings 
in the Notth. The Royton Co-operative Society refused-an application 
by Mosley to use their meeting hall. When the Oldham Co-operative 
Society agreed to allow Mosley to hold a meeting in the Co-op Hall 
at Greenacres in Oldhamp there were howls of projrest from the Oldham 
branch of the I. L. P. and the National U: nemployed Wor: Kers Movement, 
56 
though the meeting went ahead as planned. In November 19349 the B. U. F. 
applied for the use of Broughton Town Hall in Salford, in order to start 
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their first campaign in the city. The Salford Town Hall and Markets 
Committee refused them permission, thinking that damage would probably 
be caused to the hall. A member of the committee considered that it 
would be unlikely that the Fascist movement would be able to hold 
a meeting in any hall in Salford for many years. 
57 Other council 
committees concerned with the letting of public halls were beginning 
to be aware of the problems of allowing the B. U. F. to hold meetings 
in premises under their controlp and it was not to be long before 
many other councils followed Salford's example. A rather more ominous 
note was sounded when permission was granted by Swinton and 
Pendlebury Council to allow the B. U. F. to use Pendlebury Town Hall 
for a meeting, but only on the condition that Fascist uniforms would 
not be worn, and that the B. U. F. would ensure the safe policing of 
the hall by engaging the County Constabulary at their own expence*53 
Another setback, although of a much less important nature, was the 
refusal by the Manchester Watch Committee to allow the B. U. F. to fly 
the Fascist flag over the new premises in Piccadilly, into which the 
Fascists had recently moved. 
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Although the B. U. F. had somehow to live with these problems, they 
hung on the horizon like dark clouds. The leaders in Manchester and 
elsewhere attempted to capitalise on the problems of violence and 
anti-Semitism. They claimed that violence was caused by the Jewish 
dominated Communist Party, and hence it was only right that Jews 
should be attacked in speeches by Mosley and others. Physical violence 
was only used in self defence. or so the argument went. 
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Thus the B. U. P. in the North of England, and particularly in the areas 
around Manchester was making a seemingly astonishing advance for a 
political movement still in its infancy. However the rapid growth 
was due mainly to the dominance of populism in the movementýs ideology, 
certainly at branch levelf hence the rapid turnover. of members, 
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Many of those members engaged in acts of sheer hooliganism, but 
many were also willing to engage in the violence and anti-Semitism 
led by its more ideologically committed members. The movement would 
have to alter course if it was to survive as a viable political body. 
If not the likeAhood was that it would be engulfed by the many 
problems with which it had been beset from the start. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
=ORM AND RETRENCIDIENT 
The underlying problems facing the B. U. F., exacerbated by the 
reactions to the Olympia meeting and the defection of Lord Rothermere, 
seemed to occupy the minds 6f the movement's leadership towards the 
end of 1934. Mosley apparently decided to face up to3the situation 
and he reorganised his movement in an attempt to mould into shape an 
effective political machine, using more orthodox political means to 
gain support than had previously been the case. Mosley realised that 
the only support that really mattered would be that of his own B. U. F. 
M. P's in parliament. Hence he introduced reforms whicht he hoped, 
would produce results at the next election in the form of parliamentary 
seats. 
In January 1935 Mosley produced his new plans for the movement* There 
I 
were to be two alternative methods of organising a 'unit' system, I 
which would carry out M. P. policy. 
1 The first, and the preferred 
method was as follows. Units would consist of members who could make 
themselves available on a certain night of the week, The aim Was to build 
the unit into a 'section' of thirty members. Three sections would 
make a 'company'. Probationary members could attach themselves to the 
unitt achieving full membership after one month. If a new member 
joinedthe movement with enough friends to form a unit or sectionp he 
was*permitted to lead the formation for the first month on probation, 
The second method, to be introduced into areas presenting particular 
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difficulties, provided greater flexibility though-required more work 
'from the Unit Leaderg who had to make himself available on at least 
four nights a week. Each member of his unit had to be available on 
any. two nights each week, with the Unit Leader in charge of such 
members who could turn out. In this case each unit would be made up 
of. twelve members. The old Defence Force which provided the stewards 
for large meetings was to be scrapped, since all Blackshirts would 
henceforth act as stewards if their particular unit was asked to 
perform such duties. 
Both systems, particularly the first, were intended to produce a 
high degree of competitiveness amongst members. Unit leaders could 
be removed if they did not produce a unit at full strength. Unit 
members could be similarly discarded if they did not turn out for 
duty., Every member had the opportunity for promotionp which would be 
by. 1the natural selection of proved capacity and the ability to leadt* 
Indeed, this was positively encouraged. One could progress from 
being an ordinary member through to Unit Leader and then to Section 
Leader. If three sections could be formed it meant promotion to 
Company Leader. Theoretically this promotion ladder went on to the 
highest ranks of the movement, In order to promote this competitive- 
nessp Unit and Section Leaders were to be encouraged to attend 
training courses in the 'leadership principle'* The system of 
competitiveness was to be enhanced by the various types of uniform 
allocated to the different positiaas in the movement. Members who 
gave -two evenings work each week to the Unit were to be allowed to 
wear the basic uniform Blackshirt, already worn by ordinary members, 
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Differing degrees of seývice reliability and efficiency would bring 
rewards in the form of badges and additional bits and pieces to the 
basic uniform. The full dress uniform, worn by the 1st Di#ision, 
National Headquarters, would be allocated to members who gave their 
services on five evenings per week. Even the club or branch premises 
were to be regarded as 'a concession to conspicuous service and 
development rather than as an ordinary growth of the movement'. Mosley 
even specified the number of rooms to be used, and what they should 
be used for. TheYwere to be 'workshops' not 'playrooms'. 
Although it was recognised that once the new plans had been put into 
practice it might prove necessary to modify them it was, nevertheless, 
maintained that two basic rules must be adhered to. These were that 
$every Blackshirt must give a definite proportion of hid time as a 
condition of membership' and levery Blackshirt must work within a 
definite unit which will always operate as a whole'* 
With the exception of those constituency organisations already formed. 9 
all the existing branches were to be taken over by the Blackshirt 
Organisation at National Headquarters, which would also be in the 
control of the Womens Unit. Headquarters Inspectors, touring the 
branchesp were to replace the area system. In the North West of 
England thisy presumably, was to mean the end of the Lancashire Area 
with its headquarters in Prestong although in June 1935 Manchester 
took over the administrative responsibility of a much larger area 
which had formerly been the responsibilty of the Preston headquarters, 
I. I The 'area' system seemed to be continuingg at least in the North West. 
I 
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Finally a 'Political Organisation' was to be formed in order to 
create the desired electoral machinery. All existing constituency 
organisations and the Womens Organisation were to be under the 
control of the Director of Political Organisation. Members of the 
Political Organisation were, -not to wear uniforms but would be 
provided with badges. The work of the Political Organisation was 
simple. Members would give their service 'in the same way as members 
of other parties - to develop definite constituency organisations on 
alconstituency, ward and polling district basist. The aim was that 
every constituency in the country would have a Fascist constituency 
organisation. The Blackshirt organisation would provide essential 
services, such as the provision of a room in the club or branch 
headquarters, but would in fact be organised on separate but 
parallel lines. 
These reforms were far reaching and reflected the concern of the 
leadership over some of the problems encountered in the boom year;. i 
of 1934. Given the nature of the changes involved, it was almost 
certain there would be some delay in reorganising the whole 
ipovement, This certainly proved to be the case in Manchesterg where, 
as will be indicated when we turn to an aýialysis of the 1938 
municipal elections, 
2 
six months elapsed before a; --general)meeting-was 
bLelcl*-to: inform'ý? tho-'. Mmlpers of the new changes. 
3 Almost a year elapsed 
4 before the new system was introduoed in Stretford. 
The reforms announced by Mosley in January wereq in faoty only the 
beginning of a series of changes which involved the closure of 
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Black House, the Chelsea National Headquarters of the B. U. F., in the 
autumn of 1935, and the introduction off a new constitution in 
January 1936v which involved a change of name from 'British Union 
of Fascists' to 'British Union of Fascists and National Socialists'. 
The emphasis would henceforth be on 'National Socialist' rather than 
'Fascist', though the movement was commonly known, from the time of 
the change, as 'British Union'. Another change in the organisation of 
the movement occurred at the end of 1935 when the whole movement 
was split into -two administrative areas, North and South, with the 
Northern headquarters operating from Manchester. 
Since all these changes affected the very heart of the movementp it 
is not surprising that their impact was felt in Manchester, which 
was increasingly seen as an important administrative centre for the 
whole of the movement, taking over, firstly, the administration of 
Lancashire, and later that of the whole of Northern England* 
The end of 1934 had witnessed an increase in B. U. F. activity in the 
North of England, and this continued into 1935. Mosley himself 
never seemed to slacken the pace. In the first week of January he 
visited Burnleyq Accrington (where there was an audience of 192C*) 
and Buryp producing his familiar speech on the c6tton industry in 
each town, The following week he was in Blackburn (where an estimated 
crowd of 3ý000 heard him speak at King George's Hall)q Stockportq 
where he spoke at the Town Hall, and then on to a meeting at the 
5 Publiu Baths at Darwin. In the third week he spoke at meetings in 
Earlestown, Oldhamq Ormskirk, West Didsbury and Eccles, 
4 
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Life at branch level in Manchester seemed to reflect this high level 
of activity. Over the Christmas period of 1934 new headquarters of 
the Manchester 'sub' area were opened in Imperial Chaxabers, Piccadilly. 
What was precisely meant by the sub area was never explained and, as 
With the description of other administrative areas in the North, it 
has been difficult to discover the exact area involved. However it 
seems likely that the particular sub area linked to the Imperial 
Chambers headquarters covered the South Fast of Manchesterv which 
included such districts as Gorton and Longsight. Over the same period 
two hundred people attended a B. U. P. new Year dance in Manchester. 
Their New Year resolution was that they would do everything they 
"6 possibly could to further the cause of Fascism* 
Political activity continued on several levels. There was a debate 
-. on 
Fascism held by pupils at North Manchester Grammac School with 
the motion, in support of Fascism in Britain, being proposed by two 
senior. boys at the school, who were membe3s of the B. U. F. One of 
the boys was described as an Assistant Political Officer. 
7 'At Homes' 
I 
were. held in members homes, to which special guests were invited. 
One of these was held at the local organisers home in Crumpsall in 
April, with Henhry J. Gibbs of the Blackshirt and J. R. Smeaton Stuartq 
the Political Officer of the Blackley district, as special guests* 
8 
In Didsbury, a 'Fascist Centre' was opened at the home of Mr Robert, 
at Northern Grove, West Didsbury. Robert waa a Frenchman who became 
a fanatical convert to the Fascist cause. The windows of his house 
were plastered with Fascist leaflets and his children were often to 
be, seen pushing Fascist literature through letterboxes in the 
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surrounding distrietv which was substantially Jewish, while Robert 
himself went on a house to house sale of Blackshirt. 
9 When the B. U. F. 
Peace Campaign was launched in 1935f Robert again organised his whole 
family in distributing the campaign literature. His children even had 
to salute the Union Jack and the M. P. flag before they went to bed. 
10 
A well known figure in Fascist circles, Miss E, V. Cordereyp a full 
time worker in the Manchester head4uartersq'took charge of the 
Womens section of the Manchester area in 1935- In April the section 
was visited by Mrs Wright from Preston, the National Inspecting 
Officer for the Lancashire area. Two months later the section was 
visited by Oswald Mosley's mother, by which time speakers classes 
were being organised by women members, The first public meeting 
organised by the womens section in Manchester was held at Clough 
End, Platting, where the speaker was Corderey, and by June a Womens 
Propaganda Section had opened in the area, led by Cordereyp'Mrs T 
Sharpe and Mrs Edith Scott. Women members who were considered suitable 
were invited from all parts of Lancashire to take part in the 
Spaakers classes, led by Moran, and to join in the other training 
activities connected with their role in the electoral nachinez7 of 
the movement. 
The Lancashire Womens Section headquarters moved from Preston to 
Manchester in 1935 when the new Lancadhire Area Headquarters were 
12 ppened by Mosley in June. This move was a recognition of the 
importance that had been attached to the Manchester headquarters for 
some time. The city contained many more branches than Preston and was 
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much more at the centre of the bug6, -ex*hSion'in 
membership that had taken place in the previous year* The Cotton Campaign 
had more connection with Manchester than with Preston and the city 
was the venue for more important speeches by Mosley than any other 
town or city in the North. 
Shortly after the new Area Headquarters were opened, Manchester 
became one of the three areas outside London to have its own central 
school for training speakers. 
13 Along with those at Leeds and 
Cheltenhamp it was expected to improve the standard of public 
speaking generally and to increase the number of Blackshirts able 
to mount a platform and provide a r6using speech. Raven Thompson led 
some of the classes in Manchester and the Womens Speakers classes 
were incorporated into the central school. 
Although Mosley paid many more visits to the North of England in 1935 
than in any previous yeary'his greater interest in the region was 
reflected in any increaudd support for the movement. The truth of 
the matter was that tle movement in Manchester, in common with other 
areas, seemed to be sufferingýa reaction against the heady .-, 
experiences of the first two years in the life of the B. UoP. Apart 
from the move of t1m Lancahhire Area Headquartersp the other 
organisational changes that were introduced in the city seemed to 
amount to a recognition of the fact that membership had fallen 
drastically. For example, the branches in Hulme and Withington were 
combined into one Division, with a single headquarters in Parkfield 
Streetv Rusholme. 14 It was later disclosed that this division was also 
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to include the branches in Ardwick and Gorton. 
15 
The B. U. F. continued to claim a high level of expansion in thE North 
of course, though even the claims became fewer and fewer. It was 
claimed for example, that the membership in Manchester had trebled in 
the first three months of 1935. All one can say to that sort of 
claim is that if it was true it would certainly not have been 
confined to a couple of lines in Blackshirt. 
16 Another claim was that 
Mosley attracted a crowd of between 159000 and 20,000 at a meeting 
in Oldham in October. 17 Yet a month later, when Mosley addressed a 
meeting at the Free Trade Hall, the hall was no more than three 
quarters full, and it was clear that the audiance included many 
opponentse 
18 On a year previous Mosley had spoken to a capacity 
audience in the hall. 
One of the essential problems was that social and sporting activities 
seemed to be taking precedent over more political matters. Ju Jitsu 
classes were organised by A. G. Woodgate, and the Manchester B. U. P. football 
team decided to arrange fixtures with the National Headquarters and 
with the branch in Birmingham. Until he was sacked Charles Dickinson 
remained in charge of the Manchester B. U. P. boxing teamp which 
numbered fourteen, including Dickinson himself and which won a match 
against the National Headquarters team. In June a B. U. F. Athletic 
and Social Club was opened at 9 Morley Street, which served to 
emphasise the importance attached to such activities by the movementp 
19 
and by November 1935 q B. U. F. swimming team had been formed in the 
Manchester East District. 20 A variety of social events continued to 
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be organised. For example a social was held at the Manchester 
headquarters to celebrate the Jubilee, at which the guest of honour, 
according to Blaokshirt, was a man who held the Victoria Cross and 
who was found on the streets of Manchester. ýselling matches for a 
living. 21 As early as the summer of 1934 Mosley issued warnings against 
M. P. branches developing into social clubs, 
22 
yet that is what 
continued to happen. In May 1935, for example, the police raided 
tbelB. U. F. branch premises in Heywood, near Rochdalev after it was 
discovered that the bar often served drinks after h6urs and also 
sold drinks to non members. When the police arrived the Fascists, 
23 'screaming and cursing', tried to blo* their way into the rooms. 
In the face of this general decline in support and morale, and the 
drift away from political activity, the special campaigns launched 
at,, the end of the year seemed to take on a greater significancep 
indeed were partly moulded by the declining fortunes of the movemento 
The first of these was the 'Mind Britain's Business' campaign which 
began at the Free Trade Hall in September. The main thrust of this 
campaign was that Britain should not become involved in what were 
considered to be the domestic affairs of other countries. This 
included an attack on the role of the Leaguo. -of Nationsp though the 
campaign centred initially on the Abyssinian affairo Mosley spoke 
at the Free Trade Hall on the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia 
and, managed to introduce some anti-Semitio overtones into his defence 
of Italyg' proclaiming that "Over the whole of this Abyssinian dispute 
runs the stink of oil and stronger than even the stink of oil is the 
stink of the Jews. 1124 
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The Abyssinian theme was pursued by Major General Faller in a speech 
in Liverpool the followine evening and, also in the same evening, by 
Mosley in London. In Manchester the campaign was followed up with 
speeches in Stevenson Square and Miles Platting by Simmonds and Gibbs. 
25 
Similar meetings were held in Salfordp Bolton and Stockport. The Mind 
Britainlis Business campaign, which related initially to the Abyssinian 
crisis, was to become part of a much wider Peace Campaign, in which the 
movement came down strongly on the side of non-intervention and 
acknowledged the right of Germany to include all German speaking 
peoples in her territory. Peace campaign literature was distributed 
in Manchester on a door to door basis and special campaign meetings 
continued to be held for some time. Mosley was later to be on the 
side-of Franco in the Spanish Civil War, though his position was 
coupled with the view that Spain was not a problem in which Britain 
should become involved either way. 
In November 1935 the Mind Britain's Business campaign became 
intertwined with the approach of the general election. The response 
of the B. U. P. to the election was, of course, a negative onev in that 
no candidates were nominated. However the election wan not ignored. 
Voters were encouraged to abstain from voting for the 'old gang' of any 
party, and in proclaiming 'Fascism next time' the movement was merely 
coming to terms with the fact that it did not have the resources to 
fight the election on a massive scale. Even if it did fight the 
election, Mosley must have known that the humiliating experience 
suffered in the 1931 election was more than likely to be repeated* 
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The Mind Britain's Business and general election campaigns did not 
receive the same support from the B. U. F. in the North as the cotton 
campaign had. This was partly a reflection of the relevance of the 
respective campaigns to the problems of the region, but it was also 
an indication of the decline in the organisational ability of the 
movement in Manchester. 
The movement was, by the end of 1935, largely discredited as a 
political force. The various problems which it had to face in 1934 
were now accompanied by severe financial difficulties. In 1935 the 
headquarters of the movement, Black House in Chelsea, were sold and 
the movement moved into smaller premises. The Central Defence Force 
was disbanded and there was a close scrutiny of the expenditure of the 
various branches. Robert Benewick, for example, has estimated that 
E20,000 was spent on salaries alone in 1934- 
26 These financial 
problems became more apparent when several prospective contributors 
to the movements funds withdrew their support as a result of the discredit 
attached to the movement after the Olympia meeting. 
When it became known that Mosley was contemplating some drastic changes 
in the organisation of the B. U. F. the system of intriguey on which 
the matter of choosing successors was based, intensified. It was 
obvi ous that there would be some plum jobs availablep but not enough 
to go round all the available staff. Some heads would have to roll. 
The changes introduced by Mosley in January 1936 amounted to a 
fundamental reorganisation of the structure of the movement. 
27 The 
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whole of the existing B. U. F. organisation was split into North and 
South. The Northern region was administered from Manchester, where a 
suite of about a dozen offices in Corporation Street, previously used 
for the administratioh of the Manchester areat were used for the 
purpose, while the Southern region was administered from the old 
National Headquarters in Great Smith Street, London. The Northern 
Headquarters were opened on January Ist and the following appointments 
were made. John Hone, an ex-serviceman, who was a civil engineer and 
widely travelled in Europe and Africa, became Assistant Director 
General. Administration (Northern). Hone was untypical in terms of 
the average age of the B. U. F. leadership, being 55 when he took up 
his appointment in Manchester. He worked alongside John Sant (known 
as 'Blood and Sant' because of his rousing speeches) who was 
appointed to the post of Assistant Director General. Organisation 
(Northern), Sant had been in the Consular Service attached to the 
Balkan Boundaries Commission aid had been with General Harrington's 
forces at Chanako At one time he had been employed as a foreign 
courier. He had previously been a Section Leader of the Cýntral 
London branch before being attached to the Chief of Staffs Department 
at National Headquarters in 1934. In Janfhary 1935 he had become 
a'National Inspecting Officer for Yorkshire and the North East at the 
age of 29* The Organiser of National Meetings (Northern) was Richard 
Re: mall'Bellamyv middle class and educated at public school. 
28 The 
Women's Organiser (Northern) was Miss Olga Shore, who had previously 
worked at the National Headquarters. Not much is known about Shore 
except that she spoke fluent Spanish. The B. U. P. had this to say of 
her: 
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During her world travels in the course of her 
duties in the shipping and marketing world, she 
learned several foreign languages and speaks 
thera fluently. 
A keen student of psychology, her powers of 
assessing character are invaluable. In her 
selection of women officers to work under her 
she displays a fine sense of discretion a 
strong supporter of the idea of -feminine ýemincipation 
A summary of her views of this may be said to 
, 29 be 'liberty without licence , 
There was in fact a delay of seven months before Shore took up her 
new post in l4anohester and she arrived in the city in July 1936.30 
All of these people were 'outsiders I and had been promoted over the 
heads, of local leaderse One man who survived the game of intriigue 
however, was Tommy Ackroyd, who had started a charity for local 
children in the Platting area of the city in 1934- By 1935 Ackroyd's 
charity was known as the IFascist Fellowship Scheme' and was said to 
be in operation throughout Manchesterg distributing clothingg bedding 
and-coal to the 'Poorer classes'. The Fellowship Scheme in fact was 
proving to be Ackroyd's means to power. Ha was provided with a room 
at the Corporation Street headquarters and was described as the 
National Organising Officer of the charity. By the end of 1935P when 
his position in the new administration was about to be confirmedp he 
organised a Christmas party for 990 children at Churnett Street 
Public Hall in Plattingp3lthough the correct attendance fiffure was 
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about, 400 which was doubled for propaganda purposes . 
32 In May 1936, 
Ackroyd, claimed to be providing clothing for children in Manchester 
33 
so that., they could take part in the annual Whitsuntide processions, 
and had opened a national Fascist Fellowship 1/- fund, 
34 All this 
was considered to be good solid work for the movement in Manchester, 
though it was, alas, also to be his downfall. Ackroyd could not 
resist the. temptation of running away with all the Fetowship money 
that-was trusted to his safe keeping. He fled to Australia, where he 
could not quite shake off his pastq and where he was eventually 
imprisoned in 1940 under Defence Regulation 18b. 
Ackroyd, however, had consolidated his position in the hitrarchy of 
the Manchester leadership, and when the reorganisation took place he 
was appointed Senior Political Adviser (Northern), He was a local man 
of course and had been a Conservative Party agent before joining 
the M. P. His job as Senior Political Advisor was to instruct a team 
of election agents for each constituency throughout the North of 
England. 
All the five senior M. P. officers received a salary of Q per week 
and had a full time personal secretary eaol;. In addition there were 
2 or 3 accounts officers, a press officer, 2 or 3 mail register and 
filine clerks, a van driver and four orderlies and messengers, There 
were four National Indpectors who had to report tb the Northern 
Headquarters, and who were chosen partly because theyý, resided in the 
areas they--were to take charge of. Captain Wriahty who was a founder 
member of the movement and had been continuously activeg surviving 
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all the changes in leadership that had taken place, was Inspector for 
Lancashire* He was of courve based in Preston* The Yorkshire area 
was in the charge of P. Whittam, who lived in Normanton. He had 
been educated at Mt. Pelier public school before going on to Oxford 
and Cambridge universities. A man called Armstr6ng, about whom little 
is knownp took charge of the North East area. The Midlands area was 
in the charge of Charles Bentinck-Budd, who had been to public school 
and had travelled in Europe. He lived in Birmingham and had been a 
B. U. F. organiser in Sussex and the Midlands. 
35 There were also 
0 
several National Organising Officers attached to the Northern 
Headquarterso whose job it was to tx7 to form Fascist branches where 
none had previouýly existed. According to Bellamy, "These N. O. O. Is 
fluctuated in number, and were never posted to any particular locality 
for more than a few months. If by that time they had failed to 
produce anything, they were held to have fallen down or had been given 
an impossible wicket. 1,36 
This, fairly elaborate hierarchy was complemented by a panel of staff 
speakers who were the responsibility of Bellamy. 
There must have been a dozen or more of themy 
quite well paid by contempoary standards, and 
considerably better paid than I who was several 
ranks above them. They were a mixed lot ... the 
Only thing they had in common was in being 
greatly articulate. One or two of them were 
almost illiterate, but their obvious sincerity 
cancelled that out; some of them were foolsy 
and one at least was little removed from a 
159 
-ý-crook. Those with smooth cultured voices I sent 
to address university societies, and various 
cultural associations. Incidentally, they were 
the ones I had least time for. The ones with the 
'rasping voices and. elmtic aspirates were for the 
queues outside the Labour E=changep and dock and 
factory gates; they had my respect, as not only 
were they deeply sincere but they often showed 
considerable courage. There was one speaker I 
held in high regard: DougleaRevitt from Cheetham 
Hill, lower middle class rather than working class, 
who never 'ducked' a meeting, but bloody-headed 
would continue to the end. There were others 
almost as plucky but he was outstanding, 'never 
letting himself get excited or abusive under the 
grossest provocation. 
37 
It is in fact possible to arrive at a rough estimation of the cost 
of the administration of the B. U. F. in the North of England in 1936 
after reorganisation. If one assumes that all the top five people, 
Hone, Sant, Bellamy, Shoreq and Ackroyd, were paid a salary of Z3 
per week, which is what Bellamy was paid, the total sum would be C750 
for that year. If their secretaries were pDid an average of 28/- per 
week, 
38 the figure would rise to just under C19100. The Staff Speakersq 
of whom there were at least a dozen, were paid more than Q per week 
and it might not be unreasonable to assume their combined salaries 
would amount to C11,500, "while -the four National Inspectorsp assumins 
a similar rate of pay as Bellamy, would net a total of ZjpOOO per 
annum. The total salary bill of over E39600 excludes the salaries of 
other &adqtLarters staff. This s= must be added to the cost of 
renting a suite of about a dozen offices in the city centre and the 
16o 
cost of providing stationery and other office equipment, lighting 
and heating as well as fuel for transport, etc, It is unlikely that 
the total cost would be lower than E6,000 per year and probably 
nearer C99000,39 
A new administration in the North, with seemingly adequate resources 
of both. finance and labour, might have been expected to produce more 
aotive'campaigning and a higher membership. Yet the fact remains that 
the new year saw a continuation of the falling off of members and an 
intensification of the problems the B. U. F. was already faced with. 
The rather grand start to the year proved to be illusory. If there 
was any revival of interest in the wake of the organisational changesp 
it must have been Of a temporary naturey since the downward trend in 
the fortunes of the movement continued through to 1937 and 1938. This 
can partly be ascribed to the reputation the B. U. P. had gained for 
itself in the previous years. Reynall Bellamy, the new organiser of 
national meetings in the North, saw the effect this had on the 
ýembership. 
There were also places in Lancashire whichp 
despite the appalling economic conditiond as an 
incentive, British Union made no impact in 1937 
or 1938. Enquiries showed that these were towns 
where, in 1933 and 1934, particularly during 
Lord Rothermeres boost, The B. U. P. had taken hold 
like wildfire and had drawn to itself almost 
every unstable person and adventurer of either 
sex that the town possessed. Genuine prople who 
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had been attracted by the programme and policyg 
felt that they could not afford to be associated 
with the types that congregated at District 
Headquarters and either refrained from enrolling 
or, having joined, soon faded out. In these spots 
nothing remained but a bad odour, still lingering 
three or four years later. 
40 
The reputation of the M. P. as an anti-Semitic body much given to 
acts of violenceg not only derived from the past but could be seen 
in I the streets of Manchester in 1936 and later. Fop example, although 
the membership was suffering a decline the incidents of violehoe were 
not. Regardless of who was to blame for the attacks on individuals 
and the d&uptions of meetings, the fact remained that the public 
and the media associated the B. U. F. with violence. In February 19369 
the B. U. F. held a most provocative meeting in Cheetham Public Hall 
in the YBart of the Jewish area of North Manchester, which resulted 
in disorder. During the meeting Captain Wright, of Prestong spoke 
of the B. U. F. moving into Cheetham Hill. 
41 It is hardly surprising 
that the Jewish people in the area decided to protest at the maeting. 
At the beginning of March there were violent scenes at a B. U. F. 
meeting at. Warringtoný during which a Fascist van was overturned. 
42 A 
week later there was trouble at Barnsley and at the end of the month 
there was some disorder at Hull. Manchester B. U. F. members were present 
at all of these meetings. 
A serious incident occurred in June 1936 after a B. U. P. meeting at 
Hulme Town Hall which was led by Mosley. After the meetine Mosley and 
his supporters adjourned to the B. U. F. club in Tomlinson Street, where 
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Mosley was'to perform the official opening ceremony of the local 
headquarters. By all accounts it seems that the trouble was caused 
by the anti-Fascists who had congregated outside the building. The 
Manchester Guardian reported the incident in what by this time had 
become a rather perfunctory style of reporting on clashes between 
the B. U. F., and their opponents. 
43 Nellie Driver, who was present . 
during the incident, and whose comments are worth repeating, if only 
to catch the atmosphere on such occasions, provided a somewhat 
partisan account. 
We had obtained a new district headquarters a few 
streets away, and the Leader had left the hall 
immediately after his speech with half the National 
Headquarters staff to opan it. No one impeded him 
and the local people turned out of their homes to 
give him a friendly welcome, He was just drinking 
a cup of tea after the ceremony when a brick came 
crashing through the window not far from his head* 
He surveyed it in astonishment. That was only the 
beginning for very soon every window in the front 
of the buiýdihg was smashed with missiles. A 
large mob of thousands was outside the headquartersp 
whilst another mob of equal size was picketing the 
Towh Hall - preventing anyone from entering or 
leaving the building - and they were definitely not 
the loral residents. 
I was with my Manchester friendp who ' 
was Women'd 
District Leader for the Hulme branch, and we escaped 
from the Town Hall with our coats buttoned up over 
our uniforms. The mob surged around usp and I can 
honestly say I have never seen a nastier crowd. Its 
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mood was evil, and our lives would have been in 
danger if they had known wa were Fascists. Many of 
them were drunk, and the Red Leaders had spread 
the lie that two of our men had trampled a little 
boy of three to death! They knew hoo to get the !v:: - -- ,ý 
women in a murderous mood. 
We were determined to get into that headquarters, 
so we worked our way through the mob to the front 
and dashed across the street which was littered 
with stones and broken Class, to the door. A 
policeman ran up to us and shouted "There's two 
of your girls out here, for God's iake open this 
door! " He pushed us in and a howl of frustrated 
rage arose from the mob, and a shower of stones 
struck the closed door behind us, 
Sir Oswald %rac. -dtood at the top of the stairsq 
ready to rush to our aid if necessary (on a 
similar occasion he saved the life of one of his 
boy supporters by rushing into a mob and dragging 
himp wounded by a razor, from under their feet and 
carrying him to his car). "Welcome" said Sir Oswaldq 
"I'm sorry its not much of a welcome we can give 
you, is it! " I never saw anyone calmer. As he spoke 
a shout went up. "They are on the roof, they are 
--trying to fire the buildingV' A file came whizzing 
through a side window and it was at this juncture 
that the Leader started to pick up the chairs and 
examine the legs with a practical eye. 
Telephone wires had been cut so that the pitiably 
small handful of police could not ring up for 
reinforcements, but with great courage they foiled 
the attempt at arson. As time went on the mob - 
did not disperse and the Leader reilised they would 
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not go whilst he was still there. We had given 
him a full report of conditions outside, as we 
were the only ones to get through. 
So his car was drawn up quickly to the door, and 
the police fought to keep the mob back as long 
as possible, whilst Sir Oswald walked slowly round 
the car with great dignity and got in at the other 
side! Our hearts were in our mouths as we watched 
from the dtairs. A bodyguard of tough men got on 
the running board and on the top, and it drove straight 
at the mob, which scattered in all directions. 
After he had gone the hooligans calmed down somewhat 
and became more facetious, shouting "Black Rats, come 
out and fight fair. "' but we want on playing darts 
and held councils of war at intervals. 
A Red climbed up and tore down the Union Jack which 
was hanging from a window, and several screaming 
hags with their hair flying in all directions danced 
on it and finally made a bonfire of it in the middle 
of the street. Heaven help this country, I thoughty 
if that mob gets into power:,, 
44 
This highly personalised account reflects on the B. U. F. 's own 
propensity to violence as much as anything elde. The fights, however, 
were not always between the M. P. and their opponents. The 
heterogeneons nature of the membership of the B. U. F. led to rivalrY 
and open hostility between groups of Fascists from different areasp 
and this added to the general reputation for violence. An example of 
this is the conflict between the Liverpool and Manchester B. U. P. 
branches. OAe particular incident was recalled by Bob Row, a member of 
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the'Preston branch at the time, when asked about the 'rough element' 
in the B. U. P. 
Well they were very bad, not so much in 
Manchester. Manchester was much more respectable 
strangely enough. Liverpool was aawilder lot. To 
get the Liverpool and the Manchester members 
together they often had a fight. In fact there 
was a shocking case where there was a meeting in 
Manchester and a lot of cars and people at the 
meeting were lining up outside. Someone made the 
mistake of asking the Liverpool branch to guard 
the cars against the Redm. Well, the buggerp just 
rifled the cars. (These were) the wild boys, I 
mean Danny Gillan and his bloody lot. He was 
thrown out of the movement two or three times for 
his wild ways, but he had his whole gang up here 
you see, and the trouble was the discipline of 
these devils, but that certainly applied to London 
as well as down in the docks (Liverpool). There were 
some very odd characters, and they all flocked into the 
Mosleyý movement because it was fashionable.. owe 
got as bad a name for riotous- behaviour as we 
accused the Communists of you see and that's the 
trouble. 45 
It was such incidents of violence and intimidationg within and 
without. the movement that made it difficult for the B-U. F. to attract 
members. -The downfall in numbers gave rise to the paradoxical situation 
of the remaining members, generally more steeped in the core of 
Fascist ideology than the ones who had departed, actually strengthening 
and expanding the populist, or surface, level of ideology in order to 
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boost membership. The confusion of the two levels of ideology led 
to a failure to attract either type of new member, the deeply 
committed or the generally discontented, and the movement failed to 
secure the reitersal of misfortune it so ardently desired. 
That misfortune was compounded by the imposition of the Public Order 
Act on Januarylst 1937, which banned the wearing of political uniforms 
in public places and at public meetings. The formation of quasi-military 
organisations was also banned, though the consent of the Attorney 
General. was required before anyone could be charged with these offences. 
Powers for the preservation of public order were placed in the hands of 
chiefs of police, who were able to lay down conditions under which 
processions could take place. 
A chief constable could, with the consent of the Home Secretaryp 
place a ban on public processions for a period of not more than three 
months'. 'The Act also prohibited the carrying of offensive weapons at 
public meetings and processions, and offensive conduct which could 
give rise to breaches of the peace was also prohibited. 
Robert Skidelsky has claimed that the government was faced with two 
alternatives. Either if could enforce the-existing lawp which would 
harm the anti-Fascists, since it was they who were breaking the law 
and not the Fascists. ("Mosley was doing nothing illegalt, 
46). Or the 
government could change the law to deal with the problem of public 
order. The second alternative followed from the objection to the first, 
7Since-it was the Fascist meetings and processions that were being 
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attacked, defence of the fight of free speech and assembly would in 
practice mean defending the Fascists against their qpponents. 1147 
It will be argued later that Skidelsky adopts a faýse premise and that 
if the government had enforced the existing law it would be the 
Fazoists and not their opponents who would suffer. If this action 
had been taken, the Public Order Act, with its consequent tightening 
of executive powers and infringement of civil liberties, would not 
have been required. The main point to be explored here, however, is 
the effect the Public Order Act had on the fortunes of the B. U. F. in 
the North of England. 
The B. U. F. officer in charge of administration for the North of 
Englandq Reynall Bellamy, thought at the time that the banning of 
43 
political uniforms would be disastrous for t1m movement, but he 
later considered that the ban had little impact. The first uniform 
style of plain blaokshirt and trouders was, he claimed. 9 aoceptableg 
anehelped to build up the comradeship", while the second uniform was 
a "mistakett. 
49 A member of the Moss Side branch of the B. U. F. in 
Manchester also thought the uniform had little impact on branch 
membership. 
50 Some people left the movement in Lancaster when the 
uniform was introduced, but others of a "different type" became 
members. 
51 In Hull the B. U. P. leader thought the uniform had some 
attraction, since active membership declined when the Public Order 
Act was introduced though, to counteract this, the non-aotive 
membership actually increased. 
52 What may have occurred herey of 
course, is. aýswing by the same people from active to non-active 
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membership. In Nelson the Public Order Act partly affected 
membership, though it is not known to what extent. 
53 It may be true 
that the Public Order Act had little effect on the numerical strength 
of the B. U. F. If this was t1m case2 then it surely rested on the 
fact that the B. U. F. was already at a low ebb, in terms of numbers, 
morale and finance. The people who had remained in the movement 
throughout the upheavals of 1935 and 1936 were not likely to be 
easily put off by the lack of a uniform to wear. These were the 
people, by and large, who had imbibed not only the rhetoric of 
Fascism but also the underlying 'depth' ideology of the movement. 
Reynall Bellamy summed up the effect the Pablio Order Act had on the 
Ilembership of the B. U. F. He does not indicate the numbers of new 
members at the time for they were, indeed, very small* 
Political credds, as well as religious, thrive on 
persecution. Therefore our movement now made some 
of its most significant progress... The men and 
women who now joined our movement came in with 
their eyes open and were under no illusion as to 
w1at was in store for them. They enrolled mainly 
for the preservation of peace, and in the conviction 
that peace could best be maintained by National Unity 
and strength and not by internal dissention and 
weakness. The exhibition of empty threats followed 
by humiliating defeat, which is how. -the Baldwin 
Gouernment stood up to Mussolinip persuaded a number 
of people jealous of their countrymen's good name to 
go over to Mosley's cause, The Fascist recruits who 
came in during 1935 and 1936 knew that in joining a 
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revolutionary movement they were saying good bye 
to comfort and safety. They realised that hence 
forth they would be liable to victimisation at 
I- work or business, There would be loss of friends, 
even disrupted home life and always the risk of 
grave physical injury. From this time until the 
implementation of Defence Regulation 18b in Dlay 
1940t the quality of those who enrolled in British 
-Union reached its best. The tone of the movement 
, never stood higher. 
54 
To these, people the uniform was useful, though less important than 
it was to those members who responded to the populist appeal of the 
'surface' ideology of the movement. 
One aspect of the exploitation of the populist level of ideology, 
which of course accompanied the deeper level to which the members 
described by Bellamy responded, was the attempt to secure B. U. F. 
representation on local councils. The Manchester municipal elections 
of 1938 provide an opportunity to study this attempt in some detailq 
since the B. U. F. nominated four candidates. The next chapter deals 
with the B. U. F. and its approach to elections generallyy before 
attempting to determine the impact of the 1938 local elections on 
the electorate in Manchester. 
170 
t'ITT&PrTlp. p qTy 
APPEUING TO THE PEOPLEt THE M. P. AND ELECTIONS. 
The 1938 municipal elections provided the first opportunity for 
the Manchester electorate to decide for themselves what they thought 
of the B. U. F. by the means of the vote. There are several aspects of 
the Manchester elections which tell us a great deal about the B. U. P. 
in general and its impact in Manchester in particular. We need to 
look at the-areas in which the B. U. F. chose to place their candidates 
and thus find out why the areas were chosen. We need to look at the 
manifestos-, put forward by the candidates, and at what the B. U. F. 
hoped-to achieve by putting forward candidates for. election to local 
councils. The following analysis will attempt to define the support 
of the candidates and provide answers to the other problems outlined 
here. However, we must first proceed by way of historical background 
in order to place the 1938 elections in their proper contexi ýnd to 
outline the attitudes towards elections which the B. U. F. held. We 
need to examine how those attitudes changed with the -, changing 
fortunes of the movement. 
When the New Party, the embryonic form of the BX. F., was founded in 
March 1931, Mosley decided immediately that he would appeal to the 
electorate for the support of his policies. It could be argued that 
Mosley was in a relatively strong position to do this comparedq for 
example, with the positions held by the leaders of other minor political 
parties, "especially that of the Communist Party. The leader of the 
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New PartYj blosleyq was a member of parliament and an ex-Cabinet 
Ministerg an important and well known figure at that, of whom great 
things were expected by many people. The New Party's strength was 
initially drawri from inside parliament and it was natural that Mosley 
would see a strong party base in the House of Commons as the way to 
achieve power, 
As soon as the New Party was formed, Mosley announced that it would 
fight 400 seats at the next general election. In the event, nothing 
like that total was achieved. TIP, first test of the New Party's 
strength came in April 1931 in Ashton-Under-Lyne. Allen Young, who 
had, been Mosley's full time political secretary, was nominated for the 
seat by the New Party. The seat was held by Labour with a majority 
of 3407 at the 1929 general election. Young gained 4472 votes and 
saved his deposit, coming third behind the Conservativesy who 
received 1.2,420 votes, and Labour with 11,005. On an 8Cý. poll, the 
owing to the Tories was in line with the general move in that 
direction at by-elections in the two previous years. In his 
autobiography, Mosley stated that "the vote was large enough to Put 
us on the map and cause the New Party to be taken seriously. "' 
If the New Party was now being taken seriously, the Party organisers 
did not capitalise on the situation, nor did the later election 
results fully bear out the confidence expressed much later by Mosley. 
His aim of fielding 400 candidates at, the general election in October 
1931 did not materialiseo Only 24 candidates stood and only two of 
those managed to avoid being placed at the bottom of the poll, 
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including Mosley himself. Instead of building the base in the House 
of Commons as he hoped, Mosley found himself in a worse positio4 than when 
he started. The New Party began with four M. P. 's in the House of 
Commons. Now it had none. 
. 
It id worth remembering these election results as we turn to the 
B. U. F. 's attitude towards elections. As leader of the B. U. F. $ Mosley 
must have known that, initially at least, he could not hope to fare 
any better than the New Party had in elections. As a Fascist leader, 
he was in an even more isolated position than he was when he led the 
New Party. He had no seat in the House of Commons from which to 
build support, and in any case he increasingly spoke of the structure 
of the House of Commons itself as being one of the reasons for the 
economic plight of the country. It was much easier to say, as he did, 
that, for the moment, elections did not matterg than to face the 
same humiliation as the New Party in the 1931 general election. If 
that happened again, the resulting damage to Mosley and his new 
movement would be irreparable. 
However, Mosley put a brave face on the situation, and he had this to 
say about the 1931 election results: 
Our constructive programme was derided and dismi6sedg 
only later to be adopted in part by the National 
. government - but in so small a degree, so tardily and 
in such muddled fashionp as to render it entirely 
ineffective. 
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For all this we make no complaint whatsoever: 
such experience is merely the classic first phase 
of a Modern Movement. Actually we -fared far 
better at our first attempt than any other of the 
modern movements which have been founded and which 
have come to power in other countries since the 
war. The Italian Fascists were more utterly defeated 
in the election of 1919, about three years before 
they came into power. Their leader polled only 
5,000 votes against the 100,000 of his Old Gang 
opponent -a result only some 20 per cent as good 
as that which I was afforded by the people of Stoke- 
onTrent in the election of 1931. 
If we turn to the case of the German Nazis, we find 
that they were routed again and again:, 7. by national 
combinations of their Old Gang before they approached 
2 
power. 
Although the voters did not see fit to return his party to parliament, 
Mosley thought that the time would arrive when it could capture 
parliament by constitutional means. It is at this point that a paradox 
appears in Mosley's reasoning, of which he himsilf was aware. One 
of the main points of B. U. F. policy was the replacement of parliament 
by a corporate system of government. The whole election process by 
which M. P. 's were returned to parliament would be overhauled and 
replaced by an occupational franchise. Yet here was Mosley attempting 
to use the very means which he derided to gain the support of 
parliament. If, because of the structure of parliamentp M. P. 's were 
as impotent in bringing about change as Mosley suggestedq how would 
his M. P. 's bring about the change he desired? His answer was that 
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"Parliament will never be an end in itself; but only a means to an 
end; our object is not political place holdingg but an achievement 
of national reconstruction. "3 All very well perhaps, but the actual 
process of change in parliament, to bring about the 'national 
reconstruction' was never clearly defined. 
Mosley admitted that he probably made a mistake in fighting the 
general election of 1931, adding that this was a mistake common to 
all new movements (meaning Fascism in Germany and Italy), He saw it 
as a phase of 'ridicule and defeat' which was a test of the movement's 
vitality. Some would say it was a phase in which the vitality of the 
movement was brought seriously brought into question. Howevert Mosley 
was not to make the same mistake again. Before the movement ventured 
once more into the election field, it had to do a lot more ground 
work, 'invading every phase of national life and carrying everywhere 
the Corporation conception'. 
It is interesting that Mosley left open the possibility of achieving 
power by other than parliamentary means. This path would not, of 
course, be sought by the movement and would not be an attempt to 
usurp the position of the Crown. It would only be a fight against 
the forces of anarchy when the machiner7 of state had become 
powerless. 
Thus Mosley left his options open. If pressed as to why he did not 
put his movement to the test of the vote in an electiong he would 
answer that he could by-pass the House of Commons when the time came 
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to fight the forces of anarchy that would be the result of the 
parliamentary system. The actual route to ppwer was left suitably 
vague in order to take into account any contingencies which might 
ariseO Mosley was becoming more committed to developing a fighting 
election machine within his movement, ' but once the B. U. F. had a 
base in the House of Commons, anything might happen. 
In Janua: r7 1935Y Mosley outlined a new stage of Blackshirt organisation. 
The roles of Unit Leader and Branch Officer and the organisation of 
branches were clearly defined. Farther, and what is of interest to 
us here, the role within the B. U. P. of a Political Organisation with 
felectoral machinery' was clearly spelt out. The Political Organisation 
was to work parallel with the movement as a whole and was to be 
under the control of a Director of Political Organisaticn who would 
control the existing constituency organisations and, especiallyp the 
womens organisation, whose main task would be to develop constituency 
organisations under the supervision of the Director. The Political 
Organisation in fact, would operate in much the same way as other 
political parties. Members would give their services 
... in the same way as members of other parties. *. 
to develop definite constituency organisations on 
a constituency, ward and polling district basis. A 
constituency organisation will be constituted by a 
political officer directing a political agent and 
assisted by a Blackshirt officer appointed to 
4 
maintain liason with the Blackshirt movement* 
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Rooms were to be rented from existing club or branch premises and 
members of the Political Organisation were tovear plain ulothes. 
Their only identifying feature would be a badge. The ultimate aim 
of the organisation was "*. *to have a constituency organisation in 
every constituency which will rely for certain essential services on 
the Blackshirt movement, which will be separately organised but on 
parallel lines.. 
5 
In the 1935 general election, the B. U. P. adopted a policy of, 'Fasoism 
next timely which formed part of an anti-Semitic campaign, in which 
people were encouraged to express their dissatisfaction with 
parliament by witholding their vote. The role of the ordinary M. P. 
continued to be ridiculed and the structure of parliament and 
the policies of the 'Old Gang' political leaders were similarly 
derided. In preparation for 'Fascism next timely the B. U. F. 
announced in November 1936 a list of 100 constituencies which 
they would contest in the next general election. According to 
Robert Benewick, 6 who discussed the list with John Beckett and 
A. K. Chesterton, the constituencies were chosen on the basis of 
the strength of the local B. U. Forganisation. The availability of 
a candidate was also an important factor in deciding which 
constituencies would be contested. If these constituencies are studied 
it is possible to see that thay were grouped into two main areas 
in England and Wales. Twenty six constituencies were chosen in the 
North West of England, with five of the ten Manchester constituenciesv 
three of the six Leeds, and three of the ten Liverpool constituencies 
appearing on the list. Forty six of the constituencies appeared in 
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London and the South East* If we look at the percentage of 
constituencies in the major cities that were on the B. U. F. list, we 
can see that Manchester and Leeds featured prominently enough to be 
provided with the largest percentage, by number of seats, of candidates. 
Table 1. Distribution of prospective parliamentar7 candidates in 
areas o high B. U. P. support. 
AM 
* NurAber of, peats 
in the area: 
Number of seats 
chosen by the B. U. R 
o of possible 
B. U. F. rep. 
ITanch ester 10 5 50 
Leeds ý6 3 50 
London 61 10 33 
Liverpool 11 3 27.2 
It is clear that the B. U. F. considered the North West of England to 
be an important part of their election plans - more so than the 
industrial Midlands or the North East. However this does not hide the 
fact that the South East was particularly prominent, ý'in, te=s of the total 
number of constituencies allocated to prospective members by thd B. U. F. 
The main area which this analysis offthe B. U. F. and elections is 
concerned with is, of coursev Ibnchester, and if we look at the 
five prospective candidates nominated by the B. U. F. for five of the 
ten constituencies in the city, some interesting points emerge. 
The candidate in the Gorton constituency was Thomas Davies, who was a 
local mant having been born in Ardwickv which borders on the Gorton 
constituency*7 He started hie working life as a labourer and was later 
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employed as a miner. He served in the 3rd Manchester Regiment during 
the First World War. Davies' previous political activity is 
interesting, since he joined the National Unemployed Workers Movement 
and took on the duties of a branch secretary. He was forty years old 
in 1936, when he was chosen as prospective B. U. P. candidate. It would 
appear that Davies was chosen because he was known locallryand 
presumably was a popular figure in the Fascist movement in Manchester. 
In Hulme the prospective candidate was R. T. Parkyng who was also a 
man with local connections. 
8 
Not much is known about Parkyn, except 
that he started his working life as a coach builder and joined the 
Army in 1916. After the war he spent * years in the Civil Service 
before taking a degree at Manchester University and then spending 
a. period of ten years in Persia. He was 38 years old when he was 
i 
nominated for the constituency. 
The. candidate for the Exchange constituency was Captain L. Wrighty 
who was Chief Propaganda Officer for the North West area in 1936. 
He was a member of the Preston branch, though he was born and 
educated in Manchester. 
9 
R. R. Bellamy was the prospective candidate for the Blackley 
constituency. He was 36 years old in 1936 and had hadatvaried career 
fall of action. He was born in Liverpool and wad educated at Sedbergh. 
He was too young to serve in the forces during the First World Wart 
though the Fascist press described him as having joined the Red Cross 
in 1918. This may well have been the case, but what was not disclosed 
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was the fact that he also served in the 'Black and Tans' 
in Ireland. 
10 
Bellamy later became a farm hand in Cheshire before joining 
the 
. 
Merchant Marine. He was also widely travelled and at different 
times 
had worked on a sheep station in New South Wales and as a cotton 
planter in Queensland. Bellamy wrote about his travels and published 
lwolbooks;. Real South Seas and Mixed Bliss in Melanesia, and had 
transcribed a book with the title Rumblin' Jack. He had joined the 
B. U. F. in 1932 and in 1936 was working at the Manchester Headquarters 
as a full time paid member in charge of Northern Propaganda. In fact 
Bellamy's connections with Manchester were closer than that. He had 
lived for seven years in Didsbux7 (or 'Yidsburyl as he described it 
when interviewed. 
' 1), 
and his grandfather was Herbert Milneq 
(of 
Kendal Milne, a large and exclusive department store in the centre 
of Manchester). Bellamy thought that Blackley was chosen as a 
constituency by the B. U. P. because it was near enough to a Jewish 
area for the people to be 'Jewish conscious' an& he considered that 
there was a certain amount of feeling against the Jews in the area 
which the B. U. P. could exploit. The B. U. F. did have a strong 
organization in Blackley, with two branches in the constituencyp 
one -in Moston and another in Crumpsall. The neighbouring area of 
Miles. Platting also contained two B. U. P. branches. Bellamy considered 
that he was chosen as a prospective candidate because of his 
connections with Manchester andp of coursey as head of Northern 
Riopaganda, he held a promine! at position in the organisatiOn of the 
B. U. P. and was well known in Fascist circles. 
The last B. U. P. prospective candidate for the Manchester area 
d 
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constituencies was L. E. Griffith, who was to fight the Moss Side 
constituency in the next election. At 24 he was the youngest of the 
five. He was a local man, having attended Chorlton Grammar School and 
the North Manchester Municipal High School. He was considered to be 
a well known figure in the B. U. F. and had been a Manchester member 
since October 1932. Griffith had also been a member of Too Hand the 
Boy Scouts before joining the B. U. P. 
It is apparent that, firstly, the prospective candidates were selected 
because of their local connections and their standing in the M. P. 
organisation and, secondly, that the constituencies in which they 
were, placed were able to rely on fairly strong support from 
established B-U. F. branches. This bears out what Beckett and Chesterton 
thought of as the reasons why the constituencies were chosen* From 
the B. U. F. Is point of view they would appear to be the most obvious 
reasons for making the choice. 
* 
The general election plans of the B. U. F. never bore fruit because the 
movement had, of courseq been eclipsed by the time the next general 
election was held, in 1945. There was no doubt as to the seriousness 
Interestingly, Nellie Driver, the Women's District Leader of the 
Nelson branch, was approached by the National headquarterst who asked 
if she would be willing to be nominated as prospective member for the 
Nelson and Colne constituency, since she was well known in the area 
and was instrumental in building up a strong branch. She declined the 
offer because she didn't think she had the remotest chance of winning. 
12 
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of intent of the B. U. F. in entering a general election with many 
candidates andt with the movement gaining some support in the months 
preceding the outbreak of war, one coald not doubt its ability to 
field at least some of those candidates. As to the suocevs the 
candidates could expect to achieve, we can only indicate the general 
pointers which emerged before the movement came to a sudden end with 
the introduction by the governmentýof Defence Regulation 18b, in 1940. 
The main pointer we have, and certainly the most relevant, is the 
electoral success the movement met with when it fielded candidates 
in municipal elections. 
In July 1936 the M. P. decided, in an appaient reversal of polivy, 
that for the time being attention would focus on local elections. 
Once the decision was taken, the local election, plans were carefully 
mapped cat. It was a year before the first candidates stood in local 
elections but the ground work was laid long before. The first elections 
contested, in March 1937, were in three L. C. C. constituencies in the 
East End of London. Two M. P. candidates stood in each of the wards 
of Bethnal Green, North East; Limehouse (Stepney); and Shoreditch. 
The results of those elections have already been adequately dealt with 
elsewhere, 
13 but it is worth looking at the results again so that 
comparisons may be made with later elections in Manchesterý(see Table 
2, page 182). 
The resultsi while not exactly disastrous for the B. U. P. in such areas 
of high Jewish settlement, were the best the B. U. P. were ever to 
achieve in British electionst Mosley could not brush off the defeats 
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Table 2. Results of 1937 municipal elections in East End wards 
with B. U. P. candidates. 14 
Bethnal Green North-East 
T. Dawson (Labour) 7p777 
Mrs. R. S. Keeling (Labour) 7P756 
A. Raven Thompson (British Union) 39028 
E. G. Clarke (British Union) 39022 
A. J. Irvine (Liberal) 29328 
H. K. Sadler (Liberal) 29293 
(Labour 59', lop British Union 23%, Liberal 1811fo. ) 
Stepney (Limehouse) 
R, Coppook (Labour) 81272 
Miss H. M. Whately (Labour) 8,042 
V. G. Weeple (Municipal Reform) 2p542 
G. E. Abrahams (Municipal Reform) 29431 
fIrs A. Brock Griggs (British Union) 21036 
C. Wegg-Prosser (British Union) 29086 
(Labour 54ot Municipal Reform 27%p British Union 19%) 
Shoreditch 
Mrs. H. Girling (Labour) 112093 
S. W. Jeger (Labour) ii, o6q 
S. L. Price (Municipal Progressive) 39303 
R. S. Falk (Municipal Progressive) 3p217 
William Joyce (British Union) 29564 
J. A. Bailey (British Union) 2092 
C. E. Taylor (Independant Labour) 385 
(Labour 63%, Municipal Progressive 2201op British 
Union 14%q Independant Labour 1%) 
183 
in the East End constituencies as though they clid not matter, since 
I 
the B. U. F. had thrown everything into these electionsp with literally 
hundreds of meetings being organised in the campaign and with strong 
candidates who were well known. Once again, as with the New Party 
results'inthe 1931 elections, a comparison was made with the National 
Socialist vote in Germany before the Nazis came to power. On that 
sort of comparison, claimed Mosley, ' the B. U. F. was in just about the 
same position as the National Socialists, with about 18% of the vote. 
It has, 'however, been pointed out that Hitler's votes were won from 
all over Germany, whereas Mosley's party had gained approximately the 
same percentage of votes from, by this time, the three strongest 
constituencies, electorally, in the whole of the country. 
15 The B. U. F. 
of course was searching around for any face saving evidence that 
might be at hand, and it was suggested that if the Jews in the three 
constituencies had not been there, the Labour vote would have dropped 
to the point where the B. U. F. could quite easily have won. 
Similar results as those in the L. C. C. elections were obtained when 
, the'B. U. P. put up candidates in the municipal elections six months 
later in October. Other constituencies in London, and also in Leedd, 
Sheffield and Southampton were contested at these elections, and the 
B. U. F. ' never came in sight of winning, The results in the provinces 
were particglaxly bad. 
16 
If we consider the organisation of the M. P. in the I-1anohester area2 
we can see that electoral considerations played a large part in the 
siting of branch headquarters and the choosing of administrative areas. 
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From the very beginning the Manchester headquarters supervised 
branches based on constituency areas. In the early days of the 
movement the area was organised by compass points. Manchester East, 
for example, consisted of the parliamentary constituency areas of 
Ardwick. and Gorton. Manchester South was made up of the Hulme and 
Withington constituencies. When plans were announced for a new branch 
in the'North in April 1934, with headquarters in Ashton-under-Lyne, 
it was envisaged that the area would cover the three parliamentary 
divisions of Ashton, Mossley and Stalybridge with Hyde. 
17 With the 
reorganidation of the movement at the beginning of 1935, the 
parliamentary bo-undaries took on a greater significance, though it 
took several months for the Manchester area to organise itself on 
the new lines laid down by Mosley. The activities at the various 
branches in Manchester, as well as at the city headquarters, were 
disrupted from time to time as jealousies and favouritism crept 
into the relationships between various members. When Mosley announced 
his new plans which, as we have seen, created new Political 
Organisation posts, and gave the Women's section particular political 
duties, these disruptive forces became more evident and it was some 
time before the pattern of political oreanisation emerged. In June 
1935, six months after the plans were announcedp a general meeting 
was held at the Manchester Central branchp where the new plans were 
announced to the members. All members were to work in units in their 
own constituenciesp where it was stated that offices had been 
acquired, and they were to concern themselves chiefly with Canvassingg 
the selling of Blackshirt and, of course, organising meetings. 
18 it 
was not until October 1935 that the leaders of the Manchester East 
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area, in the Gorton and Ardwick constituenciest explained to their 
members the new Political Organisation plans, 
19 
while it took as long 
as December before the new plansp which Mosley in the previous January 
had said were to be brought into action immediatelyv were sorted out 
-1 20 , and introduced in Stretford. 
In January 1936, election funds were opened in Plattingg Withington, 
Gorton, Hulme, North Salford and Stretford, with a separate but 
parallel-central fund organised from the Manchester headquarters. How 
effective this fund raising was is difficult to say. Reynall Bellamy, 
the Organiser of National Meetings in the North, and in charge of 
Northern Propaganda, said that crooks kept appearing within the 
organisation and district treasurors would sometimes abscond with the 
moneyqýand in some cases taking with them office equipment, such as 
typewriters. 21 Socials and dances were sometimes held to swell the 
election funds, but just how sucessful these were is not known. The 
reports in the Fascist press of such events may well have been 
exaggerated in the same way that reports of meetings and the membership 
increases of various branches were sometimes falsified in order to 
create'a good impression* 
The only opportunity we have of analysing the strength of the B-U-F- 
in Manchester when put to the test of the electoratet and analYsing 
it"on a proper psephological basis, is provided by the municipal 
election results of 1938. The B. U. F. deoided to contest four wards 
in Manchester in that year. Miss Margaret E. Pye stood in the All 
Saints ward; F. Fowden in the Collyhurst ward; James Simmonds in the 
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South Gorton 19ard, and Bernard Talbot in the St. George's ward. All 
the candidates were local people, and some were fairly prominent in 
their, local organisationsg though not nationally known. Simmonds was 
the Assistant District Officer of the East Manchester branch (Ardwick 
and Gorton), which included the South Gorton ward for which he was 
a candidates He lived in part ot Rusholme which was also in the Fast 
Manchester branch district and in fact, at least until October 19350 
the, branch headquarters were at his home address. Talbot lived in 
Fallowfield and, so far as it has been possible to discover, did 
not hold any particularly prominent position in the local organisation. 
In February 1939, after the elections, he was fined in the Manchester 
City police court for shoutijftg anti-Semitio slogans, Margaret Pye was 
born in Ardwick and was a member of the local Too H and its libraryo 
Her father and his brother had lived in Ardwick at least since they 
were children and may have been born in the area* Fowden was a local 
man from Blackley, though little else is known about him,, He does not 
appear, tp have held a responsible position in his local branchp though 
it is possible that he could have done so. 
If we take a look at the actual wards chosen by the B. U. r. in the 
election we may throw more light on the rdasons why the wards were 
chosen and the sort of campaigns waged by the candidates. Manchester 
of course was at the centre of the Industrial Revolution in this countrYp 
and in more ways than one. The cotton tradep important in many aspects 
in the Industrial Revolutiong was centred in the South East of 
Lancashire and particularly in the Manche'ster area, which expanded at 
an enormous rate as the cotton industry itself expanded. Of particular 
4 
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interest to us here is the expansion in the population of Manchester 
that'took place not only in the nineteenth century but in the 
twentieth century als6 and which is partly attributed to the fact that 
Manchester became one of the main centres to which people migrated from 
other'parts of the British Isles and abroad. 
The'structure of the population of Manchester in the 1930's was a 
reflection of this very high level of immigration. Of IRrticular 
interest to the study of the B. U*F. in Manchester were the Jews and 
the Irish* The growth of the Jewish community in Manchester is dealt 
with later. It is the influx of large numbers of Irish people which is 
important here. As early as 1820 twenty per cent of-the working class 
people in Manchester were Irish. 
22 In 1845 Engels, living in and 
writing about Manchesterg described the conditions that existed in 
'Little, Irelandt, an Irish slum in the centre of the city. 
23 This 
early influx of Irish people was related, in part, to the possibilities 
of employment afforded by the rapid industrial change occurring 
in the early nineteenth century. Canal building and, laterv railway 
building, as well as the construction of the large cotton millsy 
provided employment for large numbers of Irish people in the area. The 
Irish potato famine however was the main cause of of Irish immigrationg 
and the Irish arrived in the city in their thousands in the 1840's 
via the port of Liverpool. The influx was so great that a tremendous stress 
was placed on the capacity of the authorities to cope with the numbers. 
In November 1847Y five thousand Irish paupers per week were provided 
with poor relief and -fever periodically spread through the Irish 
community. Once the Irish had arrived in Manchestert of course, they 
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tended, to stay. Since a large Irish community had been brought into 
existence in the area, Manchester continued to be a place of contact 
with people back in Ireland. Even after the initial burst of Irish 
immigration in the early ninteenth century, people arriving in England 
much later from Ireland, in search of work, would naturally gravitate 
towards the centres of Irish population in this country. Many people 
in Ireland would have relatives in Manchester and often arrived in the 
city to join them, From this point of view Manchester was still very 
important in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for the 
Irish citizen arriving in this country. 
24 
The influx of people into Manchester did not consist solely of Irish 
people of courde. We have already noted in passing the immigrant 
Italian community, and Jewish immigrants formed a large percentage 
of the total influx. However, the point is that Irish immigration 
cohtinued. From the point of view of this study it is interesting 
to note that the 1930's influx of Irish people into Manchestery 
which had been dwindling over the previous few decades, was given added 
impetus by the fact that America could no longer offer employment to 
Irish immigrants and had in fact placed restrictions on the number of 
people entering the country, The Depression in America meant that 
Irish people who might otherwise have emigrated there, now turned 
towards England. In 1931 over 100,000 peoplep from all parts of 
Ireland, settled in Lancashire and Cheshire. 
25 By 1951 the figure for Irish 
immigration into South East Lancashire was just over 40,00026 , the 
fall in numbers being mainly due to the impact of the Second World War* 
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If we turn to the actual number of Catholics, which is the nearest 
we can get to determining Irish population numbersq we can see that 
in the Salford Diocese, which includes Manchester, the numbers of 
Catholics attending churches in the Diocese increased considerably 
in the 1930's. In 1930 the figure was 86,878; in 1935 88P870; in 
1940 97,097.27 
It is important to note the large numbers of Irish people in the four 
wards chosen by the B. U. P. because it has 6.1ready been suggested that 
the relationship between the B. U. P. and the Irish community deserves 
special attention. The four wards were predominantly Catholic areas. 
The largest Catholic church in Manchester, St. Patricks, was on the 
I 
edge of the Collyhurst ward and was a predominantly Irish Catholic 
church drawing much of its congregation from the Collyhurst district. 
In 1930 it had a registered congregation of 8,000 which had grown to 
10tOOO by 1935.28 The second largest church, in terms of congregationg 
was St. Wilfreds, in the St. George's wardp which numbered 79000 in 
1930, with a slight drop to 6,800 in 1935- 
29 The third largest church 
was St. Francis, in Gorton North, on the edge of the Gorton South ward 
in which the M. P. had placed a candidate. Miles Platting contained 
the fourth largest church, which bordered on the Collyhurst ward itself. 
In 1930 there was a total of thirty three Catholic Churches in 
Manchester and so it would seem thatp using Church membership as a 
yardstick, the four wards chosen by the B. U. F. in the 1938 municipal 
elections were the most Catholic, and, by implicationg the most Irish 
wards in the city. 
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Finding out what actually occurred in the B. U. F. election campaign 
has proved rather difficult. The local press ignored the campaigns 
and only reported that the candidates had been entered for the elections 
and., the positions they subsequently held when the results were declared. 
The Fascist press did not cover each individual election. We are 
left with the published B. U. F. election material and the accounts of 
the election provided by various people who were., either in the B. U. F. 
at the time or were engaged in opposing the M. P. and in doing so 
monitored the progress of the local elections. 
The actual manifesto6z of the four candidates were very similar, as 
might be expectedg with just the odd word altered here and there. 
30 
A. 1non political' stance was taken by the candidatesp arguing for 
example that such matters as foreign affairs should be of no concern 
to councillors. Political careerists were attacked and the money 
spent on prestigious buildings, by which was presumably meant the new 
Manchester Town Hall extensions, was also denounced. It was argued that 
the cost of social services should not be borne by local authoritiesp 
nor should the cost of Air Raid Precautionso, lnstead-these'should come 
under-the supervision of central government. 'Britain First' was the 
catch phrase which was said to sum up British Union policy. The term 
'Fascistl did not appear at, all. One of the common themes was the 
fight against 'Communism, Cant and Corruption'. The 'Gorraption' 
presumably related to the charge that favouritism was shown by 
councillors in giving local authority employment to friends and 
relatives, though no evidence was offered to show that such favouritism 
did in fact exist. 
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Fowden, the candidate in the Collyhurst wardt added his own comments 
in a separate leaflet, Reference to tAlien Financial Interests' was 
made and the Labour Party was blamed for dragging Britain towards war 
over quarrels which were of no concern to workers in this country. 
Fowden again attacked the Labour Party, and the Manchester Labour 
M. P. 's in particular, for being anti-religious. In a letter to the 
Chief Librarian of the city, who had requested copies of the manifestos 
for the Central Library archives, Margaret Pye, the candidate for the 
All Saints ward, professed her patriotism. She seemed reluctant to 
use -the term 'Fascist'. "I see the press advertising me as a Fascist. 
I am definitely a member of BRITISH UNION supporting all things that 
pertain to Britain and the British Empire, the finest Empire the World 
has ever known.,, 
31 
One important feature of the manifestos relates to the problem of 
religion. We have already briefly referred to the fact that Fowden made 
an attack on the Manchester Labour M. P. 1s, Clynev Wedgewood Benn and 
Hendersong for their supposed anti-religious stance. Powden appealed 
to'the religious nature of his prospective constituents in a leaflet 
headed 'Socialists say - Abolish Religion'. The electors were asked 
"Are you going to vote for 'Labour-cum-Comunist' Moscow's Anti-God 
Agents? ", 32 and were told that British Union guaranteed the freedom 
of religion* William Johnston was the retiring Labour councillor for 
the Collyhurst ward in the 1938 elections and, until the intervention 
of the Fascist candidate, was to have been returned unopposed. Once 
Johnston realised he had to contest the electiong he issued a manifesto 
which included the claim that he stood for freedom in the religious 
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teaching of children. This was a reference to the problems over the 
provision of educational facilities to Catholic children. Johnston, 
like Fowden, the Fascist candidate, was stating that he supported the right 
of Catholics to send their children to Catholic schools, though 
neither he nor Fowden spelt it out in so many words. In fact, the 
point did not heed to be spelt out. It was obvious to the Irish 
Catholic constituents exactly what the point was. Johnston, in fact, 
went further than his backing of religious freedom, He went on the 
attack and claimed that Fascism meant the end of political and 
religious freedom, and linked Powden's policies with those of the 
Nazis in Germany. 
The Fascist appeal to Catholics was not just a local phenomenon. It 
will be shown that a fair proportion of the membership of the B-U-F. 
was made up of Irish people, a fact which dates from the very 
beginning of the movement. The claim to support freedom in religious 
education also has a history and in fact dates from the days of the 
New Party. In the Ashton by-election of April 1931, when Allen Young 
stood for the New Party, ohe of the major local issues was that of 
freedom of religious education. As soon as the nomination papers 
were handed in at Ashtonq the question of the Roman Catholics was 
uppermost in a lot of people's minds, since it was considered that the 
estimated 49000 Roman Catholic votes could play a crucial role in the 
election results. 
33 Several Catholics resigned from the Ashton Labour 
Party and went over to support Young because of the 'religious 
conscience' clause$, and two Catholics who had originally nominated the 
Labour candidate decided to work for Young when they realised that a 
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New Party candidate had been nominated. It was thought that the New 
Party would gain much of the 4,000 Catholic vote purely because of the 
religious education question. 
34 
The situation reached a new height on the Sunday before the election 
day, when Gordon, the Labour Party candidate, while attending a 
service at a Roman Catholic church, was denounced from the pulpit by 
the priest because his attitude on the freedom of education question 
was, considered 'evasive and unsatisfactory'. The priest went on to 
ask Catholics to support the candidate who would allow "freedom of 
conscience when Catholic principles conflict with party discipline" 
and'who would "support the Catholic claim for financial assistance 
for non-providing sohools. 1,35 The priest considered that the views of 
the other two candidates on this subject were Isatisfactory'. A local 
Catholic newspaper was later distributed which contained an attack on 
the Labour candidate over the religious question. 
36 
As far as the 1938 elections in Manchester were concernedv only Fowden 
specifically mentioned the problem of religious education. The reason 
for this was that of the four candidates, only Fowden issued his own 
individual leaflet. All of the candidates issued broadsheets which 
were, similar to eacl; other. These were issiibd from the Manchester 
headquarters of the M. P., and were, as we have seenp very general 
in nature. 
As well as being predominantly Catholict the four wards werelvas might 
be expected, largely working class. If we look at the 1931 Census for 
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the Manchester city area, we can see that while the number of persons 
per acre for the city as a whole was 280, the four wards with which 
we are concerned were much more crowded than this. All Saints 
contained 79.8 persons per acre; Collyhurst 102.9; Gorton South 44.0 
and St Georges 100.6.37 If we compare the numbers of persons per 
room in the four wards with the number for the city as a whole, the 
following picture emerges: The number for the wh6le city averaged out at 
0-87 persons per room. All Saints contained 0-94 persons per room; 
Collyhurst 1.09; Gorton South 0.93 and St Georges 1.01038 
BY 1938 the B. U. P. was specifically appealingi to working class people 
for its support. The Blackshirt was headed 'The Patriotic Workers 
Paper'. A good example of the appeal to working class people in the 
Manchester wards is provided by a leaflet produced by the National 
headquarters of the M. P., and which was distributed in the Gorton 
South ward by Simmbnds, the Fascist candidate. The B. U. F. was 
described as a 'classless movement', and it was stated that while the 
Parties of class existed there would always be poverty, The poor had to 
be defended. "The snob and the parasite must go. The Rich shall not 
eat cake until the poor have bread. 1,39 In the manifixto issued by all V 
the candidates it was stated that "The people's cause must win". The 
'People's cause' was only vaguely hinted at and presented in populist terms. 
Homes for the people. were a top, priority. Rates should be kept down 
and local government should be cleaned up. Unlike political careerists 
t he'Fascists would express the people'4 willv and the people's fight 
40 
was their fight. However, the Fascists were not to be allowed to 
express the people's will--intthe: council chamber. All the Fascist 
candidates lost overwhelmingly. The results were as followss- 
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Table 3. Manchester Municipal Election results in constituencies 
with Fascist candidates. November 1938- 
COLLYHURST 
votes cast 
Johnston W. (Lab) 1709 
Powden P. (Fasoist) 242 
of vote 
87-59% 
12 - 4C5 
votes cast 
as % of poll. 
30-16% 
ST. GEORGES 
votes cast 
Kearns J. H. (Con) 2267 
Clapham., J. G. (Lab) 1840 
Talbot A. (Ascist) 139 
GORTON SOUTH 
votes cast 
Adams T. H. (Lab) 3643 
Simmonds J. (Fascist) 236 
ALL SAINTS 
votes cast 
Harper R. S. jnr. (Con) 1817 
Gower E. A. (Lab) 968 
Pye Miss M. E. (Fascist) 23 
Whittinýton L. (Ind) 3 
of vote 
53-39%, 
43-33% 
3.2Wo 
of vote 
93-91% 
6. OWo 
of vote 
64.63% 
34-43% 
0.81% 
0.1 Cýo 
votes cast 
as % of poll. 
41-00% 
votes cast 
as % of poll. 
29*26% 
votes cast 
as % of poll* 
37.66% 
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The real picture was worse than the results, if taken at face value, 
indicate. kn analysis of the local election results for the period 
between 1930 and 1939 in the Manchester area, in which Communist 
party, uandidates stood, enables us to make a comparison between the 
M. P. and another minor party, In the ten year period there was a total 
of thirteen Communist party candidatea. The average vote for these 
candidates totalled 138. Expressed as a percentagep'the Communist 
Party received an average of 3-5% of the votes cast. The average vote 
for, the Fascist candidates was 160, which was equal to an average of 
5-1% of the votes cast, On this sort of comparison it could be said 
that the B. U. F. did better than the Communist Party. However, this 
picture is distorted a little because there was no second major party 
in the Collyhurst and Gorton South wardsq wherep between them, the 
share of the poll was 9.24%. If these two wards are excludedq the 
average vote for the remaining two wards was 81 or 2,01% of the total 
vote* In other wordsp in the Collyhurst and Gorton South Wardsp the 
results of the 1938 elections were distorted because in both wards there 
was only one other candidate. The result was that the pascist 
candidates received more votes than they were likely to have done if 
there had been more than one major party candidate* 
Whenever a single major party candidate is standing in a straight 
fight with a candidate from a minor party there is a tendincy for the 
major party candidate's share of the vote to go down and the minor party's 
candidatels share of the vote to increase, regardless of the actual 
policies adopted by each candidate and put forward to the electorate. 
This distortion arises from the fact that there tends to be a high 
197 
level of confusion and ignorance amongst voters. The 1938 elections 
of courseq were held before a change in the Representation of the 
People Act allowed the names of the political parties for which the 
candidates stood to appear on the ballot paper. There was a good 
possibility therefore that some voters would confuse the Fascist 
candidates in the Collyhurst and South Gorton wards with a second 
major party, which, in fact, was not represented in the election. 
We can analyse the Fascist vote further and show fairly accurately 
whether it came from the Labour Party or not, The Labour Party would 
be a more obvious loser of the votes than the Conservative Party, 
given the nature of the campaigns-, waged by the Fascist candidates 
and analysed above. The normal expectation of turnout of the Labour 
vote in the 1938 elections can be judged by looking at the Labour 
vote in nine wards in 1937 and comparing them with the Labour vote 
in the same wards in 1938. The wards have been carefully chosen in 
order to limit any distorting factors as much as possible* For exaMplev 
none of the four wards with fascist candidates in 1938 were choseny 
nor were any wards where a major party was absent. The result of this 
analysis - shows that the normal expectation 
of turnout of the Labour vote in 1938 would be 108.6% of what it had 
been-in 1937. If we now compare this with the Labour vote in the four 
wards in which Fascist candidates stood in 1938,, we arrive at the 
following conclusions. 
In the All Saints ward, the Labour vote fell down to 83% of what 
it ought to have been (108,6%). In Ste Georgesp the Labour vote rose 
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U104. $. In Collyhurst the Labour vote rose to 105.2fo and in Gorton 
South the Labour vote rose to 107.1%. This suggests that all these 
figures are within the bounds of error, bearing in mind the nature 
of the figures we are dealing with. Thus the Labour vote in the St. 
Georges$ Collyhurst and Gorton South wards turned out to be remarkably 
close to what was expected and the drop in the All Saints Labour vote 
could quite easily be explained by the selection of a new Conservative 
candidate. The significance of this is reduced when it is remembered 
that the total Fascist vote in the All Saints ward was only 23(o. 81%). 
Thus we can say that the Labour vote conformed to the general pattern 
of behaviour of the Labour vote elsewhere in the city, where there 
were no Fascist candidates. It is not possible to analyse the 
Conservative vote in the same way because there wqs no Conservative 
candidate in two of the four wards in the 1938 elections. To conclude 
this analysis then, it can be said that there is no evidence to 
suggest that the M. P. candidates produced any particular stimulus 
in the electims either way. A psephologist would consider the electims 
to have been fairly 'low key'. 
We do however have to look beyond the limited horizons of the 
psephologist and place the lack of success of the M. P. in the 1938 
elections in its proper context, The B, U. F. fought the elections in 
the areas of the city from which it considered it drew most of its 
support and membership, and it failed. This was a measure of the rapid 
decline in the fortunes of the movement in the city since 1934, though 
we have no way of knowing the electoral support the movement might 
have achieved in local electims before tl-at year, 
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The decline of the movement was not to be halted. Indeed the problems 
the local Fascists faced were to be excacerbated by the continuing 
failure of the populist creed and the imposition of legal restrictions 
and the final banning of the movement at the outbreak of the Second 
World War. 
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I CHAPTER SEVEN 
ECLIPSE 
The reasons for the 1938 local elections being such 'low key' affairs 
were of , course due to the fortunes of the B. U. F. as a whole and could 
not be completely ascribed to the poor campaign waged by uninteresting 
candidites. The movement had, as we have seen, suffered several 
financialand organisational reversals in the past few years. 
The steady decline of the BX. F. in the North of England between 1936 
and 1940 may be registered by its increasingly divergent and seemingly 
paradoýxio'al levels of ideology. On the one hand there was the steady 
drift towards'populism (witness the 1938 local electicno) and on the 
other hand the hardening of its ideology in terms of its appeal to 
a certain type of member staying with the movement, and their adherence 
to the depth ideology. 
In-the first case there were many examples of professed concern for the 
local population, which was supposed to be faced with corruption and 
inefficiency in local government, The most notableiaxamples of this 
were to be' i found in the election campaigns of the Fascist candidates 
in t he Nanchestdr elections of 1938, Those campaignsp howeverp should 
be seen. alongside a continuing derision of local public figures* An 
extreme example of this was the series of attacks on Alderman Joe 
O'Toole, a prominent Labour politiciaii-and Lord Mayor of the city in 
19379 whose'large size and weight produced derogatory and possibly 
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libelloýw comments from local Fascists. Reynall Bellamy described 
him thust 
The very sight of this middle aged pompous man with 
his many quivering chins and rolls of fat beneath his 
neck, was sufficient to make a Fascist beast such as 
myself think longingly of a regime of plain fare, early 
reveille, physical exercise, as a suitable corrective 
to self indulgent humbug, 
Local taxi drivers who were members of the B. U. P. reported back to 
the local Fascist headquarters any incident involving O'Toole as a 
passenger. in their vehicles. Those reports were suitably embellished 
and used in local propaganda drives 
2 
and reports in tIB Fascist press*3 
On one occasion, when Mosley was due to make a speech in the Northp 
Bellamy attempted to persuade Mosley to iuke use of material collected 
on local opponents in his speech, though without success* 
I handed him some notesp genuine enoughq that I had 
put together, conderning the unedifying past of a well 
known vociferous opponent, who was also a local 
councillor. What was not generally knowný but we had 
uncovered, was that in another place this particular 
man had been in the hands of the police during the First 
World War, for absenting himself when called up for the 
Army. At another time this same enemy of ours had had to 
listen to some astringent remarks on his manner of 
conducting his business from the judge in a bankruPtCY 
court. When I handed Mosley my notes, setting out these 
factsq he looked through them with gome amusementp but 
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more detest. He passed the paper back remarking 
"No, I will not do ite"4 
Another indication of the strength of the populism of the movement in' 
the North was the way Tommy Ackroyd's 'Fascist Fellowship# was 
promoted. A Christmas party was said to have been given for 'eleven 
hundred happy youngsters' in Plattingg many of whom were said to 
have- been provided with warm 010-thing. 
5 It is difficult. -to believe 
,-ýtI 
, 
that so many children were present, but the fact is that the B. U. F. 
was emphasising this type of community action more and more, and this 
was far removed from the type of propaganda -indulged in when the 
movement was first founded. 
Yet: another indication of the emphasis of populist rhetoric was the 
use of reports th the Fascist press of working conditions in 
businesses owned by Jews. Dinah Parkinson, a Manchester woman Fascist 
leader, contributed articles on local 'Jewish sweatshops' and 
Ichainstorest to Blackshirt, though none of the 'sweatshops' or stores 
6 
were ever named. One article was based on an 'encounter' with a 
typist working in a Jewish office in Cheetham Hill. 
7 Another Manchester 
woman member, Barbara Bullivant, wrote on the 'inefficiency' of 
Manchester Citr Transport. On the other hand there were reports of 
good deeds performed by Manchester B. U. F. members. Even those who 
provided blood to the blood transfusion service were praisedy9 while 
the woman Fascists in Blackburn were commended for providing a 
10 
childrens coronation party in the local headquarters in 1937. Nellie 
Driver, the woman's district leader in the Nelson branchp contributed 
Deutscher Fichte=Bund e. V,,, " ý The Fichte -Association was founded in January 1911 in memory of the great German philosopher Fichte) 
Union for World Veracity 
Serves the cause of pence and under- 
standing by giving free Information about 
the New 6ermany dIr ct from the source 
bo76- 
Arthur Fawcette, Esq. 
379 Rippleton Rd. 
Tythenshaw 
Manchester 
Zngland. 
To protect human culture and civilization 
by disseminating facts about world 
Bolshevism, its authors and dangers 
Headquarters March 3,1938. 
30 Jungfernstleg, Hamburg, Germany 
Dear Sir, 
As I have learnt by our German friend Herr Mutschler 
that you -are interested in our literature I take the liberty to 
supply you with some copies of-our first hand reports. 
-You certainly are 4waire of the fact 
'that 
our association 
wants to do everything possible to promote friendship and under- 
standing between our two respective nations. Howeverv very much 
to our regret, there are too many false and instigating "news" 
about the new Germany in certain: Jew-controlled papers abroad which 
never serve this cause. We therefore spread the truth about oondit- 
ions over here by sending our leaflets to everybody Who is interested 
in them. I am sure you will suppbrt us in our work by passing our 
leaflets on to your friends and 6equaintances. 
Our material is always at your d18pOsalp free of charge, 
and I should be very pleased to hear from you again and to receive 
your further kind demands. .I 
Thanking you in advance for your kind attention to our 
literature, I remain in Anglo-German Friendshipp 
Yours very trulyp 
Th. Kessemeier. 
Directoy of Organization. 
Ad 
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articles on Lancashire mill life. Unfortunately many of them were 
written in dialect, which the newspaper had to decipher before 
patting them into print, 
One feature of the populism of the movement which provided'& link with 
ithe depth ideology of Favoism, was the industrial s&otion of local 
ýFascists. Another was the series of cotton campaigns in the North. 
Both have been dealt with above. 
12 One of the more direct 
manifestations of the depth ideology was the correspondence between a 
za I few members from the Manchester area and German propaganda organisations. 
An example of this was the interest shown in the Deutscher Fichte-Bund eV. 
which sent Nazi propaganda leaflets to Manchester, which were then 
distributed by some of the more zealous B. U. F. members. At least one 
Manchester member corresponded with the German organisationg which 
complained of the misrepresentation of the 'new' Germany in 'Jew- 
13 
controlled' papers abroad, Indeed it is the support of Nazi Germany 
which highlights the depth ideology of the B*U. F. and which the populism 
of the movement sometimes camouflaged from the general public. There 
were occasions when the mqveiefits sympathy for German Nazism was 
displayed in full public view; for example when the B. U. F, decided to 
adopt May lot as National Socialist Day, and on which the Mancheuter 
1, 
members decided to parade through Cheetham Hill en route to 
celebrations in Heaton Park. 
14 The views expressed by some members of 
the B. U. F. on the role of German affairs are quite interesting. 
15 The 
apparently conflicting layers of Fascist ideology are perhaps best 
indicated by the following statement of one Manchester Fascist& 
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There was the question of the big International 
Jewish Financiers and there is no doubt about it 
you know, our POliUY would have hit them. It 
would also hit any Englishman who was doing the 
same type of work* But this, you know, the policy 
wasn't designed to hit the Jewst but they saw it 
as it was going to do, and I think it would do 
that of course. And they started the war.. 
16 
The members who remained in the movement would certainly require a 
belief in some aspects at least of the depth ideology of Fascismv since 
the changes in the organisation of the movement would have turned away 
all but the strong willed. In March 1937, two weeks after the L. C. C. 
elections which the B. U. F. fought in the East End of London, Mosley 
announced a drastic reduction in salaried staff at National headquarters* 
The numbers were reduced from 143 to 309 many of whom were clerical 
workers. Mosley claimed this was the result of financial problems. 
One immediate effect of this was the formation of the National Socialist 
17 League by William Joyce and John Beckett. Of interest to us here is 
the impact the cuts had on the movement in the North of England* It will 
be rrecalled that the Manchester headquarters had moved from premises 
in Northumberland Street, Higher Broughton, to Corporation Street in the 
city centret from where the Northern Command Headquarters were 
icontrolled after the reorganisation of the moviment into Northern and 
Southern zones in lqj6* The Corporation Street premises had been 
opene d for just one year when Mosley announced the cuts in staff at 
National Headquarters. 1t: wum. -claimed at the time that few of the 
Nanchester staff would be affected, and that some of the chief executives 
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would'return to London. 
18 In fact all the staff of Northern Command, 
with, ýhe exception of John Sant and Reynall Bellamy, were sacked. 
Sant was appointed National Inspector for Yorkshirev Derbyv Lincolnshire 
and Durham, while Bellamy was app6inted to a similar position for 
Lancashirep Chesterv Westmorland and Cumberland* 
19 According to Bellamy 
"It caused widespread dismay among our members at the time, leaving me 
with no more than a few score active and dependable members for, say, 
the stewarding of a large indoor public meeting, where troubfe'could 
have been expected. 1120 
Even without the order from London to close the Northern Headquarters, 
theýnumber of branches in the areas was declining* Early in 1937 the 
branchesAn Gorton and Higher Broughton were closed, and public 
meetings, were drawing less and less support. 
21 The Jewish Vigilance 
Committee in Manchester reported to the Board of Deputies in July 1937 
that Fascist activities had been confined to the holding of 'policy 
22 
classes' amongst members. 
Mosley. continued to visit the area, though the audiences at his 
meetings were packed with Fascists from various parts of the North. In 
spite, of this 'packing', Mosley could only draw a crowd of 300 when he 
spoke at Hulme Town Hall in April 1937,23 and in December Mosley spoke 
at the Free Trade Hall which was only half full. 
24 This latter 
meeting was held in support of the Manchester area prospective 
parliamentary candidates, who were chosen in November 1936. Originally 
five names had been announcel, ýwhieh were, as we have already notedq 
Parkyn (Halme Division); Wright (Exchange); Griffith (Moss Side); 
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Beliamy (Blackley) and Davies (Gorton), A year after that announcement 
the list had been reduced to three candidates, and when Mosley spoke 
at the Free Trade Hall only Bellamy, Davies and Griffiths were 
presented to the audience. 
Two months later, in February 19_ýS, Mosley returned to Manchester to 
address a meeting at the Churnett St. Public Hall in Collyhurste The 
hall was only two thirds fall, and of the 300 people who made up the 
audience most were Fascists from all parts of the North EWeste The 
Jewish Chronicle reported that "In Collyhurst itself, the Fascists 
have signally failed to attract support. Quite a number of passers by 
were offered tickets free for reserved seats as an inducement to enter 
and swell the crowd* t126 The scene was typical of the B-U-F- in decline, 
with many other meetings poorly attended. The poor organisation of 
the movement in the North at this time can be gauged by the perfunotor7 
campaigning in the 1938 local elections, 
In 1938 the B, U. F. suffered yet another setback when Mosley introduced 
further, financial cuts. The result was that in the North of Englandq 
John Sant, lost his salaried post, leaving Reynall Bellamy as the sole 
sa 
. laried officer for the wh6le of the North of England and the Midlands* 
27 
Bellamy himielf, of course, put a brave face on the situation: 
More and more men of capability and experience 
were recruited into the movementp and as they 
proved their worth were appointed to those posts 
previously held by salaried Staff Officers* We 
ncw, had our -own unpaid County Inspectorsy Speaker 
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Training School Instructors, and Accounts Inspectors. 
There was even something like the beginning of a 
British Union Press Corps in Manchester; I was 
informed that at one meeting of the S6; lford Borough 
Council the bulk of the newspaper reporters were 
observed to be wearing the 'flesh and circle' badge 
of British Union, as the movement had now come to 
be known. 28 
The decline continued, with members continuing to drift awayo Those 
that'remained in the movement carried on the campaign of anti-Semitism. 
Vandalism of Jewish property and the dew:. cration of Jewish cemetPrYs 
were not uncommon, 
29 
However as the fear of approaching war with Germany increasedv the 
B. U. F. found itself, in that regard, in a slightly more favourable 
position. Their continuing campaign to keep Britain out of the war with 
Germany found favour with many people who, while not supporting all 
that the B. U. F. stood for, nor necessarily agreeing with the catalogue 
of events in Germany in the recent past, nevertheless started to 
attend Mosley's meetings in the North and elsewhere. The B. U. P. 2 either 
through a misinterpretation of the meaning of this support, or through 
clever, propaganda, saw this as an indication of an upsurge in Fascist 
support. In December 1938,800 people attended a meeting addressed by 
Mosley at Stretford Public Hall, though the Jewish Chronicle estimated 
that only 250 of those were supporters of Mosley. 
30 Since this was an 
important meeting addressed by the leader it is reasonable to assume 
that those 250 supporters would have been drawn from all over the 
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North of England* 
The following March, six months before the outbreak of the Second 
World War, Mosley again addressed a meeting in the North, this time 
at the Free Trade Hall, which was filled to capacity* 
31Six 
months later 
Mosley spoke at the New Hippodrome in Manchesterv listened to by an 
audience of 2000, three quarters of whom were estimated to be 
supPOrters*32 This upsurge in interest in the B, U. F*ls anti-war 
campaign has been commented on by Bellamy: 
I can state truthfully that while active membership 
in the Manchester area dwindled to a few score 
following the financial scare and reorganisation of 
1936 dr 1937, it had risen to hundredsv many hundreds 
by early 1939, whilst our supporters (those willing 
to shout for us but not work for us) were in their 
tens of thousands. If it had not been for the war?! 
33 
While there is no doubt that support for the B, U. F, was increasing at 
this time because of the campaign for peace in Europep (a campaign 
direoted, it must be notedp at a generation of people who easily 
remembered the horrors of the First World War, and would be most 
reluctant to see the country embark on the same road to destruction 
even if there was greater cause this time) it is most unlikely that 
the supporters could now be measured in their tens of thousands* 
There was, howeverg one obstacle placed in the way of the B. U*Fo at this 
time, and which has subsequently rendered difficult the task of 
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presenting a correct picture of the strength of the movement 
immediately prior to the outbreak of the Seconcl World War. This was 
that newspaper editors were often most reluctant to give press 
coverage to Fascist meetings and often disregarded the contents of 
Mosley's speeches* 
The B. U. F. itself was aware of this problem, to the point of 
seeing it as a grand Jewish conspiracy. Bellamy, in an unsolicited 
piece of correspondencep dealt with press censorship at length. 
We called it the 'Campaign of Silence which was 
in faA a. boycott of Mosley and his movement by 
Press and Radio, Previously the media had used 
ridicule and slander, which weapons had proved 
ineffective; so, it was decided never to mention 
Mosley nor British Fascism, but in very 
exceptional circumstances such as a major riot 
I for which the Blackshirts could be made to appear 
responsible, or some discreditable instance such as 
"Mosley man found Cuilty of smashing milk bottle 
in street. " (This was an actual caption in a 
newspaper, the affair had nothing to do with the 
movement, except that it came out in court that the 
stupid lout had been a member: ). 
This boycott was launched in 19379 and was in fact 
the most effective weapon used against us- A quite 
typical example war. Mosley's meeting in King 
Georgets Hallq Blackburn, on a' sunny Sunday evening 
in May when he was loudly acclaimed bY an audience 
of more than 2000, mostly unemployed cotton workers. 
I will quote from my own booit 
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"The Northern Daily Telegraph which is published 
in Blackburn, in its issue of 9th May 1938, the 
day following the impressive meetingo devoted six 
inches of column space to what Sir John Grey had 
said at the opening of the Liberal Spring Fair in 
Burnley, another six inches to the uttemnoes of 
R. A. Cross, M. P., to a few dozen members of the 
Rossendale Junior Unionist Association, and forty 
eight lines to the verbal bashing that the Bishop 
of ELackburn had administered from his pulpit to 
Hitler and Mussolini. Mosley, whose audience would 
have outnumbered several times the combined listeners 
to the two politicians and the Bishop's congregation, 
was not granted one line of print. He and his 
two thousand acolaimers might never have existed. 
Such is the freedom of the press in the 1930's. o34 
After reproducing further extracts from his unpublished autobiography, 
relating to questions raised in the House of Commons concerning press 
censorship, Bellamy continued with his own comments and thought the 
'Campaign of Silence' was responsible for historians of British Fascism 
being 'misled' about the mouements strength. 
The Times, the Daily Telegraph, and the Manchester 
Guardian did actually report, although unobtrusively 
enough, the questions and observatim s of those two 
distinguished parliamentarians, (Liuet-Colonel 
Moore-Brabazon and Earl Winterton, both Conservative 
M. P. 1s, who raised the question of censorship in the 
House of Commons) but refrained from offering any 
explanation or making a direct reply. The great 
popular newspapers on the other hand ignored the 
debate in the same way as they ignored the existence 
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of Oswald Mosley and his movement. 
It must have been this press boycott that has 
been responsible for modern historians, Cross 
and Benewick in particular, who, finding no 
mention of Blackshirt activities in the current 
newspapers, jumped to the conclusions that there 
had been nothing to report and that the Movement 
was in decline. In other words they were misled 
and got their facts wrong; actually it was the 
period of the Movements most significant and 
solid growth* 
35 
Bellamy is right to point to the increase in support in the months 
immediately prior to the outbreak of war. The lack of press coverage 
has probably led to an underestimation of the movement. Is revival at 
that time. Certainly from the evidence of the attendance at the Earls 
Court meeting in July 1939 estimated at 309OU0 by the B. U. P.; 
20vOOO by the press 
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_ there was renewed interest in the B. U. F. 
because of its peace campaign. However there are other sources of 
information, other than the press, open to historians, for example the 
Trade Union and Labour movements and the Board of Deputies of British 
Jews, which would have monitored any sdrious increase in Fascist activitys 
The fact is that no such evidence is available from those sources, 
because theyv at least, were not perturbed by the increases in 
attendance at Fascist meetings. Bellamy's belief that "We were on the 
verge of ver7 great things when the war broke out. On the very vergeo 
I was feeling quite heavy with some success* Oh! "37is not borne out by 
the facts. The months immediately prior to the war witnessed an upsurge 
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of concern regarding the situation in Europe and the possible part 
that Britain might play in any future war. The B. U. P. was a temporary 
beneficiax7 of that concern, just as Chamberlain had been on his 
return from Munich. In the ensuing months both Chamberlain and British 
Fascism fell by the wayside. 
The B. U. F. decided to test the strength of its support for the peace 
programme by going to the polls in 1940 at three by elections. The 
three constituencies; West Ham, North East Leeds and Middleton and 
Prestwich, correspond roughly to the areas of strongest support for 
the B. U. F. in previous years. Tommy. Moran stood at the Silvertown 
Division of West Ham and Sydney Allen in North East Leeds. Moran 
received 151 votes and Allen received 722 votes, 
38 The Fascists 
campaigned in both constituencies for immediate peace in Europe. 
In Middleton and Prestwich the Fascist candidate was Frederick Haslamp 
a draughtsman aged 43 who had won the Military Medal in the First 
World War. He had been a member of the B. U. F. for four years. Haslam 
had no hope of winning the seat, which was safely held by the 
Conservatives. The election was a straight fight between the B. U. F. 
and the Conservatives after the I. D. P. decided to withdraw their 
nomination. The local B. T. F. organisation was considered to be fairly 
weak. 
In this particular Lancashire constituency where 
there was a healthy and robust young district 
formation (wrote Bellamy), the movement's activities 
had been confined practically to one corner of the 
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parliamentary division* Prestwicho to all intents and 
purposes was a residential suburb of Manchester* In 
Middleton, at the further end of the constituency, 
which was an independant manufacturing town with a 
larger population than Prestwich and considerably 
further from Manchester, British Union had only a 
meagre handful of members and contacts. 
39 
Mosley spoke at two meetings in the constituenoyv at which he 
expovnded the B. U. P. case for peace with Germany. At one of the 
meetings, in Chadderton, the crowd which had gathered to meet him 
stormed the platform040 Bellamy was one of the B. U. P. officials 
present: 
At Chadderton stones were thrown and loudspeakers 
broken, Mosley, who was speaking on behalf of Haslam, 
his party's candidate, was struck by a stone. He 
leaped down from the platform to deal personally with 
the man he had seen throw it, A knot of hooligans 
immediately converged on him but got little 
satisfaction from the encounter. 
41 
In entering candidates at parliamentary by elections, in spite of 
the electoral truce between the three main parties, the B. U-F- was 
no doubt seeking as much publicity as possible. More positivelyp 
however, there was the distirrt possibility of picking up protest votes 
against the war. The I. L. P. had originally planned to contest the 
Middleton and Prestwich by election and the B. U. F. would have gained a 
substantial 'victory' if they had defeated the I. L. P. into third place* 
That was not to happen. The B. U. F., however, gained 418 votes against 
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the Conservatives 329036. It is difficult to imagine that over 400 
people in the constituency suppcrted the B. U. F. and its candidate, 
especially given the weakness of the local branch. What seems much 
more likely is that people voted for the M. P. in protest against 
the war*42 Since there was no alternative candidate to vote for 
in such a protest, the B. U. P. benefited, though only by 1% of the 
vote. The B. U. F. forfeited their deposit of E150 and the party's 
intervention, which caused the election, resulted in an expenditure 
for the local authority of nearly ZI, 30U . 
43 
The by election campaigns of 1940 were almost the last public 
utterances of the Fascist movement in Britain between the wars. The 
final stage in the eclipse of the B. U. F. came within a few days of 
the Middleton and Prestwich by election, when its leaders were 
imprisoned under the Emergency Powers Regulation 18b. Oswald Mosley 
was detained on 23 %Y 1940 and his wife on 29 June. Probably as 
many as 70 or 80 officials of-,, the B; UýF. ' were arrested with Mosley* 
44 
Several B. U. P. members were arrested in Manchester, D, E. Donovan and 
C. Hammond, both members of the Blackley branch were arrested the day 
after Mosley's detention. Houses were searched in the area and the 
police siezed a quantity of documents. 
45 A week later between 30 and 
40 Manchester Fascists were arrested on the same day as police 
swooped on Fascist members all over the countx7646 A total of 747 
B. U. P. members and sympathisers were arrested. 
47 In Stockport the 
police detained James Battersby, the Stockport B. U. F. leader; krthur 
Riley, who acted as Battersby's secretaryp and Richard Jonesq who had 
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been named as prospective parliamentary election candidate in the 
town. 48 
A few Fascists managed to escape arrest. Mrs A. B., the womans district 
leader of the Moss Side branch, 'was visited by the police when they 
were tipped off by a neighboui who saw that Mrs A. B. still kept a 
portrait of Mosley on the top of her piano. Mrs A. B. lied to the 
police and said she was not a member of the B. U. F.. It is not known 
whether this was sufficient to prevent her arrest, At any rate she 
was not taken into custody. 
Another North West Fascist who escaped arre-st was J. P. Sutherst, who 
was in charge of the Middleton branch. Although he was not detained, 
he claimed he was victimised for being a Fascist. Before the start 
of the war Sutherst had joined the Senior Division of th3 Officer 
Training Club-at DIanchester University, although he was not a student. 
He also joined the Officer Cadet Reserve, through which he was called 
up in the first weeks of the wa: r. At the end of 1940 Sutherst was 
posted to a T. A. Battalion based in Salford whicht according to 
Sutherst, "had at least half a dozen Jewish officers. " He believed 
he was recognised and "whittled out of the Army on an adverse report.,, 
50 
I knew my rights of course, and that I was allowed to 
appeal higher against this, which I did, I went to 
see the Brigadier, who was a Jew. I took it as far 
then as the Divisional Commander, who was a Jew, and 
I went to see a member of the Army Council, that was 
the next move, So, of coursep all the cards were 
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stacked against me ... Bear in mind I had never 
mentioned my political beliefs or principles all 
the time I was in the Army. S6 the result was I 
was asked to resign my commission on the grounds of 
this ... It doesn't surprise me all that much because 
I have heard from other people how they were dealt 
with during the war. You know how officialdom 
looked upon them. Even if they were not taken in by 
18b there was still a lot of doubt about people*51 
During the war Sutherst helped to organise the 18b Detainees Aid Fund, 
which collected money, books and clothing to send to their friends 
who were detained. One person helped by the fund was a friend of 
Sutherst'st Bob Charnleyq who originated from Southport but was living 
in Hullq where he was in charge of the local B. U. P. branch at the 
time of his detention. Charnley and six other Hull members were 
arrested ten days after Mosley and they spent ten xieeks in Walton 
Jail, Liverpool, before being moved to Ascotq then Huyton and finally 
on to the prison camp in the Isle of Man. While in custody on the Isle 
of Man Charnley plotted an escape from the camp with a few I. R*A. 
detainees. They dug a tunnel to the perimeter fence and made their way to 
a beach where a motorboat was supposed to meet them. The boat had no 
engine howeverf and the men had to row with planks of wood* They 
wereý'-rl within a few miles of the Irish coast when they were spotted 
by a Sunderland flying boat and eventually arrested, The ringleaders 
of the escape attempt, including Charnley, were later sent to the 
mainland, where they spent the rest of the war detained in Walton 
Jail in Liverpool*52 
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Not everyone experienced such high drama however, and the typical 
situation in the branches after the banning of the movement is summed 
up by Nellie Driver,, who recounts the attitude of the authorities 
to local Fascism in Nelson, Lancashire. 
The burden we had to bear in the branches became 
intolerable. No news, no instructions, no visiting 
officials came from National headquarters, because 
that place had been closed down and every member of 
the Staff were in Holloway or Brixton. As fast as 
they were replaced the arrests took place once more, 
so organisation was impossible, Our members left us, 
and those who dare not verbally resign pushed notes 
of resignation through our letter box. 
Officials were arrested in Blackburng Accrington 
and Bolton. I felt the wind blow like an icy blast 
when the Burnley officials were detained. Wrice our 
headquarters! windows were smashed. The first time it 
was put in a few minutes after we had left the 
premises. The second time at two in the morning, and 
the police came to wake us up, and we had to accompany 
them to the building to see if anything was missing* 
The week before British Union was banned a member had 
paid his monthly shilling subscription, but as I had 
already made up the balance sheet, I dated his card 
a month ahead - and forgot in the stress of the weeks 
ahead. The taking of such subscriptions became illegal 
just after, and the member went into a Colne club one 
evening and drank more than was good for him. An 
argument' followed and a bit of a scrap, and the police 
were called. They took him home and searched his 
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pocketsv unfortunately finding his 'B. U. membership 
card. Of course they spotted the d%te on the stamp 
and came to search our house right away. Four 
detectives rolled up in a car, and they turned our 
house upside down. They reiboved all my books, 
leaflets, badgesp banners and even a bound copy of 
the New Popular Educator. They also took a copy of 
Bruce Graeme's Blackshirt Again. I felt amused to 
think that these so-called clever detectives had 
never heard of this romantic, fictitious crookv who 
had not the remotest connection with any Fascist 
Movement. 
A few of our members also received a similar 
visitation. They tipped out the contents of our 
District Leaders dustbin in his backvardp and 
confiscated a copy of Mein Kampf from our milkmans 
house. Then they visited a perfectly innocent man 
who lived in the same town, because he had leaded his 
front windows in the pattern of a flash and circle. 
Evidently he had at one time received one of our 
leaflets through his letter box and taken to the 
emblem: 
Shortly after I was summoned to appear in the Colne 
police court to answer to the charge of receiving 
a shilling subscription after the receipt of such a 
subscription was declared illegal. I defended,, my own 
case, and was bound over for twelve months. But the 
case had brought my existence to the notice of the 
Home Office. 
For the next three months I Jay low. Police cars 
trailed round after both mother and I if we ventured 
forth, Men watched the house and listened under our 
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windows to the radio to discover which were our 
favourite stations. The man next door told us 
that the police had tried to persuade him to allow 
them to take a few bricks out of his wall so they 
could listen in on our conversation. Although he 
once had been in the hands of the police on a 
serious charge, he refused to permit it. 
I stared at the ruins of my hopes, and grimly 
faced the future. One morning in late Octoberp 1940, 
just as dawn was breaking, two detectives came in 
a car and told me I was in detention by order of the 
Home Office. I was given ten minutes in which to 
prepare for what was to be a two year exile. 
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This, -tthent was the end of the British Fascist movement which has been 
the focus of attention in this thesis. The rumblings continued 
thriughout the war over Mosley's detention and release and many of the 
detainees returned home to a difficult life in their local communities. 
When the war ended in 1945t attempts were made to restart the B. U*F- 
But there never could be a return to the pre war movement. Events 
during the war and the revelation of what Nazism meant to the Jews 
and others.. ensured that public opinion would not tolerate the 
resumption of activities in this country by the B. U. F- Mosley's post 
war party, the Union Movement, remained a peculiar anachronism in the 
Britain of the 1950's and 19601s. It was left to others, particularly 
the National Front, to carry the flag of Fascism, albeit under 
another guise, in this countryp untainted by a pre war history* 
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Part Two of this thesis has been concerned with an almost chronological 
analysis of the M. P. in one locality. The individuals who created 
the movement in the North of England have only emerged at times in 
this study when attention has been paid to their contribution to 
Fascism. We need now to consider the members of the M. P. in more 
detail* Part Three of this thesis considers how Fascists were seen by 
themselves and others, before exploring the general characteristics 
of the members of the B. U. F. in the North of England. 
PART THREE 
THE FkSCISTS 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
IDEAS AND OPINIONS 
An interesting feature of the historiography of British Fascism is 
the complete lack of interest shown by historians in the ordinary 
membership of the B. U. F. Perhaps the main reason for this is the 
tendency, for reasons of an ideological naturev for research on the 
rank and file membership of political movements to be undertaken by 
historians with, at the very least, a sympathetic understanding of 
the lives of ordinary people. At the same time such historians are 
usually preoccupied with analysing various features of the Labour 
movement or working class communities* The field is thus left open 
to historians whose desire to produce 'objective' accounts of Fascism 
has led to history written 'from the top down'. Hence the available 
analysis of the membership of the B. U. F. for examplet oentres on the 
national leadership and the various interpretations of the ideology 
of the movement contain no references to what the ordinary membership 
was thinking and doing. 
The reluctance to resort to an empirical investigation of such matters 
as membership has led to a dependence on cdltmporary views expressed 
* Extracts from Part Three of this thesis have appeared in; Stuart 
Rawnsley. 'The membership of the British Union of Fascists1v British 
Pascismt Essays on the Radical Right in Inter-War Britain* Lunn and 
Thurlow, eds. Croom Helmt London 1980o pp 150-165. 
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by the leadership of the M. P. itself and also by intelligent 
0 
observers desiring to explain the phenomenon of Fascism in Britain. 
Howeverý in spite of, or indded because of, contemporary opinion 
having an immediacy which may appeal to the historiant such a 
variety of views are available that the exercise is rendered useless. 
The leadership of the B. U. F. itself did not express an homologous 
view as th the type of people the movement attracted. At times the 
B. U. F. claimed to be 'classless' - and the uniform was said to 
emphasise this point. More frequently an appeal was made to what 
the leadership termed 'decent Englishmen'. W. E. D. Allen, chief 
propogandist of the M. P. was a little more explicit: 
Fascism appeals alike to those elements among 
the younger minded middle class who are conservative 
by temper4ment and dtrongly nationalist in spiritp 
and to those rarer and more dynamic individuals whop 
naturally revolutionary in their outlook, have 
been disappointed and exasperated by the failure 
of all leadership from the left to approach 
any fulfilment of their aspiration. 
I 
Thia, view is at variance with that expressed by the leader himself* 
Referring back to the 1924 election campaign in Birminghamý MosleY 
had-this to say: 
Our own organisation (Labour) had a paying 
membership of 200, but when we started the canvass 
Only 3 elderly women and two young men ifould 
accompany us. They were fine people, typical of the 
English workers, and closely resembled the other 
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pioneers later attached to our Movement before 
and after the Second World War. They were all 
mWnl workers.... 
2 
Referring to the political uniform, Mosley said "A shirt is the 
easie6t and cheapest garment for the purpose of recognition, and the 
shirts had to be paid for by the men themselves, most of whom were 
on the dole.,, 
3 
J. A. McNab, at one time editor of Fascist Quarterly wrote that: 
Although Fascism draws its support from patriots 
of every classq it can succeed only as a national 
mass movementv and on that account the tulk of our 
membership is and always has been drawn from that 
section which has been constantly betrayed by every 
party - the British Working Class. 
4 
If the B. U. P. itself could not present a common view of those who 
supported: Fascismý neither could its opponents. Harold IAskiq writing 
in 1935, thought that the majority of the members of the B. U. P. ifere 
5 
working class. Not so for George Lansbury, who wrote 11 ... Sir Oswald 
Mosley is recruiting a number of men, mainly of the middle classt 
drilling men, and preparing them for the time when he considers he 
can use them. " 
6 
The chief propogandists of the Commmist Party interpretation of 
. 
Xscism were R. Palme Dutt and John Straohey, who in turn were 
influenced by the ideas originating at the executive meeting of the 
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Communist International in Moscow in 1923, where Clara Zetkin 
delivered a paper 
. 
on Fascism? 
7 
and at the Third Congress of the Italian 
Communist Party in 1926. Dutt and Strqchey drew heavily from these 
sources. Brieflyp Fascism was seen as a product of the capitalist 
economic systemq and the 'reformist Social Democrats' played their 
part in the arrival of Fascism by hoodwinking the proletariat and 
depriving it of its revolutionary energies. Slotted into this theory 
was the idea that, in the vanguard of the formation of the Fascist 
state would be such powerful groups as 'big business' and 'the 
industrial bourgeoisielg followed, in their wake, by-ý the 'petty 
bourgeoisie'. Writing in 1934, Datt attempted to show that there was 
a strong basis for the development of Fascism in this country. 
In the first place, there is a very large proportion 
of intermediate strata of the population, of petty- 
bourgeois elements with very narrow and easily 
controlled political interests, and of a parasitic 
proletariat closely allied to their masters and 
virtually unorganisable to the working class 
movement. This proportion is larger in Britain than 
in other countries. The 1921 census showeel ten million 
of the population engaged in direct 
productive industries and transport, and seven million 
in 'services' of varying degrees of productive valueg 
often of no productive value, but parasitic in 
character and tied up with the process of exploitation. 
Of these seven million over four millions are 
classified under Commerce, Financep and Personal 
Service. This classification, howeveri is to some 
extent misleading without further analysis. More 
important is the proportion of salaried workers to 
wage workers. In 1924, according to Bowley and Stamp 
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(The National Income 1924, published in 1927), 
the number of salaried workers was 2.8 millions 
against 15-4 millions wage ear-nersv or 15 per cent 
of the employed population. 
Purther, of the wage workers, some two thirds 
are unorganised; and these two thirds are not an 
outside margin on all industriesp but mainly 
represent the workers outside the big productive 
industries. 
At the same time, the Labour Party and trade union 
leadership, by their denial of the class struggle 
and preaching of the 'community above classes', by 
their alliance with the employees (Mondism) and 
capitalism, and by their ban on the United Front, 
disorganise the indepencb, nt class action of the 
workers and pave the way for fascism. 
An indication of the potential fascist force is 
provided by the monster circulations, approaching 
ten millions, of journals of the type of the Daily 
Mail circulating mainly among petty-bourgeois 
elements, and in its whole character since its 
inception a real forerunner of fascism more than 
twenty years before the name existed (since 1934 
openly fascist). 
If we turn to the policy and tactics of the 
bourgeoisie in Britain, it is obvious #at these 
not only do not exclude Pascismv but are on the 
contrary most closely prepared and adapted for Fascism 
by all the developments of the imperialist period. 
On--the one hand. the State machine - with the famous 
'unwritten Constitution' which can be turned in any 
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direction desired at a momenil notiod to suit the 
emergency needs of the bourgeois dictatorship - is 
far more exactly fitted than in any democratic 
republic for all the purposes of intensified 
dictatorship and Fascism. On the other hand, the 
British bourgeoisie is trained for generations on 
the basis of its rule of India, Ireland and the 
colonial empire to methods of violence and 
despotic domination, at the same time as on the 
basis of parliamentary and electioneering humbug 
in Britain to the technique of mass deception - 
the two together constituting the perfect combination 
for Pascisme 
8 
It was the capturing of the petty-bourgeois elements for Fascism which 
Dutt later referred to when he commented, in 1935, on the activities 
of the B. U. F. in Lancashire, by which time the North of England had 
proved to be the most important area of Fascist expansion: 
Mosley-Fascism has so far met with scant success 
in its efforts to win a working class following 
in any part of the country. Mosleyism has been from 
the outset a movement based essentially on the West 
End and the suburban residential areas of the South,, 
9 
He did however see the future success of Fascism dependine on working 
class support* 
This theme was pursued with varying degrees of clarity by other writerse 
John Strachey adopted a similar analysis in a style which the general 
public found more readable, 
10 
while W. A. Rudlin, in noticing that 
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recruitment to the M. P. would partly be from those people who were 
indifferent to the old parties, added that, 
Here among the readers of the Mail, the Mirror. 
the Sketch, and the Express are thousands of 
potential recruits for fascism. Denied employment 
and the price of distraction, they will be, in 
their ignorance and irritation, easy prey for 
fascist propoganda with its skilful manipulation 
of emotions and its promise of better times... 
It will make its appeal not only to those of the 
working class who feel themselves both economically 
disinherited and politically uncared for; in a 
further period of decline there will also be many 
bla4-coated workers with a similar outlook. 
Already amongst the organised workers of this classt 
the civil servants; Post Office workers'and teachers3, 
dismay at the effects of the crisis goes hand in 
hand with disillusionment with the Labour Farty. ** 
with the clerks and the shop assistants will go the 
small traders and shop keepers and craftsmen, and for 
similar reasons. Tied, in the industrial areasl to 
the fortunes of the working class, they have been 
ruined in large numbers by the depression. And 
wheneverp outside the industrial areasq retail trading 
shows a profit they are attacked by the large concerns 
with their cheap mass produced goods... 
Within that loose collection of intermediate social 
strata called the middle class there is a third Group 
capable, in favourable ciroumstancesp of producine 
Good fascist material. The real middle classp the 
professional meni'Ithe manaGers and the technicians 
havep like the clerks and the small meng come to know 
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the meaning of economic insecurity. 
11 
One of the few attempts to provide a portrait of a Fascist stereotype 
came from a journalist, Frederick Mullally, writing with hindsight 
in 1946t 
Peter Fletcherv seventeen years old son of a 
Roman Catholic civil servantg old boy of Clapham 
Academy, new employee of the Britannia Electric 
Works ... There are millions of Peter Fletchers - 
ordinary 'decent' middle class people who had 
long represented the element of stability in 
sooiety... (who) were to lend their energies, or 
passive goodwill, to the realisation of this 
evil project. 
12 
Fletcher, it seems, had always been attracted by uniforms and the 
appeal of a 'gang' and was easily influenced by parents and friends: 
*.. (his) father railed against the Jews and he had 
heard enough from his lower middle class friends 
to identify the 'Reds' with the common object of 
his parentd'scorn. 
13 
How typical of the membership of\the B. U. F. waN Peter Fletcher? How 
close to the mark were any of the accountsv Fascistp Communist or 
otherwise, of the typical Fascist in Britain? In this brief discussion 
of some of the contemporary amountsp emphasis has been placed on the 
differences between the views expressed. There were, however, two 
elements in common to all these accounts. The first was a belief that 
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the B. U. P. attracted one particular type of personality or a 
particular class of people, 
14 though the Communists saw the possibility 
of other classes of people being attracted at each successive stage 
in the development of Fascism. There was little agreement as to 
which particular class or personality was attracted to the movement 
but almost all the accounts emphasised the homogeneity of Fascist 
membership. Hence any contradictions observed within Fascism as an 
ideology were seen as a product of the contradictions within a 
particular class or personality. 
The second element in common to all the contemporary accounts was the 
complete lack of empirical investigation. In the days before the 
development of mass surveys and sociological investigations of 
political movementsq it is not too surprising that blanket descriptions 
were not supported by hard evidence. 
15 What is surprising is that 
historians of British Fascism have not shown themselves particularly 
eager: to fill the empirical vacuum which exists in ojxr knowledge of 
the, B. U. F. Thus we are faced with vague generalisations and inspired 
guesswork. 
In devoting the whole of two pages to the history of Fascism in this 
countryq C. L. Mowat, in Britain Between the Wars declared that "The 
members of the B. U. F. came mainly from among young men of the middle 
class, and from the black coated workers - two groups whom the 
depression denied employment or importance. " 
16 According to Colin 
Cross, the author of the first serious attempt to deal with the 
history of the M. P., 
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The typical long-service Blackshirt was a man 
of the lower middle class, not particularly 
clever, but capable of sacrifice and loyalty. 
Fascism had an appeal because it attacked both 
the capitalism he resented and the socialism he feared. 
Without sacrificing his social rank, which was 
a grade above the manual worker, he could take 
part in a revolutionary movement ... The Movement 
was unsuccessful with intellectuallst few of them 
remaining members for very long ... The intellectuals 
who did stay within the Movement over a long period 
were not particularly bright and suffered 
catastrophically from a lack of a sense of humour. 
17 
Robert Denewick, another historian of the movement, prefers not to 
speculate as to the composition of its ordinary membershipp and 
dwells instead on the leadership. He refers his readers to the 
Advisory Committee on Persons Detained Under Defence Repulation 18b 
to the Hotfle Secretary in 1940,18 which he describes as 'the most 
reliable report'. We are expected to glean from this report all that 
Benewick can offer relating to the membership of the B. U. F. p'9 though 
he does qualify his reference to the report by noting that the people 
interviewed did not necessarily reflect the membership at large. All 
that Benewick will commit himself to is that 11 ... given the small 
numbers recruited and the rapid turnover, it seems in order to assume 
(short of more substantial data) a high degree of social and economic 
marginality distinct from the middle class bias of the leadershipe 1120 
The biographer of Sir Oswald Mosley is a"Llittle more forthcoming. 
Robert Skidelsky's controversial portrait of Mosley does attempt to 
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reach some firm conclusions about the membership of the B. U. P. 
Who joined? There were University graduates and 
ex-public schoolboys; unemployed pugilists and 
unemployable professional men with useless 
classical educations. The Isdrious' ranged aUýthe 
way from ex-communists to crackpot and obsessional 
antiý; Semites. With the exception of the young of 
all classes, the early B. U. F. was heavily middle 
class. It picked up support in London and the 
southern coastal towns. Its headquarters in Chelsea 
seemed to symbolise its place in the political 
spectrums The Morning Post dubbed the blackshirts 
'Boiled Shirts'. This is perhaps not what Mosley 
wanted. But it is what he got. 
21 
W. F. Mandle has produced an analysis of the leadership of the 
movement based on information contained in the B. U. F. press. 
22 The 
results, however, are inadequate and contain many ommissionse A 
similarly inadequate contribution is that of John D. Brewerv who, 
in 1974, read a repearcli paper to the Bergen Conference on Comparative 
European Nazism and Fascism, held at the University of Bergen 
Institute of Sociology. 
23 Brewer had interviewed eight ex-B. U. F. 
members and the information collected from the interviews was used to 
test the generalisation, as Brewer saw it, that the members of the 
M. P. were middle class. Brewer also attempted to deal with the 
reasons put forward for joining the M. P. He emphasised the perception 
of a 'crisis' on the part of prospective members and stressed the 
importance of the phenomenonological school of sociology, dealing 
with the individual and his meaning. In a paper more noted for its 
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air of self confidence than anything else - "The gauntlet has been 
thrown down, serious students of British fascism must take it up. 11124 
Brewer had to acknowledge that "the only firm conclusion is that of 
the complete and total lack of objective and substantial data on 
British Fascism. " However our hopes were raised of a more important 
contribution being made once Brewer Is, research was*completeo The 
results were again disappointing. 
25 We still knew next to nothing 
about the membership of the largest Fascist movement Britain has so 
far experienoed. 
233 
CHAXTER NINE 
PA NG FOR THEMSELVES 
It is not. possiblep in this brief analysis, to provide a comprehensive 
picture of the M. P. membership in all parts of the country. Such a 
task is rendered difficult not merely by lack of space but also by 
subject matter. The evidence is fragmentary even within the limits of 
the following study of parts of the North of England. B. U. F. branch 
membership lists are not available to the historian for inspection and, 
for obvious reasons, ex-members are not particularly eager to respond 
to requests-for interviews. No attempt has been made to pr6vide a 
quantitative analysis and the results are essentially impressionistic. 
Nevertheless some valuable insights may be obtained which have 
-previously been lacking. 
A dist: hot pattern emerged in the recruitment of people to the B. U. F. 
in the North. In the first place one can detect a large section of 
the early membership which could only be termed 'Fascist' in the, sense 
ýthat they were members of a Fascist movement., This group joined the 
B. U. F. for a variety of reasons; their friends were members, or they 
were attr@oted by sporting or social facilities, or they were lured 
by the chance to wear a uniform. There is no doubt that their 
understanding of the ideology was minimal and that they did little 
to improve their theoretical understanding once they were members. One 
must remember, of course, that this itself is a part of the populism 
of Fascism, and that Fascism, IV its very naturet attracts all sorts 
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of people. There were others, however, who did join the B. U. F. for 
ideological reasons, and those people already held anti-Semitic beliefs 
or they strongly supported the idea of the Corporate State. 
Throughout the history of the B. U. P. the local and regional leadership 
of. the movement was drawn from both types of member* At the beginning, 
certainly in the North of England, the leadership was drawn from the 
first. type of member, the ideol6gically uncommitted. Towards the end, 
inýthe late 1930ts, the second type of member dominated the leadership. 
This change was partly related to class background and can be usefully 
,I compared to a study of the Italian Fascist Party by Lasswell and Serenos 
One has to make the important distinction that their study was of a 
Fascist party whiclihad achieved power and hence leadership was much 
more important. Nevertheless the study can be usefully compared to 
that of the leadership of the EX. F. in the North of England. Lasswell 
and Sereno discerned two types of Fascist whoq- mainly through the 
agencies with which they were associated - the cabinetv prefeotst or 
the Senate, Chamber *to. .. were 'rising' or 'declining'., The rising 
]Fascists, those who were succesful in their political care4rp came 
predominantly from a lesser bourgeois backgroundt th6ugh leaders of 
proletarian origin were sparodically found. The declining Fascists 
were those who generally came from proletarian backgrounds. Lasswell and 
Sereno found some evidence of a slight recovery of the aristocracy 
under Fascism. The study pointed to some less readily defined skills 
which were the basis of successful careers in the Fascist state. Chief 
among these was the skill of the 'fixer' -a negotiator who enhanced 
his private income by exercising governmental or party influence. This 
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applied particularly to politians of the second and third rsnk. In 
the case of the M. P. the 'rising' Fascists were those who took over 
the local and regional leadership after the upheavals of 1935 and 1936. 
They had the administrative skills and knowledge required of such 
people. The 'declining' Fascists were those whot generally speaking, 
were placed in positions of authority because no one else was available 
in the early days of the movement. They were replaced by the 'rising' 
Fascists. If the early Fascists were to hold on to their position then 
a basic requirement was that of intrigue, fostered by Mosley's belief 
in the survival of the fittest. We will see that many attempted to 
become participants in the game of intrigue - comparable to the role of 
the 'fixer' in Lasswell and Sereno's analysis - but very few succeeded. 
One who did succeed was Tommy Ackroydp who will be looked at later. 
- The early membership of the M. P. in the North of England was 
generally unstable and produced a high turnover of numbers. This 
undoubtedly presented problems for the leadership in later years. 
Reynall Bellanq, a full time official in the North from 1936 to 1940 
was one of those left to pick up the pieces. 
There were places in Lancashire whichp despite the 
appalling economic conditions as an incentivep 
British Union made no impact in 1937 or 1938. 
Enquiries showed that these were towns wheret in 
19331and 1934, particularly during Lord Rothermere's 
boostv the B. U. P. had taken hold like wildfire and 
had drawn to itself almost every unstable person 
and adventurer of either sex that the town possessed. 
Genuine people who had been attracted 1*r the programme 
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and policy, felt that they could not afford 
to be associated with the types that congregated 
at District Headquarters, and either refrained , 
from enrolling or, having joined, soon faded out. 
In those spots nothing remained but a bad odour, 
still lingering there three or four years later. 
2 
Nellie Driverf the WomendDistrict Leaddr in Nelson, details this 
problem in her own branch in 1935: 
Some of our sympathisers were well known Tory 
businessmen and Nelson would have been astonished 
if they had known who they were. Our members were a 
mixed crowd, and when I looked at some of them I 
almost regretted my enterprise, They had brought home 
to me the ola saving, 'wrhere's nowt as funny as fowk. " 
For every good, normal member, we got several who 
were cranks - and worse. 
3 
Driver refers to several problem members, inoluding drunksp and an 
elderly couple who were 'violently Orange' and addst 
We had several other cranks and faddists with waste 
paper basket ideas. We seemed to attract them somehowq 
and two meetings ended in such chaos that London 
officiaýls came up to straighten out the mess* 
How could we possibly get on with the Cause when 
Mormon clashed with Pacifist, 'Catholic with ex-Communisty 
Methodist with G of E, 'and anti-vivisectionist with 
Christadelphian? It was almost like a comio operae 
One side would demand more street meetingsp and still 
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another side would like to include rules of 
their own, till my head hummed and I tried in 
vain to restore order. The District Leader also 
was at his with end. We could not get our members 
to salute us publicly or privately, and they were 
frightened to death of selling papers at Nelson 
Centre, or of taking part in most of the activities 
that National Headquarters insisted on. 
4 
are 
There'.., other accounts which add to this picture of a transient 
uncommitted membership during these years. Tom Pickles,, a member of the 
Manchester branch in 1933t was in and out of the movement within three 
months. He was working class, a shop steward in his factory and branch 
secretary of his union, and also took part, with many other ramblers, in 
the 'Mass Trespass' on Kinder Scout in 1932. He joined the B. UOF. 
because of the influence of some of his friends and the lure of the 
sporting facilities in the B. U. P. gym. 
5 I 
Another member, ' who stayed dn the movement rather longer, was Mrs 
Agnes Barlow. She joined the Moss Side branch in MancImster in 1934 
because she lived next door to the local headquarters and took a fancy 
to one of the Fascists in his smart uniform. The two became engaged and 
her fiance' was appointed Section Leader of the Branch while she led the 
Womens Section. When they married, Mrs Barlow ceased to be actively 
involved in the movementv though she remaind a member until 1940. She 
described her branch as having a cosmopolitan membershipy several of 
whom were roughs* 
Another Manchester member, Authur Fawcett, joined the New Party in 
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February 1931 and stayed in the movement until his marriage in 1937. 
He was, appointed Unit Leader shortly after the formation of the BU. F. 
Fawcett was born into a working class family in Salford, His father 
worked, in the local engineering industry and voted Labour, When Fawcett 
left, school he got a job as a warehouse lad, Not all the members of 
his B. U. F. branch were of a similar background however: 
They were different sorts of chaps. There was a 
fellow called Quinn who was a chauffer who was in 
the B. U. P. and his son was in it. And. then there was 
Joe Cooper who had been at public school. His father 
Toe Sheeng was a manager at Woolworths. And there was , 
a Welsh boy, who came from the Rhondda Valley in the 
Depression yearsq to work and live in lodgings in 
Stretford. They are the sort of lads... They were 
decent types you knows And we had rag=uffinsp you 
know, who were attracted to the organisatiOnp who were 
a bit on the rough side. 
John , Charnley had joined in 1933 and was a member of the Southport 
branch of the B. U. P. from 1933 to 1935- By 1940 he bad become 
Senior 
Propagandist for North East England, District Inspector for East 
Yorkshire and District Leader of Hall, where he remained 
in the B-U. F. 
until his imprisonment under Defence Regulation 18b 
in 1940. Ile joined 
becaude he had seen t1m impact of the Depression on people 
through his 
charity work with the Catholic Church, Ile says 
he recalled Mosley's 
resignation speech of 1931 and knew that the 
B. U. Fe was the party for 
him, In Southportv Charnley remembersy about 
ten percent of the 140 
members in 1934 were unemployed, although 
he was not one of themp 
having come from a lower middle class background, 
When Charnley moved 
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to Hull in 1935, where he was quickly promoted to District Leader, he 
counted the unemployed working class as high as forty per cent of the 
total of 283 members in 1936. He described the local membership as 
"Thirty per cent disenchanted; fifty to fifty five per cent politically 
motivated; ten to fifteen per cent who approved of O. M. philosophically. 
8 
The account of the changes in local leadership in the North of England 
in Chapter five and six reinforces this view of a generally heterogeneous 
and somewhat transient membership of the B. U. F. in its early years. In 
most areasq branch leadership was very much a matter of who war. 
available at the time. If there was a rapid rise in membershipp the 
Northern Headquarters would appoint anyone who made their presence felt, 
org if there was only one member in a particular area then that person 
would more than likely be named District Leader as a matter of course* 
In Halifax, where there was eventually a total membership of tenp the 
leader was appointed for this reason. The Women's District leader in Nelson, 
Nellie Driver, was appointed because she started the local branch. 
Although she was not allowed to become District Leadery sibee that was 
a male preserve, she was a very determined woman, and the man appointed 
to that position "was clay in the hands of the Woman's District Leader. "9 
Both were weavers in the local textile mills and Driver soon built up 
a branch with about 100 members. 
The leadership in Halifax and Nelson was in fact exceptionally stable. 
The'same could be said for Blackburn, where the leadership was described 
by BellaV: 
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Bill Sumner, the District Leader ... was a tough, 
broken nosed ex-trooper who was trying to raise 
a numerous family on the meagre allowance of the 
Public Assistance Board. His Woman District leader 
at that time was the daughter of a well known 
Lancashire'mill owning family. She was a young 
girl straight from the schoolroom and had joined 
British Union under the compulsion of a strong 
social conscience. The District Treasurer was a 
fresh faced upstanding young trade unionist, a 
carpenter of the name of Jack Birtkhistle. 
10 
Howeverg as in many other areas, the leadership in the North went through 
several changes. These were the result of internal disputes and intrigues 
fostered by the system of competitiveness favoured by Mosley. Manchester, 
as we have seen, provided good examples in this respect. 
Some branches attracted a more homogeneous membership than those of 
Manchester or Hull. In Harrogate, for example, the local Fascists were 
said to adopt different tactics to those applied in industrial towns. 
The local Labour Party reported that the Fascists "appear to confine 
their attention to younger members of the Tory partyp particularly those 
interested in sports - rugby and golf players (the boisterous kind of 
'young bloods'). " 11 The Harrogate Tradds Council confirmed this 
picture and reported that "their membership is being recruited very 
largely from the young people of the 'well to do' classy of which there 
are a considerable number in Harrogate, ", 
12 In Halifax there was a 
similar pattern of recruitment. The leader was the son of a well to do 
wholesale food merchant and the ten members of the branch included an 
assistant bank manager and a son of the owner of a big textile firm. 
13 
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Apart, fro'4 the problem of fluctuating numbers, the salient feature of 
the membership of the B. U. F. in the North, i. e. its heterogeneity both 
within branches and between districts, changed very little since its 
formation in 1932 until 1935. The introduction of a new administrative 
system for the North in January 1936 proved to be more significant 
than a mere change of personnel. It marked the arrival of a new type 
of recruit to the movement. 
By 1935 the membership of the B. U. F. had been drastically reduced from 
14 the high level achieved in the spring of 1934- The more violence and 
anti-Semitism were seen as central features of the movementp the more 
people drifted away. It was, of course, due to the heterogeneous and 
transitory nature of the early membership that people left in such 
large numbers. This was certainly the. case in the North where a new 
leadership was imposed from optside when Mosley introduced reforms 
which included the division of the movement into Northern and Southern 
administrative areas. 
The new members were the 'genuine people' referred to by Bellamy&15 
The new recruits who joined after 1935 were, generallyl much more 
ideologically committed to the movement than their earlier counterparts. 
They tended to remain in the movement longer, many of them being detained 
under Defence Regulation 18b during the war. 
The new recruits were led by a very different group of Fascists than 
had previously controlled the Northern area, The new fall time officers, 
Hone; Sant-, Bellamy and Shore, were appointed from outside the area. 
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Only Ackroyd, the new Senior Political Organiser, was promoted from 
within the Manchester branch* 
The dedication and professionalism of the new leadership was reflected 
in the new type of member recruited to the movement following the fall 
in membership in 1934 and 1935. The members who had not drifted away 
in that period displayed similar characteristics. They generally worked 
hard for the movement and were steeped in Fascist ideology. 
One such member was G. P. Butherst, who joined the movement in 1936 at 
the age of 19 in response to the movement's 'Stand by the King' 
campaign. Sutherst had been to grammar school before starting work as 
an office boy in a cotton mill in Middleton. He joined the Middleton 
branch of the B. U. P. and was soon asked to become branch leader. Butherst 
became involved in the movement's campaign to recruit cotton workers and 
managed to push the membership of his branch from a couple of dozen in 
1936 to over 200 in 1939. How many of these were just Isympathisers' 
is'difficult to say. Sutherst was rewarded with the silver award for 
service to the movement. Although he managed to avoid being detained 
during the war he was active in the 18b Detainees Aid Fund and was 
instrumental in starting the post war Union Movement branch in 
Manchester. 16 It was Sutherst, it will be recalled. 9 who considered that 
it was the Jews who caused the Second World War. 
17 
Another dedicated member of the B. U. F. was William Eatonp who joined 
the'Lancaster branch in 1932 and remained active in the movement until 
his detention in 1940. He came from a respectable middle class family 
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and spent three years in the sixth form at Lancaster Grammar School, 
with the intention of reading for a history scholarship at Oxford. 
Howeverg he considered the unemployment situation to be so critical 
that he did not sit the examination and instead found a job with a 
firm of book publishers in Glasgow and then with a safe-making firm 
in London. While in London, Eaton attended a lecture given by William 
Joyce, was suitably impressed, joined the B. U. F. and was attached to the 
Headquarters in London for a while before moving back North. Eaton 
received the gold badge of distinction for servides to the movement, 
one of only four ever issued. By the time war broke out Eaton had been 
appointed District Inspector for an area covering Carlisle, Lancaster, 
Cumberland, Westmorland and North Fylde. He was on the national list 
of speakersy specialising in agricultural subjectsp and was the 
movement's parliamentary candidate for Burnley. 
18 
Yet another such member was Bob Rowq born into a lower working class 
family, who joined the Preston branch in 1934 in response to the 
Daily Yail campaign in support of the movement. Row remained an active 
Fascist until his detention during the war and is now a member of the 
Directorate of the Union Movement. 
There are several reasons why the people who joined the B. U. F. after 
1936 or who had joined earlier, yet had remained in the movement 
throughout its periods of crisisq would require different qualities 
4ROthose who left in, the mass exodus of 1934 and 1935- One 
explanation of the early rapid rise in membership was the movement's 
uniform. The attraction of the blackshirt andp laterp the various 
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embellishments of badges, breechesq cap and belt, worn according to 
rank, were no longer available after the passing of the Public Order 
Act on January 1st 1937. For many of the earlier recruits the uniform 
had been a significant factor in their becoming Fascists. 
Thomas Picklesq who was in the movement for three months, was not 
allowed to have a uniform by his mother, but he earnestly desired one, 
because all his friends in the movement had one, "Like the lads today 
wear all this 'ear silly j; ear and I suppose I was the same. " 
20 Bob Row, 
speaking of the members in Lancastert was able to elaborate on this point: 
There was no doubt the uniform had that big 
advantage and it had that big disadvantagey They 
werentt, -. politically minded types, it was just a 
good, healthy, vigorous male. In some cases females. 
Some of the girls were quite pretty, that was another 
drawing point. It was just a movement. And thatv I 
am afraid, is one of the great disadvantages of the 
Blackshirt movement. Looking back I can see that 
many joined purdr., ly for the uniformg though it was a 
21 
very good atmosphere while it laste& you know. 
For the members who remained in the M. P. after the passing of the 
Public Order Act, the uniform was obviously not as important as other 
aspects of the movement. Nellie Driver was initially attracted into 
thepovement, among other things, by the uniform. "*.. It (the movement) 
had plenty of romance in the forR of tIPdrum corps, salutest standardsp 
emblems, uniforms and impressive demonstrationsp which made a strong 
appeal to me. 1122 However she later came to see the uniform as a mistake: 
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Partly, yes, they should have never gone in 
for that silly uniform that they ended up in. 
One of our members that was my frien&; husband, 
got on a bus and the people were giving him 
money. They thought he was the bus conductor, 
It was an immense uniform. 
23 
It is perhaps significant that one of the interviewees, John Butherst, 
who remained in the movement until the war and who may be classified 
as one of the more serious and determined members who responded to and 
helped create the depth ideology of the movement, joined the B. U. P. 
just as the uniform was being banned. "I think I went to one meeting 
in uniform and then it was banned in fact. "24 The uniform was obviously 
of no great importance to him since he knew, before he joined the 
movement, that the blackshirt was likely to be banned in the near future. 
The ban on political uniforms helped, in a sense, to distinguish 
between the serious Fascist like Sutherst and the less serious, of whom 
Tom Pickles and Mrs Agnes Barlow could be said to be typicalo 
25 The 
former would not be deterred from their committment to the movement, 
while the latter had lost one of the'main attractions of Fascism. 
The serious Fascist, for whom the depth ideology was so importanty had 
to disregard several other factors which would have turned the less 
serious Fascist away from the movement. For exampleg British Fascism 
was, by the mid 1930's, synomynous in the public mind with violence 
and anti-Semitism. The B. U. F. meeting at Olympia in June 1934 brought 
howls-of protest from many sections of the community against the 
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treatment of interrupters by Fascist stewards. 
26 The 'Battle of Cable 
Street' in October 1936 brought similar denunciations of the movement. 
The news media focused its attention on these two events which 
subsequently became part of the patchwork of the popular history of the 
period. Anyone who remained in the movement, or, more significantly, 
actually joined the movement for the first time after Gable Street, would 
have had to be much more hardened and serious in his reasoning than would 
have been the case for the Fascist recruit in 1932 or 1933. 
This was particularly the case after 1936 because, firstly, of the 
rise of Fascism in Europe and the linking in the public mind of events 
in Germany and Italy with Fascism in this country, and, secondly, because 
the tide of public opinion was flowing very much against Fascism. The 
Outbreak of wax in Spain in 1936 led, as we have seen, to a massive 
support in this country for the Republican cause. This was not just 
measured by the number of people who joined the International Brigadep 
but, more significantly, by the vast numbers of people who contributed 
to the humanitarian aid for beleagLered Spain, 
27 The 'cause' of Spain 
became embodied in the public mind as a measure of the strength of 
democracy. It was an anti-Pascist cause which brought in its wake a 
more intense campaign against the B. U. F. 
Although Olympia and Cable Street have achieved a perhaps deserved 
significance in the history of the M. P. there were many other 
occasions on which the violence and anti-Semitism had become apparent 
to local communities. It is in fact on the level of local affairs and 
personal relationships that a new recruit to the movement would encounter 
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most difficulty. If. for example, as was the case in Manchester, the 
local Jewish community was under siege from a sybtematio campaign 
of anti-Semitismg sometimes of a violent nature, then any local 
person who joined the M. P. would be singled out by opposition groups. 
He or she would be known by neighbours and friends as a Fascist, and 
would be'seen to embody allthe features of the Fascist- -movement, including 
violence and anti-Semitism, whether this was warranted or not. It 
would take a particularly strong willed person to overcome such 
opposition, In the first place, by 1934, anti-Fascist groups were 
keeping individual Fascists under surveilance. The Communist Party, 
for example. monitored the activities of local Fascists who became 
blacklegs in a factory on strike in Manchester. 
28 The Labour Party 
kept a watch on local B. U. F. premises, particularly the ones in Plattingv 
0 Noston and Crumpsall. 
29 These groups, together with the Manchester 
Anti-Fascist Co..; ordinating Committee and othersp knew the names of 
man. * local Fascists and made sure that as many other people as possible 
kndw them tooo In the second place the Fascist could well meet opposition 
in his or her own family, Tom Pickles' mother would not let him wear 
a uniform and he left the movement inside three monthb. On the other 
hand Arthur Fawcett disregarded his own family opposition: 
My father was an engineer... he was a Labour man* 
IV mother was Labour too, a Labour family we were* 
I have got two brothers and one sister. I have got 
one sister who votes Labour yet. I have got'a 
brother who voted Labour and said he wouldxxlýt be 
found dead in the same company wit me. 
30 - 
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It is interesting that Tom Pickles now (1980) has no interest in 
Fascism and considers himself non political, while Arthur Fawcett, 
although he left the B. U. F. in 1936, says he is'still intensely 
patriotic and would prefer a Fascist government to a communist one. 
Every year, on the QueeAs birthday and on St. Georg4s day, he raises 
the Union Jaok on a tall flag pole in his garden, muoh to the 
embarrasSment of his neighbours on the estate of bungalows, 
1 -1 
The ability to overcome family and local oppositiong and indeed 
public opinion at largeg may have been a significant characteristic 
of theýmore serious member of the B. U. P. who would respond more 
readily to the depth ideology of the movement. 
A further fadtor which could have influenced people who might have 
otherwise flirted with Fascism was that the B. U. F. had experienced 
a drastic decline in membership, for reasons which have already been 
outlineAq and was also in financial difficulties whichv in turng led 
to retrenhment and administrative changes. Many local branches were 
amalgamated because of falling numbers, and others were purged in an 
attempt to eradicate the #social club' atmosphere which had developed 
in many areas. Once again, only those people who were more seriously 
committed than their earlier counterparts would remain ing or joint 
a movement on the decline and with a real danger of sinking completely* 
If one turns to the class affiliation of members of the B. U. F. one 
has to be very careful indeed. Extrapolating findings on the class 
designation of a small group of interviewees to the membership as a 
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whole, is not feasible if we wish to achieve a degree of accuracy. 
All one can do is provide a general picture which points to a class 
mixture, amongst old B. U. F. members, It has already been indicated that 
the most striking feature of the membership of the M. P. is its 
heterogeneitij; "ga feature which is not amenable to statistical 
interpretation. 
Class affiliation is of course related to income and employment, and it 
is through a brief investigation of the latter that we may add to what 
we have, already discovered about class affiliation. It appears that a 
significant proportidn of the early membership of the M. P. in the 
North was, ý recruited through a fear of unemployment or a sense of 
despair in being unemployed. This was usually coupled with a lack of 
faith in the ability of the established political parties to deal with 
unemploymentl This was particularly the case in South East Lancashire 
where the B-U. F. launched their special cotton campaigns to attract 
cotton. workers. There is some evidence that many cotton workers did 
respond to the B. U. F. in this direction. In Middleton the leader 
thought there were working class members, mainly cotton workerst and 
considered this to be true of the B. U. F. membership in East Lancashire 
generally. 
31 In Nelson the Womens District Leader, her motherp who was 
also a member, and the District Leader, were weavers and many of the 
100, members worked in the local cotton mills. 
32 In Blackburnq "the 
District members were mainly mill workers and meohaniosp most of 
whomýwere jobless, also a sprinkling of small shopkeepers and 
business people. "33 
40 
The District Leader in Hull has estimated that as much as 40% of the 
local memberdiip was working class and unemployed and thought the 
membership in Bolton, where his brother was District Leaderg to be the 
same. 
34 The leader in Lancaster considered that there were large 
numbers of working class people in the movement generally and that 
Lancaster was no exception to this pattern. Some of the local members 
worked on the railway and several were process workers at a large chemical 
plant-in Lancaster. The leader knew of a 'fair number' of the total 
of 60 members who were unemployed. 
35 In North Leeds the situation was 
similar, with the local leader recollecting that "many of them had 
menial jobs or were unemployed.,, 
36 
There'is little evidence to suggest that such members, unemployed or 
not, were recruited from the organised sections of the working classes. 
Very little headway was made in recruiting members from the highly 
unionised engineering industry or from coalmining for example. The 
working class recruit was typically one who had not been educated into 
the labour movement by trade-union or Labour Party membership. Even 
herev howeverg there were exceptions. The case of Tom Pickles has 
already-been mentioned but there were others, The whole of the 
Communist, Party branch in Accrington was said to have joined the B. U. p. 
37 
and in Salford three Labour League of Youth members joined the local 
B. U. F. branch though all left'within twelve months*38 Those members of 
the labour movement who joined the B. U. F. seem on the whole to have 
flirted with Fascism rather than to have experienced a deeper committmentp 
and so contributed to the high rate of turnover of membership. 
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It, was not only sections of the working class who experienced fears 
of unemployment or protection of their trade. Various occupational 
groups responded to the Fascist appeal in the North. The self employed 
were particularly vulnerable in this respect. The response from this 
type of worker cut across class lines and included working class 
people who attempted to start one man painting and decorating businesses 
or window cleaning rounds, owners of small shops and garages, and also 
taxi drivers. The B. U. F. organised special meetings for such groups 
and at one meeting, in June 1938,400 taxi drivers turned up to hear 
Mosley promise his backing in a campaign to stop price cutting by 
private car hire firms. The Fascist leader in Middleton knew many 
members who were taxi drivers and he used to be one himself at one time. 
Reynall Bellamy also noted that many members were similarly employed in 
Manchester, The Communal Council of Manchester and Salford Jews reported 
in 1938 that they had managed to deal successfully with an outbreak 
of anti-Semitism amongst taxi drivers in Manchester. 
39 
There were many small businessmen and shopkeepers who were members in 
the Northp In Hull the leader was a confectioner and is now an area 
official of the Naticnal Chamber of Trade. He attends national meetings 
in such capacity, where, he says, "It is sometimes like going to a 
B. U. P. reunion.,. 
40 
One factor that probably helps to explain the high percentage of B. U. P. 
members who were employed as taxi drivers and in other occupations 
such as the furniture trade, is that these were occupations to which 
Jews were attracted. Hence anti-Semitism among the non-Jews may have 
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been one of the determining factors. There is little more to add here 
to the impression of class heterogeneity amongst B. U. F. members, 
except to mention the small minority of Fascists or Fascist sympathisers 
who could be said to represent the upper classes in the North. A. V. Roe 
of Manchester, for example, was a well known Fascist sympathiser, who 
lent his name on occasion to the Fascist cause. Another was Lord 
Tollemache, a Cheshire landowner. 
41 There were also a few owners of 
cotton mills who. lent their name and their money to the Fascist cotton 
campaigns. 
42 These people were very few in number and insignificant, 
not. only numerically but also in what they brought to the movement in 
ideas or, indeed, finance. 
A much more important feature of the membership of the B. U. P. was 
that of -religious affiliation. The Catholic support for the M. P. 
has already been referred to in the context of the 1938 Manchester 
municipal elections. 
43 The relationship between Catholicism and the 
B. U. F. can be highlighted further however by a brief look at the 
membership in the North. There is enough evidence to suggest that the 
percentage of Catholics was much higher in the B. U. F. than in the 
population as a whole. The leaders in Hull, Blackburn and Bolton were 
Catholics, as was the leader in North Leeds* Several of the local 
leaders in Manchester were Catholics and the leader of the Arnside 
branch and the founder member of the Nelson branch were both converts 
to Catholicism. The latter, Nellie Driver, has written that "Catholics 
we had in large numbersP besides many Church of England laityp because 
they. supported our stand against atheistic Communism mostly. " 
44 There 
were solmany Catholic members in the Leeds area that Mosley's nick-name 
I 
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there wa s 'The Pope, &45 Most of the membeis in Lancaster and Preston 
were Catholics. In factq Protestants were said to be reluctant to join 
the movement in Preston because of the high number of Catholic members 
and in Liverpool there were even 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' branches. 
46 
The high number of Catholics in senior posts in the North caused some 
concern amongst non-Catholics, -', with allegations that one's religion 
47 
was important in determining one's chances of promotion. 
There are several reasons why Catholics were attracted to the B. U. P. 
As far as the Irish Catholics were concerned, it was commonly thought 
that Mosley supported Home Rule for Ireland. Certainly the 'Irish 
Connection' seems to loom large in the anatomy of the B. U. F. Mosley 
underwent part of his First World War military training near Dublin, 
and in 1920, as M. P. for Harrow, he adopted a critical attitude towards 
the governments handling of the Irish situation. Mosley's cAticisms 
of the activities of the Black and Tans helped to make his reputation 
in the House of Commons as a first rate speaker. In November 1920 he 
became secretary of the Peace with Ireland Councily which was organised 
by the Labour Party to bring an end to the governmenis policy of 
repri I sals in Ireland. His attacks were'aimed more at the Lloyd George 
government and its methods of dealing with the Irish problem than the 
Black and Tans themselves. Mosley gained much support for his stand on 
Ireland. Not only Catholics were drawn into the B. U. F. because of thisp 
but also som people who were on the other side - members of the 
Black and Tans, Reynall Bellamy being a good example, At various stages 
in Mosley's chequered political career, the Irish have provided a 
substantial proportion of his total support. 
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In the 1959 General Electiong Mosley stood as a Union Movement 
candidate in North Kensington. His policy on race in that election 
does not concern us here. However, the support that Mosley gained for 
that policy does. Mosley's record as a campaigner for the rights of 
Irish people was dusted off and embellished with an appeal for civil 
rights for Catholics. The fesult was that theýmbstahtial Irish 
population in the- -constituency tended to be attracted towards the 
Union Movement - and all its policiesp including that of repatriation,, i 
of the. West Indians. 
An important aspect of Catholic membership of the B. U. P. was the 
similarity of ideas expressed by the Catholic church and the Fascist 
movement. Skidelsky has already drawn attenticn to this interesting 
parallel, but it can be illustrated a little further . 
48 For examplep 
members of the church itself expressed an interest in the B. U. P. 
William Eaton, one bf the Northern officials, described a journey 
he made by train to London for the Fascist meeting at Olympia in 1934. 
He met a Catholic priest on the train, who was also going to the 
Olympia meeting to find out for himself how far the B. U. P. policy 
coinbided with the teachings of the church, The attitude of certain 
Catholic newspapers towards Fascismhas been noted by Skidelsky and 
he points to the sympathy expressed by the Catholic Herald towards the 
M. P. and the similarity the paper noted between B. U. F. policy and 
the social views embodied in the encyclicals. 
49 The correspondence 
columns of the Catholic press were also creating some problems. In a 
report. pres6nf6d to tbe Board of Deputies of Briti6h Jews in 1938, conoern 
was expressed about the ant i-Semitic, bias shown by the Catholio Times 
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and its readers, at a time when anti-Semitism in Europe was escalating 
rapidly. A meeting was arranged with the Private Secretary to the 
Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster and the complaint was dealt with IV 
the Archbishop himself. 50 
The B. U. P. presented a type of structure and organisation similar to 
that of the Catholic church. In the words of the B. U. F. leader in 
Hull, ', "Catholics would see a relationship between the dogmatism of 
their religion and Oswald Mosleyts idea of a job to govern.,. 
51 
The 
Hull leader himself was a Catholic. Two of his brothers who had also joined 
the B. U. F., all three independently of each other, and belonging to a 
strong Catholic familyp apparently saw the same connection between 
their church and the B*U. P. The structure of the M. P. with all 
decisions emanating from Mosley himself, suited the minds of many 
Catholicsq whose church was organised in a similar auth6ritarian mannero 
This, coupled with many of the ideas of the M. P. - its policy on 
Ireland; widespread ownership of private property, and its anti-Semitism - 
provided a convenient outlet for many people experiencing the 
frustration and despair of economic disorder and political bankruptcYt 
and who would have preferred all that the M. P. offered rather than the 
ideals of Communism. 
Fascism in this country found its greatest Catholic supportv not 
from the organised church and its officials, but from the ranks of 
ordinary working class Irish Catholics. The B. U. F. sd zed the opportunity 
of gaining support from a disaffected group of people ignored by other 
political parties. It is not as though the Irish Catholics were 
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unwilling to listen to what Mosley had to say, since many of the 
movement's ideas struck a chord with them. However, one cannot escape 
the feeling that the Irish were used, to a certain degreel by the 
movement to boost its membership. The same may be said of that episode 
in Mosley's later career when, as leader of the Union Movement in the 
1950's, he gained the support of many Teddy Boys, who were prominent 
in the Union Movement's campaign against coloured immigration. In both 
instances we may learn a great deal about Mosley's campaigning methods 
and also about the bankruptcy of his appeal. Mosley had to rely on the 
following of such groups of people because he could not gain the type 
of support which might have brought him to power. No politician can 
ride to power on the backs of small disaffected groups in societyp and 
the fact-that Mosley, in part, tried to tells us a great deal about 
the man and his methods. 
PART FOUR 
RESPONSES TO FASCISMs THE COMMUNITY AND THE STATE 
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CHAPTER TEN 
BRITISH JEWRY AND THERISE OF FASCISM 
The campaign within the Jewish community to do something, anything, 
about the B. U. F. began to break out into the Jewish press in the 
autumn of 1933. The early manifestation of this took the form of 
correspondence to the Jewish Chronicle. 
In fact it is this early correspondence which first sets the scene 
for the bitter conflict which was to take place amo nj the leaders 
of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, whose position was that 
the Jews should not become involved in 'political problems' and should 
leave the Fascists well alone, except to speak out against anti- 
Semitism. On the other hand there was the position of other Jews who 
saw themselves as 'political animals' and who felt it neoessgryp not 
only to e6ttack anti-Semitism but also the wider problem of Fascism as 
a, political oreed. We have here to remove ourselves from the immediate 
problems facing the Jewish community in Manchester in order to set 
the scene on a national basis. We will see that the leadership of the 
Jewish community in Manchesteý followed fairly precisely the argument 
formulated by the Board of Deputies in London, and it is to the Jews 
who were in conflict with the Board we must now turn before dealing 
with the Board's response and the mirroring of that response in 
Manchester. 
One early, and much quoted, letter in the Jewish Chronicle which 
258 
called for action against the M. P. was from John Brownt of Ruskin 
College, Oxford. 
From my experience in the North of England, in 
Oxford and in London, I am completely convinced 
that the only way to combat the menace is to 
organise effective and disciplined opposition* 
It is not enough to pass pious resolutions and 
to make deploring speeches, because the mentality 
of anti-Semitic fascism is unmoved by anything 
except direct action. 
I 
A week later a reply to Brown's letter came from the President of 
the Oxford University Jewish Society, which noted the anti-Semitic 
campaigý being waged by the Imperial Fascists. The writer, Mr A. 
Herman, went on to note that the Jews were being attacked by the 
B. U. F*q but this was becau" they Were Comýiunists, The letter ended with 
the much'quoted words "At the present time, our greatest supporters 
in the fight against the Imperial Fascists are the Mosley-Fascists 
themselves. " 2 
In reply to Herman's letter, John Brown supplemented his earlier 
remarks by saying: 
I can say definitely that Mosley's and other 
Fascist organisations are dangers to the whole 
of the British working class and to the Jewish 
communityg and that it is a duty of all right- 
thinking people to help exterminate these 
organisations immediately. 
3 
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Herman's-letter is in fact a very early statement of the position 
taken up by the Board of Deputies of British Jews, while Brown's 
letter presents the argument put forward by the opponentsý within 
the Jewish communityp of the community leaders. 
It is at, this point that we must turn our attention to the leadership 
of the Jewish community in this country, the Board of Deputies of 
British Jews, and to Its-attitude towards Jewish defence, which was 
to undergo a remarkable change in the 1930's. 
'The London Committee of Deputies of British Jews', later to become 
known as the Board of Deputies of British Jews, was formed in the 
18th Century by Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews. The aim of the two groups 
of Jews was to consult together and take common action, when needed, 
in the everyday relationship with the larger Gentile community* 
However it was not until the beginning of the 19th Century that 
regular meetings of the Board of Deputies took place* 
Twenty two representatives, or Deputies, were on the Board, from 
Bevin Marks the Great, the Hambro, and the New Synagogue , all in 
London, and one synagogue in Liverpool (the only community outside 
London to be represented). In 1835 the Board adopted a formal 
constitution and in the following year was named in an Act of 
Parliament as the official Jewish body which could certify the 
marriage secretaries of synagogues, thus enabling them to conduct 
marriage ceremonies* The Board took an active part in achieving full 
political emancipation in this country, though mainly through the 
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efforts of particular individual members* 
Throughout the 19th Century the Board was increasingly seen to be 
representative of the more prosperous and well-to-do members of the 
Jewish communityq and took on a-more charitable function for poorer 
Jews. The reputation of the Board was firmly established in the eyes 
of the Jewish community throughout the world in 1840, when it 
successfully defended a group of Jews in Damascus against an accusation 
of ritual murder. 
In the latter half of the 19th Centuryq and especially after 1871, 
when it joined with the newly formed Anglo-Jewish Association in a 
Joint-Foreign Committee, the Board represented all manner of Jewish 
affairs abroad. 
While the work of the Board expanded, reflecting'the expansion of the 
Jewish community in Britain, the membership grew from the original 
twenty two to over 
ýour 
hundred by the time of the Second World Ware 
This increased membership represented not only synagogues but also 
other institutiozis within the Jewish community. 
By the 1930's the social composition of the Board of Deputies had 
become established. The prominent members of the Board were often 
not only leaders of the Jewish community but also prominent in the 
business world and the professions, many members being solicitorst 
doctorsq academics or businessmen. In 1938 the President of the 
Board was Neville J. Laski, a K. C. and a member of the prominent 
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Manchester family of that name. Of the two Vice-Presidents in 1938 
1 
one, Lionel L. Cohen, was also a K. C. and the other, Sir Robert Waley 
Cohen. K. B. E. , was a director of Shell Transport and Trading Co. and 
also a director of Baldwins Ltd, 
Business links were also to be important amongst the participants 
in the campaign against anti-Semitism. For example, when an appeal 
for funds for the Co-ordinating Committee Against Anti-Semitism. was 
made in September 1936, the West End gown trade contributed E23739 
with a promise of a further E50W, The t, Manchester Furniture Trade 
raised E400004 
The Board of Deputies was also able to extend its influenoe and 
voice I its opinion through its links with the media, 
5 in w; Lys which 
were inaccessable to ordinary Jews, indeed the majority of people 
in this countrye The social composition of the leadership of the 
Board of Deputies is noted here because it is important to make the 
point that the leaders were not only Jewish but were also representative 
of the middle and upper middle class groups in society* The Board 
could not be said to be representative of Jews in general. For exampley 
the majority of Jews did not belong to synagoguesp yet all the Deputies 
in the 193U's were selected by synagogues, 
The Jewish community in this country had long since ceased to be 
a homogeneous group, politicallyl religiouslyp culturally or 
economically, However, the Board had shown itself to be capable of 
adapting to some changing circumstances in the past. For example, 
ýl 
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after the First World War there was a large influx of East European 
immigrant Jews. This group of Jews very quickly achieved representation 
on the Board. 
One large-section of the Jewish community was not represented 
effectively on the Board of Deputies. This was the large number of 
working-class Jews, which included a large number of poor traders. 
Perhaps the least represented of all were the young working class 
i 
Jews who did not become involved in Jewish affairs and were ri0ither 
nationalisticrxr religious, They had however recently become aware 
of their Jewish origins, as Jews as a whole had become subject to 
the attacks of anti-Semites, both in Europe and, more recently, in this 
country. It was this group of Jews in fact, that suffered most 
directly from the anti-Semitism of the B. U. F. 
It will be argued that the Board of Deputiesp when it finally took 
action to deal with threats to Jews from Fascistst thought only in 
terms of dealing with anti-Semitism. Fascismq as an ideologyp was 
never seen as the root of the problem and so was ignored. 
Groups, which reacted against the B. U*Fe can be classified as followst 
Those which attacked Fascism as a political creed; those which were 
said to, be 'defenders of democracy' against dictatorship; and those 
groups which saw the problem as being only one of anti-Semitismp and 
who did not take into account political considerations* 
We shall see that the Board of Deputies came into the latter 
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category. Only when war with Germany was considered to be a distinct 
possibility in 1939, did the leadership of the Jewish community think 
of taking up the second position, that of defending democracy in the 
face of dictatorship. There were several reasons for this hesitancy 
on the part of the Board, The maanthat it was only in the summer of 
1936 that action was taken by the Board, by which time the B. U. F. had 
been in existence for four and a half years, was that the Board had 
to face a great deal of criticism from other sections of the Jewish 
community and feared that the initiative might be taken out of their 
handso 
The members of the Board of Deputies, because of their social 
bacl4ground, were very unlikely to experience the physical and verbal 
attacks and intimidation against Jews which occurred in working class 
areas. The leaders of British Jewry were undoubtedly disturbed by these 
events, but they were only personally experienced in an indirect wayo 
T. hey were more likely to read about anti-Semitism than experience it 
themselveso For the working class Jew it was the reverseo 
A major reason why the Board did not attack Fascism as a political 
creed was that to do so would mean that it might be identified with 
other groups and organisations which attacked Fascism* By, their very 
nature these groups tended to be of a left wing variety. Trade Unionog 
the Communist Party, the Independent Labour Party, and the Labour Party 
itself, all opposed Fascism rather than just anti-Semitism. The Board 
of Deputies could not really be described as having left wing 
ten4noies. 
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The groups on the left which attacked Fascism would also be 
attacking the bourgeoisie which, of course, in the eyes of the left, 
particularly the Communist Party and the Independent Labour Partyq 
would include the leadership of the Jewish community. It is difficult 
to imagine the Board of Deputies attaching itself, in however small 
a way, to groups which attacked the values which the Bcard implicitly 
upheld, 'almost as strongly as they attacked Pascisme 
A report to the Board of Deputies in Ootober 1936 originally stated 
that 
Any course of action on the part of Jews which 
might have the effect, quite openly aimed at the 
Fascists, of associating or identifying the Jewish 
community as a whole in the public mind with 
extreme political parties which, equally with the 
Fascists, are condemned by the mass of the well 
balanced opinion in this countr7 as public 
nuisancese 
6 
This was a clear reference to the Communist Party and some members of 
the Board took strong exception to the sentence, which was deleted 
and replaced by the following: 
The Board, as the representive body of the 
Jewish-Pommunity hEýs, can, have, no political. 
interest or affiliation, and that its defensive 
action is directed solely against anti-Semitism 
as such, no matter from what political party or 
group the incitement may come ... It is for this 
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reason that the Board strongly deprecates any 
attempt to identify the Jewish community with 
any political party. 
7 
The standard interpretation of Fascism, which dominated 41arxist 
thinking in the 1930's is well known. 
8 
Fascism was seen as an 
inevitable result of the laws governing the capitalist economic 
system. Such groups as 'big business' or the 'industrial bourgeoisie', 
or even thelagrarian capitalists' were in the vanguard of the 
formation of the Fascist state. The revolutionary energies of the 
proletariat were supposed to be dissipated by the betrayal of the 
'reformist Social Democrats' and this would lead to the predictable 
victory of Fascism. The petty bourgeoisie was considered to be 
attracted towards Fascism. What hope then for the business and 
professional people who happened to be the leaders of the Jewish 
community? Clearly the Board could not be associated with such ideas* 
Thus the Boazd of Deputies did not defend the Jewish community 
against Fascism as a political ide6logy and only belatedly joined 
the defence against anti-Semitio attacks, which happened to come from 
a Fascist organisationo It is in this light that we must look at the 
response of Jewish leaders and officials to the anti-Semitism of the 
British Union of Fascists. 
It was the policy of the leaders of the Jewish community to advise 
Jews to ignore the B. U. P. This policy was specified in individual 
statements by members of the Board of Deputies and other leading 
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Jewish public figures. 
In November 1934 at a meeting of - .ýý Jewish ex-servicemen 
in the 
Albert Hall, London, Lord Melchett gave the following advice and 
warning to Jews* 
I want you who are responsible members of the 
Jewish community to go back and persuade your 
wives and sons and cousins to leave the 
Blackshirts alone, when they are rowdy the police 
will deal with them, Do not indulge in fisticuffs 
or catcalls. What we stand upon is the enrichment 
we can bring to the life of the nation. We have 
always been an orderly people, let us realise that the 
energy and ability and decency of our people will 
win thr6ugh in the end. 
9 
At the. same, meetingg Neville Laski, President of the Board of 
Deputies, said: 
I would like to use all the influence in my 
possession to urge young Jewish peoplet 
whatever their feelings or resentments$ to 
absent themselves from Sir Oswald Mosley's 
meetings and to give him no cause to refer to 
any part that Jews play in the feelings of the 
British working mass against his party. I hope 
my words will percolate wherever there are 
Jewish communities: let Fascist meetings alone. 
lu 
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A week latert Neville Laski addressed a meeting of branches of the 
League of Jewish Youth at Woburn House, London, where he appealed 
to Jews "to see that no ammunition of any kin4; was provided by them 
for the speeches of Sir Oswald Mosley. " and ended by warning Jews 
to keep away from Fascist meetings. 
11 
This, then, was the advice given to the Jews - keep away and do 
nothing. However it was soon obvious that many Jews ando indeed, 
many people who were not Jews, did not accept this position. Many 
other people not only wanted action, but their interpretation of 
the significance of the B. U. F. waN also different from that of the 
Board of Deputies. 
We have already seen that there had been a call in the correspondence 
columns of the Jewish Chronicle for 'effective and disciplined 
opposition' followed by a claim that the B. U. F. was a danger 'to 
the whole of the British working class and to the Jewish communitYo' 
12 
This call was repeated by the Communist Party in 1934- Harry Pollitty 
speaking at the Old Boys Club, said that "Mere inaction and stopping 
quietly at home had never saved Jews from a pogrom" and that Jews 
ignored the ideology of Fascism and only concerned themselves with 
its anti-Semitio aspeots. 
13 
By the summer of 1935 criticism was being voiced by the more 
influential sections of the Jewish community, The Jewish Chroniclep 
in an article signed by 'Watchman' produced the following: 
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It is a remarkable thing that, at the moment, ' 
the most decisive act of our leaders has been 
the resolve to do nothing. An influential legal 
committee has recommended that nothing be 
attempted in the &atter of what is called 
co=unity libel. This line of actiong or 
inaction, is tactical in motive. The failure to 
publish the committees report was also tactical 
... there is a great deal that could be done to 
protect the community against defamation* 
We cannot, no doubtp follow up every act of 
incitement... but there are some things we can 
do. We could follow up every major anti-Jewish 
meeting by another in the same town and procure 
for the speeches the same publicity in the press 
that the hostile addresses obtained. We might at 
I least consider the advisability of having at our 
command a corps of instructed speakers, self- 
controlled, courteous. and tactful, to answer the 
soap box orators at street corners, and we might 
hrm them with short, terse, leaflets distributed 
to the audience where this could be done without 
risk of disturbance. Sensible men will be needed 
for this purpose... the constructivep'or preventive 
work of enlightenment should be undertaken on a 
I large scale* 
***Our co=unity must set its own house in order*., * 
we have the ftty, religious as well as civiop to be 
as a community, as chaste and pure as humanity can 
hope to make itself, 'or at any ratev to offer as 
few 'horriblelexamples' as possible for enemy uses 
We have, if necessary, to ostracise the law 
breakerp'who deserves to be held at ands length 
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and to be treated as a pariah and HitleA most 
potent ally. We have to support Jewish youth 
movements with redoubled vigour. It is 
questionable even whether 6olid blocks of Jews 
congregated in particular districts are desirable, 
in as much as they are liable to lead to 
excessive clanishness ... 
14 
It was this article which seemed to open the floodgates of criticism 
and countercriticism. Or perhaps it was the poliuy towards 
publishing such criticism that had changed. At any rate Ccritical 
views were now being aired, 
A fortnight later for example, there was a call from a reader for 
action to unify all the existing anti-Fascist groups* The same 
reader went on to remark that "the so-called leaders of Jewry by 
their inertia or over cautious tactics have contributed directly 
to the Fascist menace against the Jews... a clear lead would meet 
with'a widespread response. " Another reader suggested that a 'defence 
organisation' be formed which, apparently, could act as a publishing 
house for anti-Fascist pamphlets, 'and organise speakers to assist 
at anti-Fascist meetings. 
The Secretary of the University of Wales Jewish StudentsiAssociation 
wrote of the 11growine impatience on the part of us younger people 
with the impotent attitude adopted by the leaders of British Jewry 
towards the menace of Fascism in this country" and ended with a 
call for Jewish youth and student organisations to organise collective 
action* 
270 
There was a suggestion that all Jews should join their respective 
political parties and become guardians of Jewish rights, since 
"protests to the Home Office from Conservative bodies might carry 
a little more weight than those of Friendly Societies. " This 
letter ended with a quote from Hillel: #'If we are not for ourselves, 
who will be for us? And if not now, ' when? Leaders of Jewry, answer, 
when? " 
It was not only the pages of the Jewish Chronicle that presented 
a note of impatience in the Jewish community with the Board of 
Deputies. Anti-Fascist campaigns were being organised in JewisH 
districts whichg'by their very nature, ' amounted to a criticism 
of the Jewish leaddrship. 
In Manohester for example, in June 1936, ' 3,5u(yjoitizens in Cheetham 
Hill the centre of the Jewish community in the city, 'signed a 
petition to the Lord Mayor of Manchester, protesting against the 
16 letting of the local public hall to the B. U. P. The petition in 
Manchester was organised by the North Manchester Co-ordinating 
Committee Against Fascism and Anti-SemtUsm, 'which contained many 
Jews. In other areas of the country pressure groups were being 
formed to deal with the continuing *anti-Jewish manifestations',, 
The Jewish leadership, both in Manchester and nationwidev could 
not'fail to be aware of the significance of local communities taking 
action on their own behalf. 
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At this point it is important to refer again to the way in which 
groups and organisations reacting against the B. U. F. were classified. 
For, while the purpose of this chapter is to deal specifically 
with the defence against the B. U. F. from within the Xwish community, 
comparison must be made between the Board of Deputies and other 
'defence' groups, in order to highlight the very isolated position 
of the Board of Deputiesio 
In -the first category then, we have those groups and organisations 
that attacked Fascism as a political creed. This was essentially 
an ideological standpoint and followed from the analysis and 
interpretation of Fascism put forward by various Marxists and neo- 
M. arxists in the inter war years. Anti-Semitism was seen as a product of 
Fascist ideology and was to be fought as such. This interpretation 
has already been commented upon and all that remains to be added 
here is a brief list of the sorts of groups and organisations that 
came into this category. We have, first of all, the Communist Party 
of Great Rritain, which, through its chief polemicists, R. Palme Dutt 
and John Strachey, contributed to much of the Marxist interpretation 
of Fascism. The Independent Labour Party also came into this first 
categoryt as did sections of the Labour Party, Some individual 
trade unions also attacked Fascism as a political creedp'while many 
individual trade cousicils followed a similar line* Organisations 
which included many trade unions and Labour Party branches as 
affiliated members also came into this category. Two such organisations 
which are of concern here were the North Manchester Co-ordinating 
Committee Against Fascism and Anti-Semitism, and the Jewish Peoples 
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Council. Both these groups will be studied in this chapter. 
In, the second category, that of groups and organisations which 
professed a general committment to a 'democratic' way of life, 
supporting in effect, though often implicitly, * parliamentary 
democratic institutions, 'we find some groups which were in a 
different category from other groups within the same organisation. 
Some trade union branches, for e xam ple, adopted a much lower political 
profile than other branches. 1bny supported 'democracy' while some 
adopted the 'left' interpretation of Fascism of the first category. 
Trade Councils followed a similar pattern. However there were many 
groups which fell solely into this second category, These included 
the Stepney Council for Peace and Democracy,, which was formed in 
the East End of London to try to bring an end to Fascist activity in 
the areao Anti-war councils and the Anti-Fascist Union also 6we 
into this category, as did the League of Blue and White Shirtsq'which 
perhaps deserves a little attention* 
The League of Blue and White Shirts was formed in July 1936 in the 
Est of London, and was predominantly a Jewish organisationp although 
its President, Mr W, Bateman, was a Gentile, Blackshirts referred 
to its-members as the Istorm troops of Jewry'. The Legion was 
described as being 'concerned with combating Fascismq not only in its 
anti-Semitio aspectsv but in general. J. . 
17 Howeverv its PurPose was 
made more explicit in February 1937, 'when it said that the movement 
would not unite with any other 'platform' advocating party politics 
or using the present anti-Semitic agitation for their own personal 
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aims. The members of the movement wore blue and white shirts, in the 
hope that if sufficient organisations wore shirts, then the Home 
Secretary would have to ban all political uniforms. The main policy 
of the Legion was to hold meetings on street corners in the East 
End of London. Often there was a conflict with the B. U. F. over who 
had the right to which 'pitch'. Audiences of between 500 and 600 
were claimed, ' and by February 1937 over 500 meetings had been held, 
In December 1936p'the premises of the Legion, in Whitehouse Lane, 
Stepney, were attacked by a group of Blackshirtsq who drove up in 
cars and caused over ZlOU worth of damages. 
18 The organisation 
struggled onq'in spite of lack of funds, 'and managed to publish 
leaflets defending Jewry. At the height of the movement's successý 
in November 1936, hopes of opening social clubs 'all over London 
and England' were expressed. However by April 'i937 reorganisation 
took place and a new executive body was appointed. The following 
month the Legion was amalgamated with the British Union of Democratsp 
the British Democratic Association and the Anti-Fasoist Unionp under 
the. name of 'The Legion of Democrats'. 
Amongst the trade unions which supported 'democracy' in the face 
of anti-Semitism was the Hounsditch and Whitechapel branch of the 
Shop Assistants Union, ' which was predominantly Jewish, In response 
to the article in the Jewish Chronicle of June 5 1936, which has 
been quoted above, the Union wm. inously resolved to convey the 
following resolution to the newspaper. 
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That, while recognising the absolute necessity 
of a well organised Trade Union movement for 
combatinig fascism and anti-semitism in all its 
forms, we welcome the statement in so far as the 
absolute unity of Jewry is essential to taking 
an active and rigorous stand to combat this 
menace. We trust that the former passive 
attitude of the leaders of British Jewry will 
give no place to the methods and poliuy outlined 
in the article and so far as we are concerned, 
representing as we do thousands of young 
distributive workers in East London, ' can promise 
our assistance in every way, 
19 
The passive attitude of the Board of Deputies which was attacked by the 
Shop Assistants Union branch, followed from the fact that the Board 
of Deputies came into the third category of opposition groups which 
looked upon anti-Semitism as the sole problem, without any reference 
to Fascism as a political creed. It is here that we can see clearly 
the isolated position of the Board of Deputies, It is they alonep 
among large camaigning bodies, that occupy this third category. 
Various other organisations, 'for example the Blue and White Shirts, 
claimed initially to be 'non-political' and to be only concerned with 
fighting anti-Semitism, but in actual fact these bodies did speak out 
in support of 'democracy'* 
There were in fact rather less important groups formed which might 
also be said to have presented a non-political stancep and thus be 
included in the third category. In June 1936 a 'Jewish Truth Society, 
was formed in Portsmouth, whose aim was 'to combat anti-Semitism of 
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every type and to disseminate knowledge, historicalq economic and 
religiousq of our people'. This was to be achieved by giving 
lectures, distributing leaflets and taking legal action, whenever 
possible, ' against anti-Semites. 
20 
In March 1935p a United Jewry Fellowship had been formed to combat 
anti-Semitism and over a year later, in June 1936t it was still 
possibleg because of the inactivity of the Board of Deputiesq for a 
suggestion to be made for a tJewish Defence Leaguel with central 
headquarters in London and branches in the provinces. 
21 In July 
1936 a 'Jewish Enlightenment Platform' was formed in the East End of 
London. In describing its aims, the secretary stated that "The 
platform (is) to be non-political and (to) only concern itself with 
rebutting defamator7 statements against Jews ... 11 
22 
However most such 'non-political' organisations which did exist 
were on the periphary of affairs, both in terms of their size and 
influence and in their geographical location, It was the Board of 
Deputies alone, among large organisations with an ability to campaignp 
that occupied this third category. The Board, as we shall seev was 
eventually forced by what it referred to as 'pressure of events' to 
identify itself with the cause of democracy, but this was not until 
March 1939, when events in Europe were becoming too painful for even 
the Board of Deputies to stand aside and refuse to see the wider 
causess of anti-Semitism. 
23 
Both inside and outside the Jewish community then, organisations, 
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groups and parties were taking action. Whether this meant publishing 
leaflets and pamphlets, holding meetings, or merely writing letters 
to newspapers etc. Sometimes the action taken was of a more active 
form and led to open conflict between the M. P. and anti-Fascists. 
In the face of this sort of pressure, the Board of Deputies could 
not ignore the relationship between anti-Semitism and Fascism, as 
embodied in the B. U. P. 9 completely. 
At the-beginning of June 1936 the honorary officers of the Board 
had sent out a letter of appeal for E10,000. This was known as the 
Press Committee Appealv the Press and Information Committee being the 
body. mandated by the Board to deal with anti-Jewish defamation. The 
President of the Board, Mr Neville Laski, said that this would provide 
the necessary funds enabling the situation to be dealt with. Nothing 
more would be necessar7.24 
In June 1936, Sir Robert Waley Cohen, one of the Vice Presidents of 
The Board of Deputiesq wrote to the Jewish Chronicle acknowledging 
the criticism appearing in the columns of the paper, He advocated 
further restraint and promised that 
The leaders of the community will not allow these 
calumnies to go by default, but will establish 
without more delay adequate means of defendin, 9 not 
merely Jews against these calumniesp but 
civilisation against these, her traitors.. othe 
leaders of Anglo-Jew: r7 are fully alive to the 
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poisonous seriousness of the attacks andaare 
determined to concert measures which will leave 
no stone unturned in the wise and effective 
origanisation of defence. 
25 
Cohen was writing i=ediately afteraaýmeeting of the Board, at 
which decisions regarding anti-Fascist propaganda were taken. It 
therefore seems reasonable to assume that his reference to 'adequate 
means' of defence related to the decisions taken at that meeting. 
The Board of Deputies met on June 15 1936. Attention was drqwn, and 
approval. given, to the letter of appeal for Z10,00U which had been 
sent to all members of the Board of Deputies, its constituent bodies 
and the press. The aim of the appeal was to place the Press 
Committee in an independent position. Attention was drawn to the 
growing problem of anti-Semitism. The money received from the appeal 
was to be used to pay the expenses of a ftll time expert assistant 
in the production of publications. 
Empbýýsis on concerted action, rather than attempts by individual 
groups, was voiced by some members of the Boardq and there was a 
suggestion that "the function and duties of combating anti-Jewish 
action and propaganda in this country should be handed over to an 
ad hoc committee. " Under the pressure of questioning by some 
Deputiesp Nathan Laski, the President, defended the work of the Board 
and its committees: 
It was easy for an honourable Deputy to say 
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"why don't you do this? " or "what have you 
done about that? " Their lips were sealed 
because it would be a dereliction of duty on their 
part if they opened their mouths. But if 
they came to their office they would receive 
the fullest information on these matters. 
26 
All-criticism was brushed aside. 
The 'adequate' means, then, which Sir Waley Cohen referred to, 
consisted of the publication and distribution of pamphletsp with the 
help, of expert assistance, to counteract the attacks of the British 
Union of Fascists*27 
Just where this expert assistance was to be drawn from was not 
quite clear. Even though one of the main purposes of the Press 
Committee was to pfovide links between the press and the Board of 
Deputies, the committee consistantly refused offers of help from 
prominent Jewish journalists. Mark Gouldeng managing editor of the 
Sunday Referee, and A. L. Eastermang literary editor of the Daily 
Herald, were both ignored when they approached the uommittee. In 
fact the actual membership of the committee did not include anyone 
with journalistic experience. A. L. Eastermanp a Deputy for eighteen 
months, had offered his services to the committee and had been 
turned_down. However, the Board of Deputies itself had a Press Officer. 
In August 1936, Mr S. Soloman, formerly Chief Sub-editor in the London 
office of the Yorkshire Post was appointed to the post. 
* In July 1936 the Press Committee of the Board of Deputies consisted 
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A call for the recruitment of men with technical knowledge and 
ability on the Press Committee was made by the Jewish Chronicle. 
28 
The paper also gave its support to a motion to be put by Mr Turner- 
Samuals at the next meeting of the Board of Deputies, on July 19 19369 
which called for the formation of an ad hoo defence committee. 
This latest meeting of the Board was to prove most significant. The 
Presidentt Nathan Laski, announced at the start of the meeting that 
it had been decided to form a co-ordinating committee to unify and 
direct, the defence activities of the Board. The membership was to 
consist of the President, together with six other Deputies. It was 
envisaged that sub-committees would be appointed. 
This was the first action of any significance taken by the Board to 
I 
deal with the anti-Semitism of the B. U. F. which had been in existence 
for four and a half years. Another point of significance at this 
meeting concerned the Turner-Samual motion, calling for the formation 
of an ad hoc body. This motion was eventually withdrawn since the 
Board had formed the Co-ordinating Committee, but only after a 
rather acrimonious debate, in which suspicions and jealousies were 
aroused, as the total lack of initiative on the part of the Board 
6f, Percy Cohen, C. B. E. (Chairman); Dr J. L. Monstein; Lionel L. Cohen 
K. C.; Sir Robert Waley Cohen; P. D. J. Druiff; Philip Guedalla; L. J. 
Hydleman; Julius Jung; Neville Laski K. C.; N Lazarus; Ernest Lesser; 
M. Gordon Liverman; Sir Philip Magnus, Bart; The Rev M. L. Perizureig; 
Harry Samuals; George J. Webber. 
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was finally being aired. 
The President left the chair at one point, because he took an attack 
on the Board to be a personal attack on himself. Attempts were made 
to stifle the debate, which were partially successful. Sir Robert 
Waley Cohen, for example, said he had always felt that on the 
question of defence, the less said the better. -ý However, the meeting 
ended on a note of unity, as the Board of Deputies closed ranks to 
heal the self-inflicted wound of inactivity and to remove it from the 
gaze of the outside world. 
An example of the way in which the initiative was taken away from the 
* This was indeed the case, In July 1936, Mr J Mendelowitchy a 
representative of the Great Syhagogue on the Council of the United 
Synagogue, put forward the following motion for inclusion on the 
agenda at the Council meeting which was to be held on July 21* 'That 
this Council strongly recommends its representatives upon the Jewish 
Board of Deputies to stress the urgent necessity of prompt measures 
being taken in order to strengthen the Jewish defence against the 
continuous growth of anti-Semitism in this country'. Philip Goldbergq 
the Joint Secretary of the United Synagogue repliedt t1I duly received 
your letter on the 5th inst. which I have placed before Sir Robert 
Waley Cohen. Hb asked me to tell you that, in his opiniong it would 
not be in order to discuss a matter of that kind at a meeting of the 
Council of the United Synagogue*" 
29 
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Board of Deputies, if, indeed, it had ever held the initiativel is 
shown by the work carried out by the Jewish Labour Councile 
The Labour Council was formed in 19j4 at a conference of Jewish 
working class organisations, mainly trade unionsy with the aim of 
fighting both Fascism and anti-Semitism, It was supported by the T. U. C- 
and also the London Trades Coundil, since the work of the Labour 
Council was oentred in the East End of London. 
Meetings were held regularly in the East End of London and a leaflet 
'Mosley and the Jews' was printed and 50,000 copies distributed amongst 
groups of trade unionists, with the co-operation of the T-U-C- In 
January 1937, a mass meeting was organised by the Council on 'Trade 
Unionism and anti-Semitism'. However one of the earliest major events 
organised by the Labour CouAcil, occurred on July 26 1936, when a 
meeting was convened in the East End of London. 
A total of 179 delegates took part in the meeting, representing 
86 organisations, grouped into Workers Circle branches, Trade Unionsp 
political prganisationj Priendly Societiesp Benefit Societiesy 
Sýmagogues, Zionist bodies, youth organisations and ex-Servicemen's 
organisationso It was at this meetingp held only a week after the 
Board of Deputies had finally produced a plan of action, that the 
divergence--of views relating to the B. U. F. between the Board and the 
Labour Council were made public. The chairman of the meeting refdrred 
to the recent action of the Board. He went on to warn the 'Jewish 
masses as represented by the delegates' that: 
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There may be some delegates amongst you who 
might say that now that the Board of Deputies 
have taken the matter in hand there is no need 
for further conferences and action against Fascism 
and anti-Semitism by other bodies, but we say in reply, 
firstly, that the Board of Deputies, constituted 
as it still is, on an absolute and often farcical 
basis of representation, does not represent the 
widest elements of the Jewish people in this 
country, Secondly, the mass of the Jewish people 
are not at all yet convinced that a complete and 
sincere change of heart and mind has taken place 
in the leadership of the Board. There must, 
therefore, be in existence a strong and virile 
popular Jewish body to act as a driving force in 
our fight againsjr the dangers confronting us. We 
shall welcome and co-operate in all efforts 
undertaken by the Board in that direotion. 
30 
The actual policy of the Labour Cow:,, cil may best be summed up by 
referring to a resulution passed at the above meeting. 
This conference demands that collective action 
be taken by the Jews in this country on the basis 
of the following: 
1) Co-operation with all forces in this country 
combating Fascism, 
2) Legal action against anti-Jewish libels 
(Protocols of Zion etc*). 
3) This conference consi. &ers it necessary to constitute 
an all-in body from the organisations represented here 
today and any further organisations wishing to 
participate in the campaign, together with the Jewish 
Labour Council, This body should appoint: 
rý 
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a) Organisation sub-corrimittee. 
b) Propaganda sub-committee. 
6) Finance sub-committee. 
d) Press sub-committee. 
01ass meetings of protest against Blackshirt 
propaganda and violence. 
5) Intensification of boycott* 
6) In view of the recent decision of the Board of 
Deputies to organise a special campaign against 
the anti-Semitic propaganda in this countryp the 
Conference cohsiders it necessary to ensure 
co-ordination and co-operation of the two bodies 
in this direction. 
7) kppeal to Parliament for the prohibition of 
a) wearing uniforms, the carrying of weaponsp 
military and quasi-military formaticns by political 
organisations and the establishment by them of 
barracks for special detachments. 
b) any organisation using racial and religious 
discrimination and incitement. 
8) Setting up of local and district committeesýto 
ensure financial support for the campaign* 
31 
The policy pursued by the Jewish Labour Council was very similar to 
that of the Jewish People's Council, which was formed in August 1936 
and initially represented twenty six Friendly Society lodges; six 
trade union branches, four synagogues, fourteen youth organisations 
and fifteen groups of the Workers Circle movement. Clearly this 
represented a greater cross section of the Jewish community than 
the Board of Deputies. The work of the two councils largely overlapped 
and the various organisations which were represented by the delegates 
to the two bodies were largely the same. Friendly Societies and trade 
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unions, as well as youth org-anisations were well represented and 
the chief formal link between the Labour Council and the People's 
Council appears to have been the London Trades Council. It is not 
surprising that the Board of Deputies reacted in a similar way to 
both groups. However, it is the dispute between the Board of Deputies 
and the Jewish Pepple's Council Against Fascism and Anti-Semitism 
(to provide it with its full title) that illuminates most clearly 
the conflict within the Jewish community. 
The aims of the Jewish People's Council were - 
The provision of material and speakers to non- 
Jewish organisations, explaining how and why 
Fascism was Jew-baiting, and the provision of 
speakers with the necessary material relating 
to a) the social composition of Jews in Britain 
(percdntage of Jews in trade and commercep studentst 
workers, unemployed etc. ); b) Fascist violence* 
a) Police court proceedings, and d) answers to 
statements having a specifically Jewish 
character made by Fascists. 
32 
In a statement of policy the Council declared thatq 
Anti-Semitism in Britain cannot be saparated 
from its political necessity to the Fascist 
movement. Anti-Semitism is being made both a 
rallying cry and a smoke screen, thus hiding 
from the British people the true purpose of 
Fascism. The struggle against anti-Semitism 
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is therefore as much a task for the British 
people as a whole as for the Jews, and the 
struggle against Fascism and for the defence 
of democratic rights is as much a,, task for the 
Jews as for the British people as a whole* 
Convinced then that it is impossible to fight 
anti-Semitism by concentrating only on the 
defamation of the Jews, and convinced further 
that it must be a stru&le by Jews and non- 
Jews alike against Fascism, the Jewish People's 
Council Against Fascism and Anti-Semitism has 
been formed to give a clear and authoritative 
lead to Jewx7 on the question of anti-Semitism 
and Fascism, and to unite all Jewish anti- 
Fascist bodies. We appeal therefore for support 
from Jew and non-Jew alike without distinction 
of political belief, for the common defence of 
democratic rights and libdrties, and for personal 
freedom. 33 
The Council did not see itself as a rival to the Board of Deputies* 
Instead, said Mr Jack Pearce, the Secretary, in a sppech at 
Shoreditch Town Hall, the hope was that the Council would really 
be a people's council "an organisation which would alvrays be at the 
service of-the Jewish workers. 1134 
When the British Union of Fascists proposed to march through the 
East End of London on October 4 1936, the Council-sprang into action 
very quickly and organised a petition, containing nearly 1O0vOO0 
I signatures, from people living in the East End, This was presented 
35 to the Home Office. 
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On November 15 the Jewish People's Council held a meeting in the Kings 
Hall in the East End, at which 169 representatives of 91 organisations, 
which included synagogaesý Friendly Societies, Trade Unions, Zionist 
societiesq Workers Circlesp cultural and youth organisations and 
branches of the Jewish People's Council were present. At this 
meeting the secretary of the Council, Mr J. W. Pearce, gave a report 
on it s activities over the two previous months. He referred to the 
petition to the Home Office and also the provision of legal assistance 
and defence for anti-Fascists, as well as the contribution made to 
the agitation against political uniforms. He spoke of the large 
public meetings of protest which had been held and also referred to 
the distribution of hundreds of thoudands of leaflets. 
36 
Clearly the campaign waged by the Jewish People's Council was on a 
large scale and involved many Jewish organisations* It was felt 
that an approach to the Board of Deputies, to encourage co-operation 
in the Jewish community, would enhance the work of the Council* 
However, the offer was turned down by the Board of Deputies. 
From the very beginning the People's Council was met with nothing but 
hostility from the Board of Deputies. For examplev the Council was 
specifically excluded from discussions concerning the establishment 
of a local defence committee in the East End of London. 
37 At the 
beginning of November 1936, the Council issued a press statement in 
which it was stated that - 
A body such as the Jewish People's Councily 
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speaking on behalf of Jewry, is essentially 
non-political. But when such a party as the 
B. U. F. attacks Jews without the slightest 
discrimination, then it becomes the duty of Jews 
as a whole to counter attack such a political 
organisation@9638 
This was clearly an appeal to the Board of Deputies to unite with 
other groups, like the Peop-, els Council, to defeat Fasoisme In reply 
the Board sent out a letter to the press stating ', i -. the "Board's 
unique position as the representative body of British Jewry.,, 
39 An 
appeal for solidarity with the Board was circulat4rA' at the end of 
November, in reply to which almost every congregation emphasised their 
loyalty. A week later the whole problem of the relationship between the 
two sides was neatly stated by the President of the Board when he 
said that 
The Jewish Peoples Council was dangerous because 
it was opposed to Fascism and not anti-Semitism 
per se had allied itself to Communist and left 
wing organisations and Vas acting as though the 
Anglo-Jewish community were an imperium in imperio. 
Its oonducto especially with regard to the Public 
Order Act, could not improve the Boarh position 
vis-a, vis the Home Office. 
40 
In the same month the Board of Deputies went to the extent of 
bringing pressure to bear on the B. B. C. and The Times newspaper for 
reporting a meeting of the Jewish PeoplePs Councilt which had 
occurred, On November 15.41 
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The Jewish People's Council was not to let the matter rest there. At 
a'meeting early in November in the East End of London, at which 
representatives of the People's Council, the Independent Labour Party, 
the National Council of Civil Libertiesp the Labour Party, the 
Communist Party and other bodies were present, the chairmanp who 
was General President of the Workers Circle Friendly Society, said 
"The Jewish Board of Deputies were prepared to fight anti-Semitism, 
but they refused to recognise that anti-Semitism would only be fought 
effectively by fightir43 Fascism* 1042 
At the meeting of November 15, in Kings Hall, which has already 
been referred to, the following emergency resolution was moved and 
carried with only five voteS against* 
This resolution views with concern the attitude 
adopted by the Board of Deputies on the question 
of Fascism, and resents the attacks on the Jewish 
People's Council Against Fascism and Anti-Semitismv 
which can only have the effect of splitting the 
ranks of Jewry and placing it in jeopardy, 
It strajgýy urged the Board to concentrate on fighting Fascism and 
declared that "the co-ordination of all forces within -Tewry is the 
43 
paramount need of the moment., 
Pearcep'the Secretary of the Council, analysed the problem of the 
relationship with the Board of Deputies in a letter to the Jewish 
Chronicle. A note was made of the lack of representation of important 
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sections of the Jewish population on the Board, and the fact that 
the Board had spoken out against the various groups which were 
organised t6 resist the anti-Semitic attacks of the B. U. P. After 
accounting for the work of the Council, ' Pearce7spoke of "the repeated 
efforts to co-operate with the Deputies in the campaign against 
Fascism and anti-Semitism (which) have been rejected... "44 
In the same monthp November, three Jewish societies in Cambridgep 
the Schechter; the Zionist; and the AngloTewish, oonvened-7a meeting 
at which the following resolution was passed$ 
That this meeting views with alarm the attitude 
of the Board of Deputies to such organisations 
as the Jewish People's Council Against Fascism; 
and believing that 1) that the distinction between 
Fascism and anti-Semitism is artificial and 
dangerous and 2) that anti-Semitism, having become 
a political issue, cannot adequately be met by 
a policy of non-political isolation, it therefore 
behoves all Jews to co-operate whole-heartedly 
with every organisation effectively engaged in the 
defOnce of all democratic rights against Fascism*45 
The attitude of the Board of Deputies towards the People's Council 
almost reached the level of paranoia, It was felt that the Council 
was a body dominated by Communists, that it was a 'Communist Front' 
which used the problem of anti-Semitism in the East End for its own 
political ends. 
46 That there were members of the People's Council 
who were Communists is beyond doubt, That there were some affiliated 
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bodiesq e. g. trade unions, which represented the thinking of the 
Communist Party is also beyond doubt. However the fact that some 
members of the organisation were Communists does not necessarily 
mean that its whole concept was inspired by the ideology of the 
Communist Party. We have already seen that when the Council was 
formed in August 1936, there were more Friendly Societies amongst the 
affiliated bodies than any other typu of organisation, and the Council 
as a whole was more representative of the Jewish community than the 
Board of Deputies had ever been, 
A further indication of the diverse political nature of the Peoplets 
Council and the strength of its support is to be found in a letter 
sent to the Board of Deputies by VIr Bernaly representing the Friendly 
Societies of the London Area Council of the Board of Deputies, The 
letter was a reply to conditions laid down by the Board of Deputies 
concerning the conduct of the open air speaking campaign organised 
by the Friendly Societies. 
My executive also requests me to inform you 
that it is their considered opinion that if 
there is a definite cleavage between the Board 
and the Friendly; 'Societies movement in relation 
to the Defence Campaigal it will result in a 
number of lodges and Societies identifying 
themselves with the Jewish Peoplels Council. 
. You will recall that certain Lodges and 
M*Zbers withdrew from the People's Council out 
of loyalty to the Association in its active 
participation in the campaign. When the question 
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of loyalty to the Association no longer obtains 
we feel we shall be unable to restrain them 
from giving the Jewish People's Council 
unqualified support*0047 
Meanwhile, the work of the Jewish People's Council continued. A 
delegation visited the Parliamentary Labour Party in December 1936 
to discuss the Public Order Bill. Local committees continued to be 
formed, and a large meeting was organised for the beginning of 
Janua3: 7 1937 on 'Trade Unionism and Anti-Semitism'. The Council 
worked closely with the National Council for Civil Liberties, the 
Labour Party and the Independent Labour Party, as well as trade unions. 
The Council was re-organised in January 1937 and the executive 
committee and all subý; committees were expanded to include an even 
more representative cross-section of Jewish opinion. A special 
campaign was launched in 1937 to coincide with the L. C. C. elections. 
The aim of the campaign was to persuade people to vote against the 
Fascist candidates* Dozens of indoor and outdoor meetings were held 
and special anti-Fascist leaflets distributed. 
The Council decided that the Public Order Act, which came into force 
on January 1 1937, was failing to deal with anti-Semitismv and in 
I-larch 1937 decided to campaign for a bill which would deal 
specifically with racial incitement. In September 1937y the Council 
made representations to the Commissioner of Police to try to bring 
about a ban on the proposed Fascist march through the East End on 
October 3* 
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The informal relationship with the National Council of Civil Liberties 
became more explicit in April 19379 when the two organisations 
convened the All London Delegate Conference on Fascism and Anti- 
Semitism, at which the nucleus of a British Committee of the World 
Congress against Racialism and Anti-Semitism was formed. The close 
links between the Council and trade unions developed and members of 
the Council continued to address trade union meetings. 
A notable point was reached in March 19. ý8, 'when the Jewish People's 
Council met a representative of the London Area Council of the 
Board of Deputies, in a debate. The t6pic was one that touched upon 
the basic reasons for the differences of opinion that existed 
between various sections of the Jewish community - should the Jews 
unite as a body to combat Fascism and Anti-Semitismv or should they 
conduct a campaign against defamation by anti-Semites alone? At least 
the two sides were now meeting, and the Board of Deputies felt able 
to discuss the problems which had led to the dispute over tactics, 
This lowering of the temperature between the two sides was the result 
of two developments. The first point concerns the increasdd prestige 
of the Council. By 1938 the support of the Council was such that the 
Board of Deputies could no longer continue pretending that it was 
of n6 significance. In spite of the pressures put on the B. B. C. and 
The Times to remove references to the Council from broadcasts and 
reports, and in spite of the appeals for 
loyalty to the Jewish 
Community, the Council continued to thrive. The support On which it 
thrived came increasingly from the more respected sections of the 
Jewish communityp the Friendly Societies and 
the synagogues. Prominent 
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people were increasingly lending their names to the organisation. 
The Dean of St Pauls was one of the speakers at the All London 
Delegate Conference in April 1937. The work of the Council had 
proved successful and had brought a great deal of publicity to the 
problems posed by the B. U. F. 
The second development concerned the Board of Deputies itself. 
Faced with the success and the wide support of the People's Council, 
it had'been difficult for the Board to continue its policy of 
aloofAess. The Board could no longer claim that the methods employed 
by the Council and other such bodies were detrimental to the cause 
of Anglo-Jewry. After all, two years hal. 'passed since the dispute 
between the two sections of the community, only one of which was 
represented on the Board, had broken out into the open. Alsop the Board 
had always been anxious to present a 'Jewish United Front'. Differences 
between sections of the community had always been played down by 
the Board and concealed from public viewp yet the Board was 
increasingly being seen as the main cause of the division between 
itself and the Council. As a result of these factorst together with 
the'increasingly alarming situation developing in Nazi Germanyq the 
Board was beginning to shift its position, from that of a 'non-political' 
body only concerned -with anti-Semitismp to a position alongside 
other campaigning bodies which condidered themselves to be 'defenders 
of democracyt, that is, a movement from the third category to the 
second category of groups mentioned earlier. It was thus that much easier 
for the Board to make contact with groups in the first categor7l the 
tpoliticall groups, such as the Jewish People's Councilq fighting 
I 
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not just anti-Semitism, but Fascism as well. 
Following the debate which brought the two sides together for the 
first time, the secretary of the People's Council wrote to the 
Board of Deputies suggesting a meeting of the two organisations to 
discuss a common policy in the work against Fascism and anti-Semitism. 
The London Area Council proposed, in reply, to appoint three 
representatives of its own, together with the secretaries of the 
Co-ordinating Committee and the London Area Council, to meet three 
representatives of the People's Council in what it emphasised was to 
be an informal conference. The Co-ordinating Committee approved the 
meeting, which was heavily weighted in favour of the Board, but at 
the same time it did not offer its wholehearted co-operation to a body 
which it still described as primarily a 'political organisation'. 
49 
In the secretary! s report of May 19.58 it was wondered tif any useful 
purpose (could) be served by continuing these discussions'. 
At a- conference between the two bodies in April 1938, the following 
understanding was reachedt 1) It was accepted that the Jewish People's 
Council was in no way affiliated to any political body. 2) That one 
organisation was desirable. 3) That the object of this organisation 
should be to combat anti-Semitism according to British traditions 
and - ideals. 4) That the title of such an organisation should clearly 
set out these objectives- 5) That the oreanisation should function 
under the Board of Deputies. 
The Board of Deputies was under pressure from various Jewish 
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groups to meet the People's Council. This pressure was summed up in 
a resolution to the Co-ordinating Committee from Cardiff. 
We, the Cardiff branch of the Workers Circle Friendly 
Society, at our General Meeting hold at the Central 
Hotel, Cardiff, on April 3 1938, decided to support 
the proposal of a comon United Front of Jewry 
against Fascism and anti-Semitism and we strongly 
urge you to meet with the Jewish Peoples Council 
to plan an extensive campaign. In view of recent 
tragic events in Austria which has brought home to 
us bitterly the spread of anti-Jewish persecution 
by Fascism, we are therefore convinced that the 
time is long past when Jewry could afford to be divided. 
We believe that the bemt interests of the Jewish 
People will be served and achieved if a United 
Jewish body will strengthen the struggle of our people 
against those who seek to defame and destroy them 
?0 
However the Board was detwrmined to meet the Peoples Council only 
on its own terms, and these amounted to the complete Aomination of 
the Board over the Peoples Council. This is in fact what happenedy 
The Peoples Council was to be liquidated, 
51 
The Peoples Council expressed anxiety during the negotiations since 
there was no guarantee that its point of view would be put forwardp 
and instead proposed an interim period of six months in which they 
would work in conjuntion. with the Area Council*52 In, fact the two 
bodies had worked together, interchanging speakersv for some time., 
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The Board of Deputies seemed to have a tough fight on its hands. 
In January 1939 it was reported to the Jewish Defence Committee 
(the new nazae for tim Co-ordinating Committee"' The change had 
occurred in November 1938. ) that 
Since the commencement of these negotiations 
as a result of the impression created in the 
public mind, the Jewish Peoples Council had 
recieved sustained financial support and he 
(Mr Horowitz, reporting to the committee) 
considered that while these funds lasted the 
'53 negotiations would not mature* 
Of course, what was meant by this observation was that negotiations 
favourable to the Board of Deputies would not mature. While the 
Peoples Council had money, they had the strength to resist the 
domination of tl-e Board. All the Board had to do, though, was to 
wait until the money ran out and then it could continue 
negotiations on its own terms, 
While negoatiations were in abeyance, the Board restated. ýits PolicY 
towards the Peoples Council, but in d6ing so it produced a major 
modification in its stand against anti-Semitism. The final shift to 
a ýfight f6r democracy' had occurred. 
The general line of the policy which has been 
followed is that anti-Semitism is to be attacked 
in whatever shape or form and from whatever source 
it comes, quite apart from any ojýher ideology with 
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which it may be tied up ... pressure of events has 
made certain modifications necessaryp (mainly) in 
the assertion of the proposition that the 
resistance to and fight against anti-Semitism is 
identified and co-extensive with the fight for 
democracy. 54 
Onelis here reminded of a term used by Harold Laski to define the 
socialist attitude towards Liberalism in the nineteenth century. 
It was, he thought, "one more particular of history masquerading 
as a universal. tj 
55 
Perhaps the same could be said of the leadership of Anglo-Jewry. 
Ahd perhaps this could be said also, that as its appeal to the 
particular became more apparent, so, then, did its masquexade as 
a-univerBal become more strident. The Board of Deputies was 
increasingly seen as representing its own interests9 those of a 
particular class in society. As this feature became more apparentp 
in the final year of peace in Europe, so its appeal widened in an 
attempt to save face and restore its prestige. Perhaps even 
. 
'democracy' had to be saved. 
The-campaign to resist the provocative anti-Semitism of the B. U. F. 
had been organised by the people of the East End of Londony and in a 
like manner, by the people of Cheetham Hill in Manchesterv as we 
shall. see. Of the two organisations described abovep only the 
Board of Deputies existed at the end of 1939, to see the beginning 
of war against Fascism and to witness the slaughter of six million 
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Jews in Europe* 
****** 
The position of the Board of Deputies was mirrored by the Communal 
Council of Manchester and Salford Jews, the equivalent body for the 
area, and, as in the East End of London, it was not the local 
Jewish leadership but the community that had to organise the defence 
against anti-Semitiamp often in the face of the very body of people, 
the community leaders, who should have been in the vanguard of such 
action. 
There was quite a strong link between the Board of Deputies in 
London and the leadership of the Jewish community in Manchester. 
Neville Laski, the President of the Board of Deputiesp came from 
Manchesterv where the local Laski family was prominent in local 
Jewish affairs, and he was able to exert some influence in the city* 
For example, the warnings Laski gave to the Jewsy to stay away from 
B. U. F. meetings, which were said in his capacity as President of 
the Board of Deputies, were repeated by him for local consumption 
in Manchester. 
In March 1935, Nathan Laski, this time in his capacity as Hon. 
President of the Zionist Central Councilq provided the opening speech 
at a conference of Zionist Workers in Manchester and Salfordo He 
, wanted young people 
to take note of what was happeniag in England, 
he said, but did not wish for a moment that they should participate 
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in Mosley's meetings. Mosley should, instead, be confronted by 
arguments. 
56 It was at this meeting that Laski threw down a challenge 
to Mosley to name the 'International Jewst who were measuring 
everything against the good interests of the country, A month 
later Nathan Laski issued a statement in reply to Mosley's attacks 
on, Jews in Manchester and other parts of the North of England. 
Speaking as a 'leader of Jewry in Manchester' he appealed to Jews 
to Areat Mosley "With the disregard he deserves" the next time he 
57 
a, _op%red 
in Manchester. 
The same warning came from Nathan Laski in May 1936, when he again 
spoke on behalf of Jewish leaders in Manchester: 
We, the Council of Manchester and Sýlford Jews, 
deprecate strongly any Jewish young men going 
to Blackshirt meetings and creating a disturbance. 
We admit that, so long as the Jewish community 
is not attacked by the Pasoistsp they have a right 
to express their opinions, as has every. body, ýs 
people, and so long as they keep within that 
boundary the Jewish people have nothing to 
complain of. 
58 
There were at the same time howeverg signs of differences of opinion 
amongst Jewry in Manchester. Frank Allaun, later to become a Labour 
Party M. P. for the city, wrote to the Jewish Chronicle concerning 
what he felt to be an opinion increasingly held among Jews. 
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That is to the effect that we should rally 
ourselves with the other opponents of Mosley 
who will also suffer if this rapidly growing 
menace develops further. We can co-operate with 
these on the issue of civil liberties. 
59 
This, of courseq was anathema to the leadership of the Jewish 
community, in Manchester, since by 'other opponents' Allaun was 
clearly. referring to the United Front and the I. L. P. and the C. P. G. B. 
as well as the National Council of Civil Liberties, 
In fact the position of the leadership of the Jewish community in 
Manchester had reflected that taken by the Board of Deputies right 
from the beginning, when the B. U. P. began to make its presence felt 
in the city. In 1933, at a Communal Council meeting of Manchester 
and Salford Jews, the body which assumed the leadership of the 
Jewish community in Manchester, Laski accused individual Jews who 
rushed into print of showing Jewry in a bad light and breeding anti- 
Semitism. The chairman of the meeting said it was time for the Council 
to-prevent anyone writing on a 'Communal matter' (i. e. anti-Semitism 
in the community or proposals for dealing with such manifestations) 
without consulting the Council, whichj, he claimedq was the ofily 
representative body of Manchester and Salford Jews. The meeting 
60 
decided to form a Press Committee to check on statements to the Preisse 
The Council became so defensive over the issue of anti-Semitism that 
in May 1934, when a member proposed the formation of a sub-committee 
"to ascertain the extent of anti-Semitism in this area and to 
formulate means to combat it'19 the chairmanp Mr Herbert Nathang asked 
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the proposer- not to press the matter, which was then withdrawn. 
61 
When the Communal Council received a deputation from the executive 
committee of the British Union of Democratsq which requested joint 
action, with the Communal Council to organise a meeting to coincide 
with a visit of Mosley to the city, the Council declined to 
participate. Instead it was agreed to -send an official short hand 
writer -to attend Mosley's meeting and report back to the Council. 
No, further action was taken. 
62 
In spite of the physical attacks and intimidations of Jews in the 
city, Nathan Laski asked Jewish people not to be alarmed at the 
activities of the Pascistop "The Fascist question was not a Jewish 
question" he said, and he asked people to place their faith in the 
hands of the police "who would use their best endeavour to see there 
was no breach of the Peoce. " 
63 
In Manchester the fight against anti-Semitism and Fascism was very 
much in the hands of ordinary Jews and members of political parties 
and trade unionists, who felt they had little in common with the 
Communal Council. As early as October 1933 trade union delegates 
from the North of England met in Manchester to discuss problems of 
Fascism. Their main concern was the position of trade, unionists in 
Austria, but they went on to discuss the best ways of combating the 
growth of Fascism in this country. 
64 
However it was another eight 
months before trade unionists considered taking action against the 
Fascists in Manchester. The Manchester and Salford Trades Councilwas 
approached in June 1934 by the Manchester Federation of the I. L. P. 
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and the Manchester C. P. with the suggestion that there should be 
a joint conference to determine future action. 
65 
Discussibns 
between the Manchester Boroug# Labour Partyv Manchester and Salford 
TradesCouncil and the Communist Party then took place, with the 
immediate aim of forming a joint counter demonstration to the 
66 
proposed B. U. F. rally at Belle Vue on September 29th. However, 
the Trades Council and the Labour Party were advised by the National 
Joint Labour Council that meetings with the Communist Party ought 
not to proceed and so thE discussions came to an abrupt halt. The 
Communists and the I. L. P. however, went aheadwith their own plans 
67 for a demonstration. 
The Trades Council continued to adhere to the advice of the 
National Joint Labour Council, and, when a motion calling for a trade 
union aziti-Fascist demonstration at the B. U. P. rally was put to the 
quarterly meeting of the Lancashire and Cheshire Federation of Trades 
Councils, it was opposed by A. Purcellp Secretary of the Manchester 
68 
and Salford Trades Council, who secured the defeat of the motion* 
Inýspite of these setbacks there was by now a measure of disagreement 
am . ongst the trades council delegates against the leadership on this 
issue. There was a stormy meeting in September 1934 at which many 
delegates spoke in favour of taking part in an anti-Fascist 
demonstration. A motion which called for such a demonstration was 
narrowly defeated. The leadership conceded howeverv that an indoor 
anti-Fascist rally of Labour and trade union members could take place, 
69 
well away from any Fascist meeting. The rallyt organized by the 
Joint'Council of Manchester Bourough Labour Party and Manchester 
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and Salford Trades Council, was held on October 21st. Both 
organisations marched under the banner 'United Against Fascism'. 
70 
By this time the Communist Party and the I. ý#. P. in the city had 
formed a Manchester Anti-Fascist Campaign Committee, which was to 
hold a meeting three days before the B. U. P. rally in order to plan 
the details of a counter demonstration. 
71 When the meeting was held 
the following motion was passed& 
This meeting of representatives of Manchester 
working class organisations emphatically protests 
against the attempts of the police to prohibit 
the march of contingents of Manchester workers 
-to Ardwick Green on Saturday next. We absolutely 
deny the right of he polide-to pr6hibit the 
citizens of Manchester from peacefully marching 
in procession through the streets. We must assert 
this long established right of the British workers, 
which in no circumstances can be allowed to lapse*72 
We have already seen that anti-Fascists defied the police ban and 
73, t was not, only the Communist rallied together on September 29th, 
Party that attended the rally. Representatives of the Manchester 
Anti-War Council were present, as were those of the Youth Movement 
against War and Fascism. 
* 
One interesting sideline to the main anti-Fascist groups in the 
city was an organisation known as the 'Antidote to Fascism' which 
was formed in June 1934 by Dr Percy McDougallp a Manchester doctor, 
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The B. U. F. rally in September 1934 appeardd to have jolted the 
Manchester and 6ýlford Ttades Council into action. Immediately 
after the rally the Trades Council applied for permission to hold 
75 
an anti-Fascist demonstration at Platt Fields on October 21st, 
By the spring of 1935 the leadership of the Trades Council had 
agreed to take part in discussions leading to the formation of a 
united anti-Fascist committee. A Manchester conferenceg attended by 
representatives from political, religious and other organisations, 
formed a provisional committee. During the meeting, fears were 
expressed of a further ban by the National Joint Labout Council, 
but'it was stated that the desire was to create a wide anti-Fascist 
body which would be really representative of the mass of the people. 
76 
who had previously stood as an Independent candidate for the Rusholme 
ward'in the city. McDougal claimed that 700 people had enrolled 
from all'parts of the country. By all accounts the organisation 
zeemed to fit into the second category of anti-Fascist groupsq those 
whose motivating force was a defence of 'democracy'. lqdy aim", said 
McDougal, "is to form a body of people who are prepared to face Fascism 
and act, if it should be necessary, as a second line of police od 
special constables. I do not want anybody to fight or to interfere 
with the meetings. " His literature stated that there is "no uniform 
except British nerve and musole.,, 
74 Nothing more was heard of the 
'Antidote to Fascism' and the main anti-Fascist campaign continued to 
be carried out by the Labour movement in the citY. 
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The Labour Party did not object to the formation of a joint anti- 
Fascist committee and three months later a joint conference against 
war and Fasoism was held in Caxton Ha1lq Salfordq' attended by 
delegates of the Labour Party, trade unions and other organisations 
in, Lancashire. 77 
Since -it was the Jewish a'ea of Cheetham Hill in North Manchester 
that, lbore - -,:. the brunt of Fascist activity, the trade union and 
Labour Party groups decided to organise their own anti-Fascist group 
in the area. This group became known as the North Manchester 
Co-ordinating Group Against Fascism, whose aim was to unite trade 
- union, Labour, Liberal and Jewish organisations in opposition to 
the activities of the B. U. F, It was apparentp however, that members 
of the dommunist Party were connected with the Co-ordinating Committee 
and took an active part in its work. 
78 One of the first meetings 
organised by the Committee was held in Cheetham Town Hall on March 8th 
19361. where the crowded meeting backed a demand for an official 
enquiry into the reasons for allowing the B. U*F. to hold a meeting 
in. the same hallýý-A resolution was passed which demanded that all 
future Fascist applications for meetings in Municipal halls should be 
placed before the full city council and not be decided by the Town 
Hall Committee alone. 
79 
As well as anti-Fascist groups being organised within Manchesterp 
there was also a move to establish an anti-PasOist movement covering 
a wider area of the North West. in May 1936 delegates of'Labour parties, 
trade councils, co-operative societies and branches of the League of 
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Nations Union, from various parts of Lancashireq attended a 
conference called by the Exchange Division Labour Party in Manchester. 
8o 
The conference decided to form a Northern Council Against Fascism, 
whd)se main purpose would be to co-ordinate the many different groups. 
A provisional committee was elected and the North Manchester 
Co-ordinating Committee became an area committee of the Northern 
Council. The links between the two bodies were solidified by the 
election of Mr Carl Ross, secretary of the North Manchester Co-ordinating 
Committee as treasurer of the Northern Council. 
81 
The North Manchester Co-ordinating Committee held a meeting at 
Cheetham Public ITA11 shortly after the formation of the Northern 
Councilq at which it was again pointed out that the Fascists had 
been allowed to use the same hall for another of their meetings. A 
resolution was passed protesting at the Corporations' action in 
once more letting the hall,, in spite of the Committee's previous 
representation to the city authorities and 'knowing full well that 
the meeting mudt result in a provocation of the residents of the 
-, 82 area. " The meeting also decided to supplement the protest by 
organising a petition for the residents of the area to signs A month 
later the signatures of 31500 local residents were attached to the 
following petition sent to the Lord Mayor of Manchester: 
That in view of the fact that the Fascists have 
again been given permission to hold a meeting 
in the Cheetham area in spite of a tremendous 
protest aroused by their last visit, we, the 
gnneral public of the North Manchester area, 
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strongly protest to the city authorities against 
their action in again letting a public building 
to the said organisation, knowing full well that 
the meeting must result in the provocation of the 
residents of that area, and therefore we request 
that permission for the meeting be withdrawn, 
83 
The deputation which took the petition to the Lord Mayor consisted 
of the chairman and treasurer of the Northern Council; the secretary 
of the North Manchester Committee and delegates from the Taylors 
and Garments Workers Union; the Manchester No2 branch of the A. U. U.; 
84 
the Workers Circle, and the Waterproof and Garment Workers Union. 
The petition was to no avail however, since the Town Hall Co=ittee, 
by a unanimous vote, decided to take no action in regard to the 
protest. 
85 
The Northern Councilp using the precedent of the ban on Fascist 
uniforms in a public park imposed by the Manchester City Council, 
86 
attempted to obtain a similar ban on uniforms worn at a B. U. P. 
meeting at the Free Trade Hall in November, The Northern Council 
sent a petition to such effect to the Lord Mayor, which wam signed 
ty, 
'among 
others, Professor J. L. Stocks, newly elected Vice 
Chancellor of Liverpool University, his wifey and mkv members of 
the city council and Manchester University staff* 
87 
However the 
petition was handed in too late for any action to be taken by the 
City Council. 
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The Northern Councilo in its first report in September 1936, 
detailed the work which had been carried out since its inception in 
May. Lancashire was chosen out of the whole of the North of 
Englandl'the report said, as the venue for most of the meetings and 
demonstrationsv because of the Fascist concentration in the county. 
88 
Two months later the North Manchester Co-ordinating Committee issued 
its, first report. As a constituent part of the Northern Council, 
it had organised meetings both in and outside of Manchester and 
had co-operated with political organisations in Blackpoolp Birkenhead 
and Bury in getting Blackshirt meetings banned. The Committee had 
also started to issue a newsheet called Mosley Exposed. 
89 
Circulars 
protesting against local Fascist meetings were issued regularly and 
local instances of anti-Semitism were publicised and reported to the 
authorities. It was reported that 30 different organisations were 
affiliated to the Committee, of which eight were trade unions and 
nine were Friendly Societies. Through the affiliated bodiesp the 
Committee claimed to represent between 15,000 and 16,000 people. 
go 
In February 1937 the North Manchester Co-ordinating Committee 
organised a meeting in Cheethaxa Town Hall to consider ways and means 
of 'resisting further Fascist provocation. 1-01 An invitation was 
sent'to the Jewish Peoples Council in London to provide a 6peaker 
for the meeting and the Council decided to send their secretaryp 
Mr Pearce. 92 Other speakers at the meeting were Alderman George Tittv 
an ex-Lord Mayor of the city and Mr C Ross of the Cc-ordinatinj; 
Committee. 
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The main purpose of the meeting was to organise all the various 
organisations in North Manchester into one central committee. There 
was a call for local Jewry to definitely associate itself with the 
work of the Northern Council. The meeting had in mindy partiuularly, 
t. the Communal Council, which had consistently refused to associate 
itself with the Committee's work. In one sense the meeting was a 
failurep in that no decision was taken regarding the formation of 
a central committee. However, a resolution was passed calling on 
the local civic authorities to ban the use of public hallofor Fascist 
meetings. 
93 The meeting was significant in that it clearly revealed 
the division between the official leadership of the Jewish community, 
the. Communal Council, and large sections of the community itself, 
who gave their support to the activities of the Committee. Mr Pearce, 
of the Jewish Peoples Council saidt on his return to London, that 
he was particularly gratified to see the number of Jewish organisations 
present at the meeting and the realisation by the delegates of the 
necessity for the Jewish people to undertake their own defence 
against Fascism. 
94 
The divisions between the official Jewish leadership in Manchester 
and the Jewish community at large were aired yet again when the 
North Manchester Co-ordinating Committee organised a meeting in July 
1937 in Cheetham Public Hall, at which Professor H. Levy of-Lond6n 
University gave a talk on 'Should the Jews Fight Fascism'. He called 
those Jews who said "keep quiet - do nothing about Fascism" traitors 
to-their race who were aiding and abetting the destruction of the 
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Jewish population in this country* He said that the only way for 
AnSlo-Jewry was to unite and to accept the hand of any and every 
section of the non-, Tewish population which was ready to fight 
against Fascism and anti-Semitism. 
95 
In September 1937 Yet another appeal to the local Jewish leadership 
was made. This time it was even more direct* An audience of 400 
people in Cheetham Park heard Councillor A. G. Pollitt, representing 
the National League of Young Liberals, and Mr Ben Ainly, representing 
the Communist Party in Manchester, catalogue the most recent examples 
of anti-Semitism in the area. The meeting, held under the auspices 
of the North Manchester Co-ordinating Committee, passed a resolution 
f1calling upon the Council of Manchester and Salford Jews to co-operate 
with the North Manchester Co-ordinating Committee in the work they 
are doing to combat Fascism. , 
96 
The appeal was read out to the monthly meeting of the Council of 
Manchester and Salford Jews, which decided not to take any actiony 
97 
save that of resolving to adhere to the same policy as before. 
The Jewish Council had, however, been acting on its own to combat 
anti-Semitism. In September 1936, two months after the formation 
of the Board of Deputies Co-ordinating Committeep the Communal 
Council decided to form a local committee for Jewish defenoeq9Q A 
meeting was held at Frankenburg House, Cheetham Hill Road, in the 
month and was attended by Jewish Friendly Society representatives 
who were asked for their advice and co-operation in meeting the 
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threats to Jewry. After a long discussion the following motion was 
passed: 
That this representative body will welcome the 
energetic co-operation of all sections of the 
Community with the Council of Manchester and 
Salford Jews in the work of the Co-ordinating 
Committee for Jewish Defence in Manchester and 
district, for defending Jewish honour and 
-99" . combating attacks against it. 
The meeting in Frankenburg House was the prelude to a much larger 
meeting held one month later at the Great Synagogue in Cheetham Hill 
Road, and attended by representatives of Synagoguesp Friendly 
Societiest Zionist bodies and 'Jewish organisations of every kind. 1100 
The opening address was given by Neville Laskiv the Presidenjr of the 
Board of Deputies, who outlined the work of the various committees 
and sub-committees of the Board of Deputies and the steps taken 
to counter anti-Jewish statements and writings by the holding of 
public meetings, the publication of pamphlets and replying to attacks 
in the Press. Laski also spoke of the work carried out by the 
Association of Jewish Friendly Societies. He ended his address with 
an appeal to the Jewish community for discipline and cohesion and 
10i 
urged the support of the Defence Fund. 
Discipline and cohesion within the Jewish comunity on the matter 
of defence were two quite s9perate problems however. While the 
Communal Council attempted to impose its own discipline by adhering 
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strictly to its policy of non interference with Fascists, this did 
lend itself particularly well to a cohesiveness and unity with other 
Jewish groupsp since the Communal Council was becoming increasingly 
isolated from ordinary Jewish opinion in the local community. 
The leaders of Jewry in Mahchester on occassion did in fact refuse 
to take even the very limited steps of the Co-ordinating Committee 
of the Board of Deputies. In the same month that the 'Battle of 
Cable Street' occurred in the East End of London and the B. U. P. 
street corner meetinSs were increasing in Cheetham Hill, the executive 
committee of the Communal Council resolved to suspend all propaganda 
meetings under the auspices of the London Co-ordinating'Committee. 
The reason for this seemingly absurd decision was that the Public 
Order Bill had been introduced into parliament and it was felt thatp 
on the advice of the Chief Constable of Manchester, whom Nathan 
Laski had talked to before the meeting, action of any kind might 
undermine the due process of the bill through parliament, 
Io2, Local 
defence work9 it seemed, would now concentrate on the distribution 
of leaflets. Further work of some description was envisaged, since 
the meeting agreed to request a sum of C100 for defence work from the 
London Co-ordinating Committee, which had agreed to bear such expenses, 
while the expenditure to date of the Communal Council amounted to 
just Z30. Any envisaged defence work would not however imply any 
weakening of the disciplined approach, since the same meeting resolved 
not to co-operate with the Manchester Council Against Fascism. The 
very same week in which this meeting was held an actual pids head 
had been found tied to one of the doors of the High Crumpsall 
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Synagogue in the city. Fascist leaflets were found strewn about the 
paths nearby. The Communal Council decided however, to keep the 
news of the incident out of the press. 
103-- 
In the face of increased Fascist provocation in the Jewish districts 
of Manohester in the Autumn of 1936, and the resulting aotion by 
organised anti-Fascist groups, the Communal Council issued a major 
appeal for a unified and centralised effort in combating anti-Semitism. 
The Council stated that: 
Mere isolation and fractional action will only 
weaken and discredit us; unity and centralised 
leadership, on the other hand, will strengthen 
us and ITring us success. The Council therefore 
calls upon you, ' 661le6tiVely-and individually, 
not only for your loyal support, but also to 
give united adherence to its leadership* 
If you wish to combat and finally defeat 
anti-Semitism, you must unswervingly follow 
the Councils W direction and its direction alone. io4-- 
The message ended with an appeal to Jewish people to inform the 
Communal Council of any experiences of anti-Semitism- 
In November 1936 the Communal Council appointed a Mr David Rowland 
to the post of secretary of the Co-ordinating Committee. Two months 
later he presented a report on the fecent work of the committee. There 
was a reference to the memorandum on anti-Semitism in Manchester and 
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district which had been submitted to the President of the Board of 
Deputiesq and the report also referred to a protest meeting against 
anti-Semitism which bad been held at Blackley Institute in Manchester, 
before the ban on protest meetings. Mr Rowland also reported on the 
arrangements for the further distribution of literature on a house 
to house basis in certain districts of Manchester. 
105 Within a short 
time it was apparent that the work of the Co-ordinating Committee 
was such that it was felt that a salaried organiser should be 
appointed. The question was raised at the monthly executive meeting 
in February 1937, at which it was decided to appoint someone at a 
106 
weekly salary of Z2. , Rowland himself took up the position and 
became secretary and organiser of the Co-ordinating Committee. 
Throughout 1937 the policy of the Communal Council remained consistent* 
Leaflets continued to be distributed, representations were made to 
local authorities concerning anti-Semitic slogans which appeared from 
time to timep and the Committee had set up a Speakers Class for training 
Jewish speakers. The policy o: r. non co-operation with anti-Fasoist groups 
was re-affirmed when a request for co-operation from the North 
Manchester Co-ordinating Committee Against Fascism was flatly turned 
down in September 1937.10T 
At this timey however, one can detect a slight shift of emphasis 
which paralleled that within the Board of Deputies itself. The 
Manchester Co-ordinating Committee began to recruit contacts, Jewish 
and non-Jewish, in the areas of Manchester affected by the B. U. F. Is 
campaign, who agreed to act as 'observers' on behalf of the Committee, 
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The contacts would. report any Fascist meetings or the distribution 
of anti-Semitic literature* Although in the main the contacts were 
made by introductions and recommendations, observers from tpolitical 
bodies' were also used. 
10ý This was the first reference to any 
association with political bodies of any sort. Since only the Labour 
Party, the Independent Labour Party and the Communist Party had 
continuously kept a watchful eye on the development of the B. U. F. in 
the-areaq it is reasonable to assume that the Labour Party, at the 
very leastq was used in this way. 
Added to this was the fact that members of the Manchester Co-ordinating 
Committee now attended Fascist meetings, Whereas attendancep even 
if only to observe meetings, had previously been condemnedo this 
activity was now openly encouraged. Reports of the meetings were sent 
to the Co-ordinating Committee in London. 109 
The long process of moving from a position whereby anti-Semitism 
was removed from any political context to that of recognising that 
somehowv 'democracy' was endangered by the presence of a Fascist 
party and that anti-Semitism was a part of that danger, had begune 
The shift in emphasis can be clearly-discerned if one notes the 
actions of Nathan Laski in March 1936, when he successfully prevented 
Mr Houston, a B. U. F. member noted for his particularly viritlent 
anti-Semitism, from speaking at a Fascist meeting in the middle of 
the Jewish area in Cheetham Hill. The meeting itself went ahead 
as planned and it was of no concern to Nathan Laski or anyone else 
on the Communal Council that it did take placev as long as Houston 
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was replaced by another speaker, which he was, through the help 
of Jewish members of the city council. 
"Q Compare this with the 
successful attempt by the Co-ordinating Committee to prevent a 
Fascist meeting in Withington in July 1938. The meeting, which was 
to be held in a public house, was cancelled by the Wilson Brewery 
Co. after an appeal was made to them by the Committee. 
111 By July 
1938, in the eyes of the Communal Council, anti-Semitism was 
synonymous with Fascism. 
In the annual report of 1938/9 it was acknowledged that the 
secretaz7 -of the Co-ordinating Committee and other helpers had 
attended every Fascist meeting of importance in the city. Defence 
literature had been distributed at the meetings. The Committee 
had by now even gone further than this and had begun to organise 
immediate meetings to counter B. U. F. meetings in Stevnnson Square. 
119. 
where litarature was also distributed. 
Such activity had, as we have seen, already been organised by anti- 
Fascist, 
-groups 
in the city, Their continual overtures to the 
Communal Council had been spurned and their activities condemned. 
Now, on the eve of the Second World War, the Council was beginning 
to recognise, implicitly, the strength of the anti-Fascist case. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
FASCISM IN A PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 
We have dealt in some detail with the history of the B. U. P. in the 
North of England and the opposition it aroused. It is now time to 
consider how the State, in both a central and a local sense, viewed 
Fascism in the 1930's. The StatelP major response to Fascism was, of 
course, the Public Order Act, and it is the legal background to that 
Act, the passing of it by parliament, and its use by the local 
authorities in Manchester to which we now turn. 
The Public Order Act came into force on January ist 1937- Most 
parliamentarians were in no doubt that it was designed specifically 
to deal with the British Union of Fascists and the problems created 
by their wearing of uniforms and the meetings they held. 
1 
Pressure on the goverment to deal with the problem of publio order 
had in fact started to build up as early as 1934. In January of that 
year the Home Secretary was asked to take steps to ban the wearing 
of unifoms by political bodies. 
2 He was questioned on various other 
occasions as to what action he proposed to take and the full cabinet 
considered the problem of public order arising out of the activities of 
3 the B. U. P. at the Olympia meeting in June. 
1934 
. The previous month 
the Home Office had instructed the Special Branch to provide a 
detailed weekly report on the activities of several movements which 
made use of uniforms. Of all these 'shirt' movementsp special 
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attention was paid to the B. U. F. 
ý In June of 19349 after the 
riot at the Olympia meeting the Home Secretary was asked if the 
government was prepare& to take steps to maintain free speechq and 
also if he was prepared to extend the Firearms Act to cover the 
carrying of lethal weapons such as knuckledusters, loaded sticks 
and mounted razor bladesf, 
5 
It was not just M. P. Is who were bringing pressure to bear on the 
government. As the preservation of public order became a more urgent 
matter, the government was forced to react in response to specific 
events. For example, it was in response to the events at Olympia 
that the Home Secretary suggested, in a statement to the House of 
Commons, that new legislation might be necessary for the purpose 
of preserving public order. 
6 
Whether the reaction took the form of 
statements to the House of Commons or meetings with Opposition party 
leaders, the government was finding itself pressurised into doing 
7 
something, even if it was not really sure what could be done* 
Another source of pressure on the government was that produced by 
organisations and groups outside parliament. Many anti-Fascist 
groups were formed all over*the country, though, while the lobbying 
of M. P. 's formed part of their campaign, andt indeedy some M*P-IS 
were members of those groups, they did not, because of their left 
wing nature, have the legitimacy or respectability of the towns 
and cities which sent deputations to London to petition the Home 
Secretary. 
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The governmentg howeverg was very reluctant to take any sort of 
initiative in dealing with the growing number of incidents of 
violence and intimidation at B. U. F. meetings, whether caused by the 
B. U. F. or their opponents, or to legislate against the wearing of 
political uniforms. 
It can be shown that, through an analysis of existing case law and 
statute law, the authorities had no need of the Public Order Act. 
It can also be demonstrated that many people realised that existing 
legislation was adequate and that Manchester in particular showed 
the rest of the country that before the passing of the Act, the 
activities of the British Union of Fascists -could be contained by 
the use of that existing legislation, together with a certain 
amount of local initiative. If this was the case, one must answer 
the question, why was the Public Order Act passed? To answer that 
question an attempt will be made to demonstrate that the passing of 
the Act does in fact tell us something about the nature of parliamentary 
democracy and its use of, and recourse to, law; that the strengthening 
of the executive arm of government in such a way was not merely a 
by-product of the passing of the Act, but rather of central importance 
in any analysis of British parliamentary democracy in the inter-war 
years, 
Statute law laid down in the nineteenth century, firstly as a result 
of civil unrest caused by rapid industtial and social changep and 
secondly as a result of the growing importance of various towns and 
cities outside London, provide a starting point for this discussion. 
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It was a result of fears of unrest that in 1819 parliament passed 
the Unlawful Drilling Act. 9 This act prohibited unauthorised 
meetings for the-purpose of military training or exercise. The 
punishment for assisting such activities was transportation for up 
to seven years or imprisonment for two years. People attending such 
meetings only had to face the latter punishment. Justices of the 
Peace, or constables, could disperse meetings covered by this act, 
In, the case of Redford y Birley and Others, 
10 
which amounted to an 
appeal against conviction under the Illegal Drilling Act by people 
present at the infamous tPeterloot meeting in Manchester in 1819, 
it was decided that Imilita: r7 training and exercise' could include 
the formation of ranks. In the summing up of that case it was stated 
concerning the meeting at St. Peterýs Field that 
When we consider that these country people came 
marching in this way, through the town of 
Manchester, bearing flags and banners inscribed 
with mottcr; z. not merely containing high sounding 
words ... but inscriptions of 'No Corn Laws'; 'Better 
die like freemen than be sold like slaves' and 
other various expressions of defiancey it is 
manifest, that there was an avowed intention to 
insult those who were intrusted with the administ- 
ration of justice and the laws, 
11 
In 1934, it was quite evident that Mosley was organising the British 
Union of Fascists along military lines. Training and Drillingp reveille 
and inspectiont were regular features of life at Black House, the 
B. U. F. headquarters in Chelsea. The 'National Defence Force' and the 
3al 
formation of a Fascist 'motor corps' and 'air force' (however 
incapable they were of being used in any real military sense) aroused 
the suspicions of many people. Anti-Fascist -groups found it very 
easy to attack the B. U. P. military organisation. 
It was in response to a question in the House of Commons regarding 
the ownership of armoured cars by the B. U. P. that the Home Secretary, 
Sir John Gilmour, pointed out the existence of the Unlawful Drilling 
Act of 1819. He ended his reply by saying "I have no reason to suppose 
that appropriate action would not be taken under that Act should 
12 
occasion arise. " 
Yetýin June 1934, five months after Gilmour's statementg Mr Adams, M. P. 
speaking in a Commons Supply Debate on the B. U. P. said 
0 .1 say deliberately that a prosecution could 
certainly be sustained against him (Mosley), and 
against the Press which nourishes him in his 
various activities. I think it is pertinent to 
ask whether,. if the Communists behaved in precisely 
the same way, they would have precisely the same 
measure of toleration. I think that that is a 
fair question. What would have happened supposing 
that the Communists had got special carsp which 
have been described, I believe, as armoured cars? 
What would have happened if Communists had drilled 
in the same manner? What has become of the Illegal 
Drilling Act? I do not think that the conscience 
of this country is going to allow Sir Osvrald 
Mosley indefinitely to get away with the slogan 
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'Britain First' as though that is the sum 
total of all political wisdom and the excuse 
for every kind of social disorder. 
13 
As far as actual public processions were concerned, it is 19th Centur7 
legislaticn that one must turn to again. In 1847 the Town Police 
Clauses Act was passed, 
14 
which initially only applied to towns 
where it was incorporated in a local act. However, the sections which 
are of relevance here, (ss 21-29) were applied to all boroughs and 
urban districts by the Pablic Health Act of 1875. It is useful to 
quote the relevant passage here. 
Section 21. (relating to powers to make orders for 
preventing obstruction in the streets during public 
processions etc. ) The commissioners may from time 
to time make orders for the route to be observed by 
all carts, carriages, horses and persons and for 
preventing obstruction of the streets, within the 
limits of the special Act, in all times of public 
processions, rejoicings or illuminationsp and in 
any case where the streets are thronged or liable 
to be obstructed, and may also give directions to 
the constables for keeping order and preventing any 
obstruction of the streets in the neighbourhood of 
theatres and other places of public resort, and 
evex7 wilful breach of any such order shall be 
deemed a sepnLrate offence against this Actq and 
every person committing any such offence shall be 
liable to a penalty not exceeding forty shillings. 
Section 28. Every person who publicly offers for 
sale or distribution, or exhibits to public view 
323 
any profane, indecentt or obscene booký paper, 
printq drawing or representation or sings any 
profane or obscene song or ballaki, or uses any 
profane or obscene language ... 
15 
It was certainly not unusual for this act to be inv6ked for public 
processions. Usually processions of a religious nature were involved. 
What we do know for certain is that this act was not used, when it 
might properly have been, against the B. U. F. For example, the B. U. P. 
in Manchester deliberately marched through the poorer Jewish area 
of Cheetham Hill in a provocative manner. i. e. wearing uniforms and 
acting in a hostile manner towards the local community. The words 
underlined here are important, for it was deliberate provouation 
that was the central issue in the case of Beatty v Gillbankso 
16 
In 1881 William Beatty, a Captain and leader of the Salvation Army, 
marched some of his followers in formationg headed by a band together 
with flags and banners, through the streets of Weston-super-Mare. 
The Salvation Army was often opposed by an organised band of people 
called 'The Skeleton Army' and sometims fights broke outo In one 
particular incident a 'disorderly and riotous mob' of over 2000 people 
had gathered and fighting and stone throwing broke out, The police were 
overpowered, but after reinforcements arrived the crowd was dispersed. 
None of the members of the Salvation Army, including Beatty, were 
seen to commit any overt act of violence. A notice was served on 
Beatty and copies of the notice posted in the town, to the effect 
that no assemblies of people were to be held that could lead to a 
34 
disturbance of the peace. The Salvation Army ignored this notice and 
held another processiong which also provoked opposition. The police 
then intervenedp though they acknowledged that the Salvation Army 
had not committed any overt act of violence. Beatty, together with 
others, were bound over to keep the peace for twelve months. Beatty 
appealed against this decision and won. In awarding judgement for 
the. appellants however, Justice Field said: 
I entirely concede that everyone must be taken 
to intend the natural consequences of his own 
acts, and it is clear to me that if this 
disturbance of the peace was the natural consequence 
of acts of the appellants they would be liable, 
and the justices of the peace would have been right 
in binding them over ... a man may be convicted for 
doing a lawful act if he knows that his doing it 
may cause another to do an unlawful act. 
17 
The case of Beatty v Gillbanks is important here because it relates 
to the case of Wise v Dunning of 19029 
18 
an appeal against a 
decision in which a Protestant lecturer and Pastor in Liverpool was 
bound over to be of good behaviour after holding meetings in Catholic 
areas in Liverpool, and making speeches which were found to be 
offensive to the large numbers of Catholics in the city. Lord Alver6tonq 
one of the appeal judges, in deciding that the magistrates had acted 
correctly, quoted from Justice Fields remark in the case of Beatty 
v Gillbanks. Lord Alverston also quoted from Reg. v Justices of Cork. 
19 
and Regg. v Justices of Londonderry. 
20 in order to bmke the point 
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that in different cases, before different judges, the 'essential 
condition' had been stated, "That there must be an act of the 
defendant, the natural consequences of which, if his act not be 
unlawful in itself, would be to produce an unlawful act by other 
persons. " 
Another casep which the judge did not refer to, was that of McAva 
v Magistrates of Edinburgh (1913) S. C. 10739 the result of which 
has been put very succinctly by Joseph Baker. 
There are certain districts in certain Cities in 
which a large majority of the population belong 
to a certain race, or hold a certain creed or faith, 
and if a person holding other views, goes there to 
promulgate his opinions as regards that race, creed 
or faith, although he has a perfect right to hold 
those opinionsp and although in a proper place he 
has a right to express them, his doing so in that 
jaarticular neighbourhood would certainly lead to 
a breach of the peace. In such a case, if a man 
took up his stand and began to discourse on such lines, 
the police would be entitled at once to move him one 
21 
Although there was a local act in force in Liverpool, the Liverpool 
Improvement Act of 1842, which dealt with Ithreatenedg abusivep and 
insulting words and behaviour whereby a breach of the peace might 
be occasioned' this local act was not invoked or mentioned by the 
local magistratesq and the Appeal Judges in the Wise v Dunning case, 
although noting its existencep did not find good reason for the 
3i6 
appellant to be charged under the act. 
In July 1936, Mr Dingle Footq in another Commons Supply Debate, 
referred to the case of Wise v Dunning and drew a comparison between 
that case and problems arising from 11 ... anti-Jewish speakers holding 
meetings in the East End of London, largely populated by Jews. " He 
expressed the hope that the authorities would make full use of the 
powers which it clearly possessed in that type of provocation. 
23 In 
the same debate, Mr Herbert, M, P*, who was a qualified solicitor, 
referred to the 1839 judgement in the case of Regina v Vincent 
regarding unlawful assembly. Using references from Kenny's Outlines 
of Criminal Law he showed that the case covered public meetings, 
military style of formation and the possession of offensive weapons, 
Herbert was aware that Regina v Vincent might be referred to as a 
fmisleading case' but told the House that he was sure of his ground. 
In any case, he reminded the House, he had taken a First Class in 
the Honour School of Jurisprudence at Oxford. 
23 
Herbert went on to refer, obliquely, to the recent case at Oxfordy 
where a B. U. F. meeting had been broken up and several people injuredv 
and wondered 
Whether there is not some way by which the 
existing law of the land can be applied, in 
proper and legitimate fashion, not to the 
subordinates of this leader (Mosley)q but to 
the leader himself, so we know whethery by 
training these young men to do these thingsq 
i 
3i7 
he has laid himself open to the charge of 
committing the indictable misdemeanour of 
causing an unlawful assembly or creating an 
illegal conspiracy. 
24 
Herbert ended by saying that the Debate was about the administration 
of justice and the proper enforcement of the law* 
Another point raised in the same Debate concerned what had come to 
be known as the 'Trenchard Ban'. In 1931 the Commidsioner of Police, 
Lord Trenchard, acting under the powers of the Metropolitan Police Act. 
of 1839,25 had banned public meetings outside Labour . 
Sxchanges. The 
Commissioner was able to give directions under the Act to police 
constables, without the direction being made public. Here was-a clear 
example of the willingness of the authorities to use legislation 
(in this case against unemployed people) in order to preserve public 
order when they thought the circumstances required it. 
Use was made of existing legislation to deal with disorder at publio 
meetings in two important cases which came before the appeal judges in 
the 1930ts, The first concerns the organising of public meetings by 
members of the Communist Party in Wales in 1934, The case went to 
appeal and in Thomas v Sawkins 
26 it was decided that the police had 
the right to enter a public meetingv even if it was against the wishes 
of the organiserz of the meeting. When the case went before the local 
magistrates court the justices decided that if the police were not 
present at the meeting in question (which was called to protest against 
the Incitement to Di. safection Bill and to demand the dismissal of the 
3e8 
Chief Constable of the County of Glamorgan) there would be seditious 
speeches and other incitements to violence, and breaches of the peace 
would occur. It was decided that the police were entitled to enter 
and remain in the hall for the meeting. 
In dismissing the appeal, Chief Justice Lord HewartP quoting from 
various previous judgements, said: 
I think that there is quite sufficient ground 
for the proposition that it is part of the 
preventive power and therefore, part of the 
preventive duty, of the police in cases where 
there are-. such reasonable grounds of apprehension 
as the justices have found here, to enter and 
remain on private premises. It goes without 
saying that ýhe powers and duties of the police 
are directed, not to the interests of the-policeg 
but to the protection and welfare of the public. 
27 
Sir Horace Edmund'Avory, another of the appeal judges, commented 
that "In my opinion, no express statutory authority is necessary 
where the police have reasonable grounds to apprehend a breach of the 
peace ... 11 
28 
On March 12th 19339 as we have seeng the police entered a M. P. 
meeting at the Free Trade Hall, Manchester, after disorder had broken 
out. The police ordered the Fascist Defence Force out of the hall 
and Mosley followed them. 29 Mosley prevented the police from entering 
any of his meetings in the hall for over a year after that incident. 
30 
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One may only speculate why it was a case against Communists in which 
the law regarding the right of police to enter meetings was clearly 
definedq when Mosley had stopped police entering his meetings for 
some considerable time previous to the Thomas v Sawkins decision, 
meetings at which there were 'reasonable grounds of apprehension'. 
In any case, we have already seen that Mosley could keep within the 
bounds of law and yet still be prosecuted if it could be shown that 
he had reasonable grounds to assume that his lawful actions would 
cause others to commit unlawful acts. This certainly occurred at many 
of Mosley's meetings. 
The second case which reached the appeal courts in the 1930's was 
that of Duncan v Jones. 
31 Mrs 'Katherine Duncan held a meeting near 
to the entrance of an unemployed training centre in May 1933. The 
meeting was apparently connected with the National Unemployed Workers 
Movement, and on the same day, after the meeting, there was a 
disturbance inside the centre. The superintendL-nt of the centre 
linked the meeting with the disturbance and when Duncan tried to hold 
another meeting in the same place, she was st6pped by the police. In 
the following year Duncan again held a meeting outside the centre, to 
defend the right of free speech and public meetings. When she refused 
to move to a site 175 yards away, the police arrested her. 
32 
Duncan appealed to the Quarter Sessions, where it was found that 
a) she must have known of the probable consequences of holding the 
meeting; b) the respondent reasonably apprehended a breach of the 
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peace; c) it became his duty to prevent the holding of the meeting; 
d) by attempting to hold the meeting, Duncan obstructed the respondent 
when in the execution of his duty. 
It is perhaps interesting to note that Dingle Foot and D, N. Pritt 
acted for Duncan in her appeal, both of whom made repeated attempts 
in the House of Commons to draw to the attention of the Home Secretary 
the fact that existing legislation was being ignored in relation to 
the. B. U. F. 
Lord Hewart, dismissing the case in the Appeal Court, referred to 
the "somewhat unsatisfactory" case of, Beatty v Gillbanks and that 
although Pritt and Foot tried to draw conclusions from the case, he 
considered it to be of no relevence, and that a causal connection was 
clearly indicated between the meeting of May 1933 and subsequent 
disturbances. 
There were many occasions when the M. P. meetings held on street 
cornersp or on waste ground or common land provoked general disorder* 
Some examples, particularly in the Manchester areajýhave already 
been provided. In no case was the ruling in the case of Duncan v Jones 
used against any member of the M. P. 
Finally, mention must be made of the 1908 Public Meetings Act which 
did not refer to the holding of public meetings as such, but rather 
disruptions caused at public meetings. The relavent passage from this 
Act states that: 
331 
Any person who at a lawful public meeting 
acts in a disorderly manner for the purpose 
of preventing the transaction of the business 
for which the meeting was called together shall 
be guilty of an offence ... and shall, on summary 
conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding 
Z5, or to imprisonment not exceeding one month. 
Any person who incites others to to 
an offence shall be guilty of a like offence. 
33 
The Times newspaper, shortly after the disturbances at the Olympia 
meeting in June 1934, commented: 
There is a widespread feeling that the police 
authorities in London are neglecting the powers 
of preserving the peace embodied in the Public 
Meetings Act of 1908, which, it is recalled, were 
effectively invoked by the Manchester authorities 
in circumstances similar to those prevailing at 
Olympia on Thursday evening* 
34 
However, this negligence on the part of the police authorities did 
not extend to the activities of anti-Fascist groups. In September 
1934 the editors of the DailX Worker were summonsed under the 1908 
Public Meetings Aotq after an article appeared in the paper with the 
heading "Deliver the death-blow to Fascism in Britain: Communist 
Partyls stirring call to action". The article referred to the proposed 
Fascist meeting in Hyde Park on September 9th and continued: 
The whole force of the Communist Party in London 
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will be thrown ... into the task of bringing 
the tens of thousands of London's working class 
out on to the streets and into Hyde Park in 
such numbers and with such determination that 
there shall be no room in Hyde Park for Mosley's 
blackshirted hooligans nor toleration for the 
Governmentts increasing drive towards Fascism4"135 
The summonses were dismissed. 
From this brief survey of statute and case law, the following 
points emerge. It was illegal to hold meetings for the purpose of 
military training and zExercise. The police had the power to control 
the routes etc, of public processions and any obstructions caused by 
public processions could be dealt with, The use of profane or obscene 
language was illegal and such language could include making speeches 
that were calculated to offend people nearby. In breaches of the peace, 
everyone must be taken to intend the natural consequences of their 
own acts. A person could be charged if that persor? s actiong even if 
lawful in itself, produced an unlawful act by other persons. In the 
I letropolitan area, the Commissioner of Police had the power to,. ban 
public meetings and in all areas the police had the right to enter 
any public meetings, even if it was against the widhes of the 
organisers of the meeting. Disruptions at public meetingsp caused with 
the intention of halting the proceedings of the meeting were illegalg 
as were incitements to others to stop meetings, This survey does not 
include local a; Lthority acts which may have increased the powers of 
the'police in local areas, though of course reference has been made 
to the Liverpool Improvement Act of 1882. 
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In any caseq it was apparent that in practice, no statutp37 
authority was necessary to allow the police, with reasonable grounds, 
to prevent breaches of the peice (Thomas v Sawkins). This point was 
emphasised by the Home Secretary in March 1935, when the police did 
interveneý not against the B. U. F. but against their opponents. Anti- 
Fascist marchers attempted to walk from Hyde Park Corner to the 
Albert Ballq where the B. U. F. waaL. holding a large meeting. The 
Commissioner of Police, with the approval of the Home Secretary, 
stated that there was no statute under which the orders were given, 
rather it was a matter of judgement and common sense. 
36 
It would seem that the authorities were not only prepared to make 
use of existing legislation regarding public order when it suited 
them, as in the case of the 'Trenchard Ban' or the use of the 1908 
Public Meetings Act against the Daily Work2r., but were prepared to go 
one step further and rely on nothing more than 'judgement and common 
sense' when they thought that circumstances required it* Where, one 
may askq was the judgement and commonsense of the authorities when it 
came to the provocative Fascist anti-Semitic campaigns in Jewish 
districts? 
It was not merely the fact that M. P. 's were aware of the existence 
of adequate legislation. The government itself acknowledged that 
the authorities had enough power at their disposal to deal with some 
aspects at least of public unrest. In May 19369 the Secretary of 
State for Scotland said that further powers were not necessary to 
deal with the problem of Fascists from different parts of the country 
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grouping together for the purpose of a mass meeting, when there was 
a possibility of a breach of the peace oocurring. 
37 Such breaches 
of the peace did occur because of those very reasons, and by 1936 
the authoritiesq whether town or city councils, or the police 
themselvesq should have had enough experience of Fascists grouping 
together for large meetings. Yet no action was taken. 
The Manchester Guardian was one of the leading campaigners against 
the introduction of new legislation. Following the 1934 Olympia 
meetingg the paper reminded B. U. P. members who attended the meeting 
that existing law provided full powers to deal with wilful disturbance 
at public meetings, 
38 In August the same year the paper commenýed 
that: 
Those of us who live in cities where the police 
carry out their duties with tact and tolerance 
have not noticed any partic-41ar need. for increasing 
their power to ban meetings, to control processionsp 
or to prevent centralised demonstrations... we do 
not want another Sedition Bill full of unknown 
terrors. 39 
Even when the Pablic Order Bill was introduced into parliamentg the 
Manchester Guardian was quick to point out that 11 ... we must be 
careful not to make it too easy for the police to prohibit public 
meetings in advance ... on thu whole it would seem that the less 
drastic the Bill is the better. The Fascist menace is not so bad 
that we need to make fundt6mental changes in the law, although we 
I 
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need to make it more quickly responsive.,, 
40 
A more strident criticism came from the anti-Fascists in Manchester. 
When the Noithern Council Against Fascism met in conference at Caxton 
I 
Hall, Salford, the following statement was issued& 
The Northern Council Against Fascism has taken 
an active part in arousing public opinion, and 
the Watch Committee of the Manchester City Council 
was the first public body to send a deputation to 
the Home Office on this question. But the Bill so 
drafted cannot meet with the approval of the 
defenders of democracy, for though it makes provision 
for the banning of uniforms and private armies, it 
also contains provisions which carry still further 
the invasion of democratic rights and peTsonal 
liberties already commenced in such acts as the 
Sedition Act. The law officers of a pre-Fascist 
goverment are provided for the first time with a 
legal excuse for abolishing all progressive political 
organisations and confiscating their funds. For the 
first time for 100 years a free hand is to be given 
to the political agent provocatiste! And at the same 
time the organisers of Fascist meetings are to be supplied 
by the police with the names and addresses of all those 
who may venture to express their dissent from the 
brutal tenets of Fascism. The only legislative need 
at the moment id for the prohibition of political 
uniforms. It is therefore necessary that most serious 
consideration be given to, the Public Order Billp and 
that a strong fight be organised against the increasing 
forces that are menacing the traditional liberty of 
'41 the British subject, 
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The National Council for Civil Liberties adopted a similar critical 
approach. Representatives of the Council were present at the meeting 
in Caxton Hall and supported the statement issued by the Northern 
Council. 42 
Attention focuses on the North of England, and on Manchester in 
particular, as the centre of action between the B. U. P. and their 
opponents on the one hand, and the authorities - the police, the city 
council, the watch committee etc. - on the other. It was in 
Manchester that the B. U. P. first came up against decisions made 
by the various bodies which curtailed thoir activities in such a way 
that, if the same attitudes had been adopted in other parts of the 
countryl notably the East End of London, much of the subsequent 
conflict could have been avoided. 
The first incident, in which the police, in this case, took a tough 
line, was one of the first mass indoor meetings that Mosley held. 
The venue was the Free Tradd Hall in Manchester on March 12th 1933. On 
that occasion, as we have seen, violence broke out after a member of the 
audience attempted to ask a question. The police, under the direction of 
Police Ispector Garner, did not hesitate to enter the hall and move 
the Fascists up the centre gangway. The Fascist Defence Force was asked 
to, leave. Inspector Garner told Mosley that the police and not the 
Defence Force would keep the Fascists safe. However, Mosley decided 
that he, too, would follow the Defence Forceg saying: 
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The trouble here tonight (a voice 11 was pieces 
of rubber truncheons") - was a small highly 
organised gang of Communists (boos). The police 
have not removed the Communists, but the Fascists, 
who have preserved order at three or four 
hundred meetings (a voice "with rubber"). When 
my men are ordered to leave, I leave also, thank 
you,,, 
43 
Following this conflict, Mosley refused to have the police watch over 
B. U. P. meetings in the building for over a year afterwards. 
One'of the main problems the authorities were faced, with in dealing 
with public disorder was that, in dealing with problems of public order 
connected with one particular factionp say the B. U. F. 9 they might 
also find themselves limiting the freedom of movement or speeoh-k 
etc. of otherg more innocent, political facticns. If the B. U. F. was 
to be banned from using public hallst was this ban to include other 
political groups? If marches were bannedt was the ban to 
include 
groups other than those which the bans were originally 
intended to 
operate against? Usually commonsense prevailed in Manchesterp 
as was 
the case in May 1934v when the MancIrster Watch Committee 
refused an 
application by the B. U. F. to hold a procession in 
the city on the 
same day as the proposed annual Labour 
May Day demonstration. The 
Watch Committee authorised the Labour demonstration 
because it was an 
annual tradition. The same committee 
banned a B-U-F- march 
because it 
realised that a Fascist demonstration 
in the vicinity on 
the same 
day would give rise to a great deal of provocation- 
44 11oweverv when 
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a general ban on all marches or demonstrations was imposed, it coiild 
be the case that groups whose activities would not normally lead to 
public disorder were affected, 
We have already referred in some detail jro the case in. which a ban 
was placed on all Political processions in Manchester on Saturday 
September 30th 1934, on which date the B. U. F. had arranged a rally 
at Belle Vue, Manchester. 
45 The B. U. F. rally itself was only allowed 
to be held because of the intervention of the Home Secretary, Sir 
John Gilmour. The Manchester Watch Committee had unanimously decided 
that the people who convened the meeting should pay for whatever 
police protection was required. Neither the B. U. F. nor the Belle Vue 
authorities were prepared to accept such conditions and it looked 
as though the rally would not be held. However, the Home Secretary 
decided that the bill for police protection should be borne by the 
public, i. e. the Manchester ratepayers. 
It was at this point that the Chief Constable of Manchester decided to 
ban all political processions on the day of the B. U. F. rally. It 
was obvious that this would affect the anti-Pasoists more than anyone 
else, since the B. U. F. had no plans for a procession. 
46 Efforts were 
made to have the ban on political processions lifted and, as we have 
seen, various deputations were made to the Home Office. 
47 It is 
useful to quote from the leader column of the Manchester Guardian to 
illustrate what contemporary opinion had to say regarding the march 
ban* 
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it may be wondered why the police should object 
to a peaceful procession. There can only be one 
reasonable explanationg although one is left to 
guess it. It is that t1je fascists wished to march 
through the streets to Belle Vue and that, having 
put a prohibition on them, the Chief Constable 
thought it only fair to impose a similar 
prohibition on their opponents. There would be this 
difference between the two processions, however. 
One would be a military display, a provocation and 
an incitement to order. The other would be an ordinary 
procession, almost as innocuous as a Sunday-school 
'walk'. 
... If the Fascists are not to march in the streets, 
are they to be allowed to march and parade (under 
police protection) in the Belle Vue grounds? And if 
they are, wilL ft be open to anti-fascists to pay 
their shillings and claim a right to perform (under 
the same police protection) similar evolutions?... 
Are the anti-fascists to be allowed to march to Platt 
Fields on October 21st? Or does it require only an 
intimation by the fascists that they also wish to 
demonstrate that day, to have both processions 
prohibited? Some elucidation of the legal position 
is also desirable. The Chief Constable is understood 
to be acting under his undoubted powers to prevent 
obstruction of the streets. If this is good enough 
ground in the present caset and, if it is, how many 
processions now held would pass the test? 
48 
As we have seen, the ban on processions was defied and various anti- 
Fascist groups went ahead with their planned march. The Belle Vue' 
episode showed that the Watch Committee was willing to take action 
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in advance of meetings and demonstrations in order to prevent event s 
escalating into displays of violence and intimidation. Hawever, the 
policeg in their belief that they were being even-handed in their 
treatment of Fascists and anti, '-Fascists, restricted the legitimate 
and unprovocative actions of other political groups. The police 
continued to adhere to their belief in impartiality without stopping 
to think about the basic cause of civil disruption, i. e. Fascist 
provocation. For example, one significant result of the disruptions 
at M. P. meetings was the police attendance at the meetings of other 
political groups and parties. As a result of the disturbances at 
Hulme Town Hall on June 27th 1936, described in Chapter five by 
Nellie Drivert the police kept surveillance on Labour Party meetings 
in the city. A complaint was made by a city councillor at the monthly 
meeting of the Manchester Borough Labour Party in July, who said that 
a policeman had been present at each of the usual open-air Labour 
meetings in the area and had asked the chairman and each of the 
speakers to give his name and address before speaking and had 
insi I sted on the meeting being closed by 9.30 pm- 
49 The question of 
such police action was raised in Parliament by Mr Rhys Davies, one of 
the Manchester M. P. 1s, who said that: 
I am not as critical of the police, as some people 
are, but I want to make it perfectly clear that 
we shall be very apprehensive if the police pursue 
that course throughout the country, and I should 
regard it as an offence to our intelligencep and 
as a serious blow to our liberties, if the police 
throughout the country took the names and addresses 
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of everyone speaking at an open-air gathering, 
unless of course it were in a place where such 
gatherings were prohibited. 
50 
It will be shown later that when the Public Order Bill became law 
the police immediately contacted left wing political groups whom the 
police considered were making use of 'political uniforms', though 
in fact were not, and suggested that they cease forthwith. Many civic 
authorities - local counoils and watch committees - could clearly 
discern the nature of Fascist violence and provocation and decided to 
deal with it not, as the police did, with blanket restrictions ard 
surveillance, but quite simply by placing restrictions on the Fascists. 
We have seen that, as early as the end of 1934, the B. U. F. was being 
A case which seems to have escaped the attention of historians 
scrutinising the Metropolitan Police files for the period is of 
interest here. A resident of Hampstead, London, complained to the 
police about two B. U. F. members marching in military formation with 
what looked like rifles. (This was after the passing of the Public 
Order Act). The police suggested to the man who complained that the 
Fascists were probably Iskylarking'. The police did follow up the 
case - but not against the Fascists. The police inspector who 
interviewed the man said "I judged during my conversation with him that 
he holds strorganti-Fascist views"q and the man was reported to the 
Special Branch with the suggestion-that his address might be useful. 
51 
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affected by the refusal of some local authorities to allow public 
halls to be used for Fascist meetings. Very quickly this ploy was 
adopted by local authorities up and down the country, and by 1936 
had developed into a steady flow of decisions against the B. U. F. In 
January 1936 the B. U. F. was refused permission to use the town hall 
in BirminghaM52 and in the same month magistrates in Carlisle refused 
an application for an occasional licence to enable the B. U. F. to hold 
a meeting in a local theatre. 
53 Mosley was to have spoken at both 
meetings. Macclesfield Finance Committee adopted a similar policy. 
54 
A month later Bridlington Town Council reaffirmed a previously taken 
decision not to allow the B. U. F. to use any public hall in the town. 
55 
At the same time pressure from the local Labour movement resulted 
in Oxford City Council refusing the Oxford University Fascist 
Association permission to use the Town Hall for a meeting to be 
addressed by Mosley. 
56 A week later Rotherham Town Council adopted 
a similar policy. 
57 Hull City Council did the same in April 1936 and 
instructed the Town Clerk to refuse all future applications from 
Fascists for the use of halls. 
58 
However it was to Manchester that other local authorities began to 
look for a lead in dealing with the B. U. P., since it was Manchester 
that had first taken the step of prohibitihg Fascist political 
uniforms. Actually the first decision of this sort, already referred 
to in Chapter five, was taken by Swinton and Pendlebury Council in 
January 1935. It is possible that this decision of a neighbouring 
council had some influence on the later decision taken by Manchester 
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Watch Committee. At the beginning of July 1936 the Mnchester 
Headquarters of the B. U. F. applied for permission to hold a meeting 
on Albert Croft, Queens Road. This application was successful but 
the Fascists were told that they would not be allowed to march in 
uniform. At the same meeting of the Watch Committee it was decided to 
send a deputation to meet the Home Seoretary with the object of 
pressing for legislation prohibiting uniformed political prooessions. 
59 
The local B. U. F. 9 as was to be expected, had something to say on the 
matters 
It is stated in the press that the denial to our 
or isation of the right of procession to a 
meeting which accorded to other parties is 
based on the fact that we wear uniforms. In order 
to test whether the Watch Committee is animated 
by a genuine objection to political uniforms or 
by political prejudice against Fascism. (The M. P. ) 
now make application for per-mission for a march of 
our members to the meeting in, their everyday 
clothes. They will, of course, be accompanied by 
bands and banners, which have also been used by 
Socialist processions through Manchester and other 
cities, 
60 
However, the National Headquarters of the B. U. F. was also concerned 
at the ban, which prompted a press statement from Neil Francis-Hawkins: 
The B. U. P. has decided to call the bluff of the 
Watch Committee. If they ban the march in plain 
clothes they are refusing the Fascists exactly 
the same rights that they have accorded to the 
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Socialistsq and thereby will be clearly 
convicted of political prejudice. 
61 
The Fascists did apply for permission to march in plain clothes and 
this request was granted at a special meeting of the Watch Committee 
held on July 16th. However, the ban on uniforms did little to reduce 
the temperature surrounding the march and subsequent meeting. Over 
5,000 people, #almost entirely hostile' gathered at Albert Croft to 
meet the marching Fascists. 
62 
Aw-&, c later Hull City Council followed 
Manchester's example and prohibited Fascists attending meetings in 
uniform. 
63 
The decision taken in July to ban political uniforms seemed to have 
been overshadowed by the similar decision taken in October of the 
same year. The reason why the latter decision, described as "a lead 
which would probably be followed by local authorities throughout the 
country? 
64 
was considered to be such a breakthrough was that it was 
reached at the same time as the Public Order Bill was being introduced 
into parliament. The political temperature was much greater than in 
the previous July. The October decision was reached after the B. U. P. 
had applied to hold an open-air meeting in St Georges' Park, Hulme. 
65 
The decision was said to have been reached "with acclamation" by all 
political parties on the city council. 
66 
The actual meeting passed 
off peacefully. 
67 
The reaction of other local authorities was overwhelmingly in favour 
of othe action taken by Manchester. Although the chairman of Leeds 
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Watch Committee, Alderman Rowland Winn, thought that it should be 
left to the government to give a lead on the question of political 
uniforms - "It is not our intention to follow the example of 
Manchester, or to interfere with the Fascists unless we have reason 
to believe that they are deliberately creating a disturbance of the 
peace" 
68 
_ Leeds did in fact ban political uniforms the following 
m onth. 
69 
Cardiff City Coincil voted the following week to ban Fascist 
uniformsq and it was clear to the Cardiff councillors that they were 
following Nanchester's lead. 70 The same week the Proctors: ofC 
Cambridge University banned the wearing of uniforms at the Cambridge 
University Fascist Society dinner, 71 as did Pontrefact Corporatiorý 
for Fascist meetings in public halls, 
72 
and a sub-committee of the 
London Education Committee stopped the B. U. P. from using Hoxton 
School in Shoreditch. 73 
It has already been siggested that local authorities, in restricting 
the use of public halls for Fascist meetings, and preventing Fascists 
from wearing political uniforms, were acting in anticipation of the 
passing into law of the Public Order Bill. However the Pablio Order 
Bill was not yet law, The legal situation had not changed at all, yet 
local authorities were now dealing with the Fascists menace. More 
importantly, they were dealing with it in a way which was far more 
preferable to the w4y in which the Public Order Act would deal with 
public disorder. The local -Mhorities were placing restrictions only 
on'those people who were the basic cause of public unrest - the 
Fascistsp whereas the Public Order Act imposed blanket restrictions 
on the Fascists and their opponents. Even before the Pablio Order Act 
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became law the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police wrote on 
December 24th 1936 to the organiser of the I-L. P "' Guild of Youthi 
warning that the organisation could be prosecuted once the Let came 
into force. 
74 Fenner Brockway, Secretary of the I. L. P. 9 provided 
the only reply possibles 
I have received your letter addressed to our 
organiser of the Independent Labour Party Guild 
of youth. I am conveying its contents to the 
branches of our party and of our Guild of Youth, 
but I wish to take this opportunity of informing 
you that the red shirts and red blouses which are 
worn by the members of our Guild are in no sense 
a military uniform. They are worn mostly on 
rambles, for sport purposes, and on week-end 
outings. Me members of the Guild of Youth do 
not drill or carry through any physical exercises 
similar to those practiced by the Fascists. I am 
taking up this matter with the Home Secretary 
through Mr. James Maxtonp K. p. 75 
Simil&rly, as we have seen in Chapter three, the Italian school 
children in Manchester had to remove their 'political uniforms' and 
adopt a different style of jersey. The result of the Public Order 
Act was a general restriction on political activityq When marches 
were banned, the ban applied to everyone , not only to the people 
the ban was originally meant to affect. We have seen that the Public 
Order Act was not necessary in a strictly legal sense. There were 
already enough powers at the disposal of the state to cope with 
the public disorder created by the B. U. F. However the Act 
0 
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was necessary in the sense that if the state had used the full force 
of the available legislation against the B. U. F. it would have raised 
fundamental questions about the position of the state in relation 
to right wing groups which, of course, were and are seen as much 
-lesscfathreat to the interests of the state than left wing political 
groups* 
We return here to a theme developed in Chapter one, which is that 
Western democracy id attuned to many of the demands that Fascism 
makes. Mosley was too impatient and his methods were suspect. However 
when the state did act it brought in new legislation uhich only 
placed limitations on the public display of political beliefs, In 
this way a piece of 'blanket! legislation affected the left as well' 
as the right. The state did not legislate against the specific details 
of M. P. propoZanda which gave rise to public disorder on the 
streets of Britaint though it did concern itself, through surveillance 
of left wing groups, with specific policies of, sayp the Communist 
Partyq or the N. U. W. M. If the B. U. F. had been seen as a threat to 
the interests of the state then it would have received the same 
treatment as sections of the Labour movement. Existing law would have 
been ruthlessly applied and any new legislation would have dealt with 
the specific policies of the movement. The B. U. F. was a threatv but 
only in the sense that public order had to be preserved. The way to 
public order was to ban political uniforms and to control demonstrations. 
We have seen that these restric#ons did not deal the death blow to 
the B. U. F. It was not Fascism that was being legislated againstp but 
public disorder. 
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To conclude, it has been shown that the B. U. F. attracted the support 
of different sorts of people from different class backgrounds* The 
heterogeneous membership of the B-U-F. reflected tIn contradictions 
in capitalist society aý large. Similarly the different layers of 
ideology of the B. U. P. also related to those contradictions* When 
the state finally legislated against the M. P. it did so in an 
ambiguous way which exposed the contradictory nature of law making 
agencies in tIm state. In all these aspects of Fascism in the 1930's 
the history of the M. P. in the North of England provides an insight 
which hbp es6aped the attention of historians of British Fascism. 
Perhaps more detailed analysis of provincial right wing movements 
may now be undertaken by historians in order to further uncover 
the contradictions inherent in the conservative authoritarian state* 
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R! 111 1! )(1 it N, a, ila, I Palty that was iresponsdde foi the Means Test. 
P)JJ. ý1, ý! ý 1ý, ',,, r Ill, - w1y ii -, t %s hik h is a job at a decent wage. 
Y''urs faithfully, 
BERNARD TALBOT, 
British Union Candidate. 
T., ý 1, p, ., iAc, t, -r. 3. 
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APPENDIX B 
Anti-Semitic Cartoons 
Published ýZ the B. U. P. for internal 
circulation. 1937. 
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"THE NERVE OF THE WORKERS, 
-WITH OUR LOAD IT'S WE WHO 
SHOULD DO THE SWEATING" 
-i cl 
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APPENDIX C 
Correspondence from members of 
the B. U. P. 
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UNION 
40M 
OVEMENT 
DIRECTORY: 
E. J. HAMM (SECRETARY) 
S. BAILEY 
D. HARMSTON 
M. MOLONEY 
M. QUILL 
R. ROW 
r, S. J. P. avT. sley 
83 I. ewhey Roadq 
Yilnrow, 
RIDC-. -ID., -', L-lj- 
Lanes. 
: ". r. Rar. nsleyg 
76A ROCHESTER ROW 
LONDON, S. W. 1 
Telephone: 01-834 2500 
14th Septe-, mbur 1976. 
Durin, -,, a recent holiday in Blackpool I saw yotr letter re your 
Ph. D reseafch project and would be . glad to assist you. I am secretary of 
Sir dswald 
], *csley and of this movement, which he founded and led up to 1966; 1 -.. ras also a rember 
of the British Union of Fascists, in South '. *, '. --Ies Lnd in the Greater London area. 
I expect you will know that the definitive books on the subject 
of y-cur research are 1114y Life" by Sir Osv,, ald '.. Iosley and "Oswald 1.1osley" by Robert 
Skidelsky. Some of the critics found the latter too 
favourable but I would regard 
it as objective. We never object to hostile books but like to warn research studen*s, 
I as to take some of them with the proverbial pinch of salt. 
'., e have on occ ion checked 
the learned footnotes in some of them and discovered that the "original sources" do 
not exist at a119 or at leasiC, in the form quoted. 
If you feel I can assist you do Tlease write to r-e. ' 
Yours faithfully$ 
"r f G-ýd ý -1 1- 
ý : -) ý 
"No one connected with Union Movement Union Movement (Trustees) Ltd., or Union Movement Branches (Trustees) Ltd., has 
any power or authority to enter into any contract or engagement or incur any financial liability of whatsoever nature on behalf of 
the Movement or any Member thereof, or on behalf of either of the said companies save and except only such financial liability as 
Union Movement (Trustees) Ltd , and Union Movement Branches (Trusters) Ltd., may incur in their capacity as Trustees for the property of the Headquarters and Districts of the Movements respectivly by writing under the hands of any two Directors of 
either of such respective Companies. , 
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SANCTUARY PRESS LTD., 
Publishers of 
ACTION 
Incorporating Union 
Price 90 
Directors: E. J. Hamm 
R. Row 
Dear Ur Plamsley, 
76A ROCHESTER ROW 
LONDON, S. W. 1 
Telephone: 01-83412500 
30: 8: 78 
Men you were here last week you said you would 
like photocopie's of pre-r-ax BUF cotton pamphlets, which I have pleasure, 
in enclosing. Though no dates are'printed on'either, I think that 
"Votton, India and You" came out fairly early, ' and Raven Thomson's 
"Cotton" must have been published around 1937. The reason for saying 
that is the address of the old Lancaster branch shom with others at 
the and. The branch moved from Church Street to China'Street some time 
in 1937, as f ar as I can remember* 
Sorry that the front cover of "Cotton" lool-o rathor 
blurred: this is because it is coloured redt and also right at /the end 
where the Lancashire branches are listed. 
Reading through Raven Thomson's pamphlet aCain,, I 
=st say he was rather optimistic in thinking that the Indian millomers 
could1have footed the bill of re-housino the thousands of Indian cotton 
workers; even all the millions of the Birla family would not havo been 
enough for that! However, they certainly should have coughed up a good 
sumt having made their millions out of the smatshops. In the event, 
had our policy been carried through in India,, in all probability it would 
have been run on a national scale with the Dirlas and other fat cats 
chipping in considerably. Nevertheless,, the, Indian workers would have been 
re-houced in decent conditions:. Mosley-was determined about that after 
seeing the Indian industrial slýms on his tour of India with Ramsay 
L-lacDonald during his Labour Party days. 
I hope all this helps you regarding the general 
pre-war 1,111ovement in'Lancashire. The statistics alone are intoresting. 
Kind reeards, 
APPENDIX D 
Letter from Mr G. V. WhittenhEZ 
Member of the Manchester Co-ordinating 
Committee Against Pascism. 
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Brighton 313L 21 Coombe Riseq 
Saltdean, 
Brighton B32 8QI, ' 
26th March- 1977 
Mr. S. J. Rawnsley, 
Postgraduate School)of Studies in Sooial Science. s,, 
University of Bradforap 
Bradfordp 
Wesb- Yorkshire BD7 IDP- 
Dear 1-11r. Rawnsley, 
Your letýer to Mr. Reuben Falber was forwarded 
to me. I must apologise for the delay in writing to you, 
but in recent weeks I have been very. pre-occupied with 
some urgent matters. 
As you will undersiandg it is not easy to recall 
the events of over forty, years ago. I do not remember 
being secretary of a 'North 141anchester Co-ýcrdinaýing 
Committee against Fascism (I lived in South Manchester) 
but I was an active member of "i Manchester Co-Ordinating 
Committee against Fascism during the middle 1930n, 
The only important event of vhich I have clear 
memories was the visit of Oswald Mosjýey to 31.4anchester 
I think in 1935- The British Union of Fascists held 
a meeting in Belle Vue Gardensy preceded by a marchq all 
in a very military style with unifcrms. The anti-fascist 
movement organised a counter-demonstration, which was 
officially banned by the Manchester Chief Constablev I 
was sent by the Co-crdinating Committee first cn a 
deputation to the Chief Constable, and'then to the 
Home Office in London in an attempt to get the ban 
lifted. We were'supported by the labour. movement and 
also by the Manchester Guardian (as it was then named). 
In the visit to the Home Cffice I was accompanied by 
John Strachey, and Reginald Bridpeman (then secretary 6f 
the Leaeue against Imperialism)q both prominent in 
the anti-fascist moveýent at that time. Ne were interviewed 
by the Permanent Under-secretary for Home Affairs., I 
416 
remember that by a strange coincidence both the Chief, 
Consfable and the Underse6retary were named Maxwell! '. In 
the event the ban was notlcfficiallY lifted, but our 
counter-demonstration weni ahead and was not interfered with 
by the police perhaps as 4 result of our protests. 
At the*B. U. F. meetiýe in the Belle Vue Gardenrý the 
public attending appearee-tc be anti-fascist to a man 
and 'surrounded the blackshirts9who were in military 
formation. A strange feaiure was that standing beside 
Moctley during his speech was a police officer who--. I 
believe was the vexýr Chieý Constable I had met! I was 
certain of his identity at that time. He had a long 
police officer's staff which he kept pointing at the 
opposition for some reasoA..,, It was well known that the 
B. U. F. received strong police protection amounting 
sometimes to active help 
'at that time in its pu lic 
activities. I 
C, __t M., ý. vtp ý *-t a-. A,: -Q&. r I might mention that I was sent by the Manchester 
Co-drdinating Comzitteeoo a-conference in Paris in 
1933- I. enclcse a copy of a report which I wrote for 
the magazine of Manchester UniveiAty which micht be of 
interest to you alttough not relevarat to your enquiry 
about the M. F. 
Yours sincerely, 
G. Vf`W'fii t tenbury. 
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